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THE RACIAL JUSTICE ACT AND THE LONG
STRUGGLE WITH RACE AND THE DEATH
PENALTY IN NORTH CAROLINA*
SETH KOTCH & ROBERT P. MOSTELLER*
In August 2009, the North Carolina General Assembly enacted
the Racial Justice Act ("RJA "), which commands that no person
shall be executed "pursuant to any judgment that was sought or
obtained on the basis of race." One of the most significant
features of the RJA is its use of statistical evidence to determine
whether the race of defendants or victims played a significant
role in death penalty decisions by prosecutors and jurors and in
the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges. The RJA
commits North Carolina courts to ensuring that race does not
significantly affect death sentences.
This Article examines the RJA and North Carolina's long
struggle with race and the death penalty. The first part traces the
history of race and the death penalty in the state, showing that
racial prejudice exerted a consistent, strong, and pernicious
influence on the imposition and disposition of death sentences.
From colonial times into the 1960s, the overwhelming majority of
those executed were African American, and although most
victims and perpetrators of crime are of the same race, the
overwhelming majority of victims in cases where executions took
place were white. Hundreds of African Americans have been
executed for a variety of crimes against white victims, including
scores of African American men executed for rape. However,
just four whites have been executed for crimes against African
American victims, all murders.
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Not only does data indicate disproportionate racial impact, but
events show that race frequently influenced capital prosecutions.
In many cases in the first half of the twentieth century, juries
sentenced African Americans to death in the shadow of lynch
mobs. Newspaper reports of executions of African Americans
included overtly racist images. In some instances, fairness and
mercy eased the pernicious effects of prejudice. However, history
shows that whether dooming African Americans or saving them
from death, racial prejudice played a powerful role in the death
penalty in North Carolina, enduring across the state's history
despite enormous social and legal change.
The second part of this Article examines major legal changes in
the modern period that may limit the influence of racial prejudice
by restraining discretion. It shows that discretionary
determinations by prosecutors and jurors continue, allowing
racial motivation-particularly unconscious racial prejudice
toward defendants or empathy for victims-to influence
decisions. Some racial disparities are less extreme but have not
been eliminated, and troubling features continue. For example,
jury participation by African Americans has remained limited in
many cases, and the disproportion of white victims seen
throughout North Carolina's history is virtually unchanged.
The task of the RJA is to ensure that the strong link between race
and the death penalty shown by history is finally severed. In its
concluding section, this Article analyzes how the key features of
the RJA will operate. That analysis, together with the historical
record and legal framework of the modern death penalty,
provides insight into North Carolina's effort to eliminate the
effects of race from the operation of its death penalty.
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INTRODUCTION
On August 11, 2009, North Carolina Governor Beverly Perdue
signed the Racial Justice Act ("RJA") into law.' As she did so, she
noted her support of the death penalty, but added: "I have always
believed it must be carried out fairly .... The Racial Justice Act
ensures that when North Carolina hands down our state's harshest
punishment to our most heinous criminals-the decision is based on
the facts and the law, not racial prejudice. '2 This Article demonstrates
that the separation of race from the decision to execute, which is
central to Governor Perdue's support for the death penalty, has
proven difficult throughout North Carolina history. The RJA
attempts to ensure that separation.3
This Article examines the influence of racial prejudice on the
death penalty in North Carolina. This history shows that racial
prejudice has had a powerful impact on the death penalty that has
continued despite significant legal and social change. Early in this
history, race operated overtly, and its effects continued into the
twentieth century in more subtle but no less pernicious forms. North
Carolina was required to reformulate its death penalty laws to meet
new constitutional standards after the United States Supreme Court
invalidated all existing death penalty statutes in its 1972 decision,
Furman v. Georgia.4 However, despite major changes in law, the
exercise of discretion continued, and race may have affected death
penalty decisions. This Article chronicles the important history of
race and the death penalty in North Carolina and develops the legal
framework in which the modern death penalty operates. It thereby
1. Press Release, North Carolina Office of Gov. Bev Perdue, Gov. Perdue Signs
North Carolina Racial Justice Act (Aug. 11, 2009), available at http://www.governor.state
.nc.us/NewsltemsfPressReleaseDetail.aspx?newsltemlD=554.
2. Id.
3. See North Carolina Racial Justice Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-2010 to -2012
(2009). See Appendix for full text of statute.
4. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam) (invalidating existing state and federal death
penalty statutes because they were capricious in their lack of standards); see id. at 310
(Stewart, J., concurring) ("I simply conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that permit this
unique penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed."); see also infra Part II.A.
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identifies the critical issues for examination in litigation under the
RJA.
With the RJA, North Carolina has chosen for the first time to
look squarely at the connection between race and the death penalty.
The RJA's opening provision declares that "[n]o person shall be
subject to or given a sentence of death or shall be executed pursuant
to any judgment that was sought or obtained on the basis of race."5 In
its most direct provision, it commands that "[i]f the court finds that
race was a significant factor in decisions to seek or impose the
sentence of death ... the death sentence imposed by the judgment
shall be vacated."6 It thus expressly forbids execution if the death
penalty was sought or obtained on the basis of race. Among its most
significant elements is its authorization for defendants to use
statistical evidence to prove disparate impact based on the race of the
defendant, the race of the victim, or on the use of race in jury
selection. The statute provides that such statistical evidence can
satisfy the defendant's burden to show discrimination and shift the
burden to the prosecution to rebut that showing if the defendant's
death sentence is to be sustained.7
The history of the death penalty in North Carolina before the
last pre-Furman execution in 1961 unmistakably shows that the death
penalty's strong identification with race during slavery outlived
emancipation and extended into the twentieth century.' However, the
history also reveals some exceptions and moderating effects. For
example, throughout much of the first half of the twentieth century,
when murder, rape, burglary, and arson carried mandatory death
sentences, juries showed mercy by following guilty verdicts with
requests for executive clemency that governors honored frequently.'
5. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2010.
6. § 15A-2012.
7. See discussion infra Part III.B. The RJA goes beyond the restrictive requirements
for federal constitutional remedies in criminal law enforcement. See McCleskey v. Kemp,
481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987) ("[T]o prevail under the Equal Protection Clause, [the defendant]
must prove that the decision makers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose.").
8. For a list of all prisoners executed under state authority in North Carolina
between 1910 and 1961, see M. Watt Espy & John Ortiz Smykla, Executions in the United
States, 1608-2002: The Espy File [Computer File], 4th ICPSR ed. compiled by M. Watt
Espy and John Ortiz Smykla, Univ. of Ala. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-University Consortium
for Political and Social Research [producer and distributor], 2004 [hereinafter Espy File];
N.C. Dep't of Corr., Persons Executed in North Carolina, http:/lwww.doc.state.nc.us/dop
deathpenalty/personsexecuted.htm (follow hyperlinks for each time period) (last visited
July 1, 2010) [hereinafter DOC Persons Executed in N.C. 1910-1961]. No executions took
place in North Carolina between 1962 and 1983. See Espy File, supra.
9. See Seth Kotch, Unduly Harsh and Unworkably Rigid: The Death Penalty in
North Carolina, 1910-1961, ch. 3 (2008) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
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Furthermore, North Carolina lawmakers made the state among the
first in the nation to switch its method of execution from hanging to
electrocution and then from electrocution to asphyxiation by lethal
gas, changes intended to make the deaths of all prisoners, white and
black, swifter and less painful.'" Despite these procedural changes, the
racial attitudes of the Jim Crow period informed the imposition of the
death penalty, and, as it had done during slavery, North Carolina
disproportionately executed African Americans, especially those who
committed crimes against whites. This pattern continued from
emancipation until the hiatus in executions that began in 1961 in
advance of the Furman decision.
North Carolina's history reveals a pairing of the desire for
progressive change that has bolstered the state's reputation as
moderate among southern states and the less forward-thinking
attitudes, particularly about race, that have long troubled the South. 2
North Carolina at Chapel Hill) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review), available at
http://gradworks.umi.com/3352719.pdf (describing various ways mercy was provided in the
context of a mandatory death penalty); see also Cindy F. Adcock, The Twenty-Fifth
Anniversary of Post-Furman Executions in North Carolina: A History of One Southern
State's Evolving Standards of Decency, 1 ELON U. L. REV. 113, 117-18 (2009) (recounting
that during the mandatory period 334 defendants were executed and 221 were granted
clemency).
10. See infra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
11. "Jim Crow" refers to the laws and customs in southern states that restricted the
political and social lives of African Americans. The Jim Crow era is widely understood to
have lasted from the withdrawal of federal troops from the South in 1877 to 1965, when
the Voting Rights Act restored the franchise to African Americans. See generally
MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004) (assessing the role of the Supreme Court
in shoring up and then dismantling Jim Crow laws); LEON F. LITWACK, TROUBLE IN
MIND: BLACK SOUTHERNERS IN THE AGE OF JIM CROW (1998) (describing the lives of
black Americans in the Jim Crow South); C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER
OF JIM CROW (1955) (describing and reflecting on Jim Crow throughout the South).
12. The reputation includes moderation on matters of race despite its own episodes of
racial violence. The most notable of these episodes was the 1898 Wilmington "race riot" or
"insurrection" in which scores of African American residents were killed and the elected
leadership of the state's largest city was deposed, signaling the end of African American
political involvement in a coalition between Republicans and Populists that briefly
dominated the state at the end of the nineteenth century. See DEMOCRACY BETRAYED:
THE WILMINGTON RACE RIOT OF 1898 AND ITS LEGACY (David S. Cecelski & Timothy
B. Tyson eds., 1998). See generally WILLIAM H. CHAFE, CIVILITIES AND CIVIL RIGHTS:
GREENSBORO, NORTH CAROLINA, AND THE BLACK STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM 3-10
(1980) (describing the state's "progressive mystique," cultivated despite harsher social
realities); ROB CHRISTENSON, THE PARADOX OF TAR HEEL POLITICS: THE
PERSONALITIES, ELECTIONS, AND EVENTS THAT SHAPED MODERN NORTH CAROLINA
1-3 (2008) (giving some brief examples of the limits of progressivism in North Carolina);
WILLIAM A. LINK, THE PARADOX OF SOUTHERN PROGRESSIVISM, 1880-1930 (1992)
(describing the paradoxical concept of "southern progressivism").
2010] THE RACIAL JUSTICE ACT 2037
In this context, its decision to adopt a mandatory sentence of death
upon conviction of first degree murder or rape in response to
Furman, which invalidated all existing death penalty statutes because
they failed to constrain jury discretion, was uncharacteristically
wooden and harsh. North Carolina's mandatory death sentence was
unusual among the states,13  and it was quickly ruled
unconstitutional.14 The RJA is more consistent with North Carolina's
moderate tradition and its place in the Upper South. 5 At the same
time, the RJA represents a new chapter in the state's history. The
command of the RJA to ensure that the complex and pernicious
relationship between race and the death penalty is finally severed is
the challenging task the legislature has entrusted to the courts.
This Article is a combination of history and law.16 The first half
examines the history of the death penalty and race in North Carolina
as a colony, during slavery and Reconstruction, and in the Jim Crow
period. It culminates in an examination of the first fifty years of state-
run executions ending in 1961, when the last pre-Furman execution
took place. The second half deals with the revised death penalty
operating in the modern period, executions during this period, the
paths that led defendants to their place on North Carolina's current
death row, and the development and details of the RJA.
13. For example, Florida, Georgia, and Texas did not impose mandatory death
sentences, and the Supreme Court upheld those statutes. See, e.g., Proffitt v. Florida, 428
U.S. 242, 242 (1976) (finding that the imposition of the death penalty is valid when judges
are given detailed guidance to assist them in deciding whether or not to impose the death
penalty); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 155 (1976) (finding the Georgia statutory
scheme constitutional since it required specific jury findings about the facts of the case and
the character of the defendant, while requiring the state supreme court to review the jury
verdict to ensure the defendant is not being treated unusually harsh compared to other
criminals); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 262-63 (1976) (upholding the exercise of
"channeled" discretion by the jury through differing statutory structures).
14. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976). Woodson is discussed
further, see infra notes 29-31 and accompanying text. Louisiana also chose a mandatory
model, but, even though its crime definition was more precisely tailored than North
Carolina's, it too was declared unconstitutional for the same reasons the Court gave in
Woodson-the inherent vice of any mandatory imposition of death is a failure to focus on
the circumstances of the particular offense and the character and propensities of the
offender. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 331-36 (1976).
15. Kentucky is the other state to have a racial justice act. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 532.300-309 (2008). The Kentucky statute differs significantly from the North Carolina
Racial Justice Act, and, indeed, those differences are an important part of the
interpretative history of the RJA because it helps define important differences in intended
effect. See infra Part III.C.
16. The historical development in this Article is the principal responsibility of
historian Seth Kotch. The developments after the 1972 Furman decision are the principal
responsibility of Robert Mosteller, a member of the University of North Carolina law
faculty.
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Part I begins with the state's first recorded execution, which
occurred while North Carolina was still a colony. It examines the
death penalty's important role in slave owners' mastery over the
state's enslaved population, noting that a heavy majority of those
executed were black slaves. Slaves were barred by law from serving
on the tribunals and juries that decided cases in which they were
defendants and/or victims, and the available evidence shows that,
except briefly during Reconstruction, jury participation by African
Americans was negligible as the Jim Crow era began around the turn
of the twentieth century. 7 Under Jim Crow, as before emancipation,
the vast majority of those executed were African Americans, and
African Americans continued to face systematic exclusion from jury
service. During the entire period, only two whites were executed for
crimes against African American victims.18
Part I continues as it sets out the history of the imposition of the
death penalty from 1910 until 1961. The year 1910, almost a century
before the passage of the RJA, was selected as the starting point
because in that year the state assumed responsibility for executions.
Sheriffs were relieved from publicly hanging prisoners in the counties
where their crimes took place, and instead state prison staff
conducted more private executions in a death chamber in Raleigh. 19
This Part ends in 1961 when the state of North Carolina executed its
last prisoner until lawmakers revamped its capital punishment statute
following the Furman decision.
An examination of events and executions in North Carolina
during this period shows that race played a powerful role in the death
penalty process. Some African American defendants were quickly
charged, tried, convicted, sentenced to death, and executed under a
shadow of racial hostility." In rape cases, the vast majority of those
executed were African American men sentenced for crimes against
white women, and no whites were executed for the rape of African
17. See supra note 11 (providing references describing "Jim Crow" period in the
South).
18. The first white person executed for a crime against an African American was
Mason Scott who was executed in 1820 for the murder of a slave belonging to another
white man. See infra note 71 and accompanying text. The second was Daniel Keath, who
was executed in 1880 for the murder of a child. Although Keath was charged only with
murder, the victim's body showed evidence of sexual assault. See infra note 88.
19. This shift, while superficially an administrative detail, had important consequences
because it placed a visible state agency in charge of the execution process. This change
implicated state legislative concerns regarding execution method, which became its own
significant element in the history of efforts to perfect the process and make executions less
visibly painful. See infra note 103.
20. See infra Part I.B.1.
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American women.2 All those executed for burglary were African
Americans.2 Between 1910 and 1961, only one white person was
executed for a crime against an African American.23
Although the death penalty was not exclusively imposed on
African Americans, it was principally reserved for them, a fact that
was deeply embedded in the mindset of the state's populace. In 1911,
a white prisoner slashed his own throat before being transported to
death row, explaining that " 'he would not be the first white man
electrocuted in North Carolina.' "24 Between 1910 and 1961,
approximately sixty other white people were executed. However,
over that period, the state executed 362 people, of whom 283 were
African Americans. Thus, 78% of those executed were African
American, and, including Native Americans, 80% were members of a
racial minority.' These extreme percentages present a daunting
challenge to explain on grounds that do not include race.
It is only at the middle of the twentieth century that instances of
African Americans serving on juries in capital cases can be found.26
Prior to the mid-twentieth century, African Americans were not
included in meaningful numbers in the jury pool from which jury
venires and trial juries were selected. However, subsequent
21. See infra Part I.B.2. Also, as the case of Alvin Mansel demonstrates, the
conviction of an African American man for the rape of a white woman sometimes
occurred based upon weak evidence. See infra I.B.l.b.
22. See infra Part I.B.2.
23. See infra note 184 (describing the conviction of Milford Exum, who was executed
in 1938 for murdering an African American while robbing him in his home).
24. First White Man is Electrocuted, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Feb. 25,
1911, at 7. His efforts at suicide were unsuccessful, and he became the first white man
executed. Id.; see also Kotch, supra note 9, at 101 n.33.
25. See infra note 108 and accompanying text.
26. See Miller v. State, 237 N.C. 29, 40, 74 S.E.2d 513, 521 (1953) (noting that three
African Americans served on a jury in the trial of an African American defendant in a
capital case); State v. Roman, 235 N.C. 627, 628, 70 S.E.2d 857, 857 (1952) (showing that
four African Americans served on the jury in the trial of an African American sentenced
to death). Systematic data regarding jury service in particular cases are generally
unavailable for cases prior to the last few decades and the principle source of information
is litigation reflected in reported cases.
27. See infra Part I.B.6. For example, in State v. Speller, 229 N.C. 67, 70-71, 47 S.E.2d
537, 538-39 (1948), the Supreme Court of North Carolina overturned the conviction of
Raleigh Speller, an African American, for rape, reversing the denial of his motion to
quash the indictment because African Americans had been improperly excluded from
service on the grand jury that indicted him. The Supreme Court recounted the facts as
follows:
The Register of Deeds of the County testified that he had been Clerk of the
Board of County Commissioners for 17 years; that Negroes comprise
approximately 60% of the population of the County, and about 35% or 40% of
2040 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88
decisions of the United States Supreme Court forced jurisdictions to
select juries from pools that were broadly inclusive of the
jurisdiction's population, which had the effect of including African
Americans in meaningful numbers in many jury venires. Although
challenges to the composition of jury venires did not end, the primary
focus of litigation shifted to exclusion from jury service by the
prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges.28
Part II begins when North Carolina reestablished the death
penalty after Furman. Because of North Carolina's false start with an
invalid mandatory death penalty for designated crimes, which was
the taxpayers; that the names of Negroes in jury box No. 1 are printed in red,
while those of Whites are printed in black; that the Commissioners pass upon the
person whose name is drawn, and either accept or reject such person when called;
that in his 17 years as Clerk to the Board of County Commissioners he had never
seen the name of a Negro placed on the approved list of prospective jurors; that it
is "common knowledge, and generally known, that Negroes do not serve and
have not served on grand or petit juries in Bertie County"; that he knows some of
the Negroes whose names have been drawn and rejected and he would say they
are average citizens; that "whenever the name of a colored person was called at a
drawing of the County Commissioners nobody said anything", or they would say:
"Strike him out" or "Let him go"; that according to his records no Negro has ever
been summoned for jury duty by the County Commissioners ....
The Chairman of the Board of County Commissioners testified that there had
been "no discrimination at all" in the selection of persons to serve on juries; that
he had never "known a Negro's name to be on the list of persons chosen for
service on a grand or petit jury", but that all rejections were for want of good
moral character and sufficient intelligence.
Id. at 68-69, 47 S.E.2d at 537-38. The trial court nevertheless had ruled that there had
been "no intentional or purposeful discrimination against the colored race in the selection
of jurors." Id. at 69, 47 S.E.2d at 538.
Speller was ultimately convicted and sentenced to death by an all white jury for
raping a white woman, and his conviction was affirmed on appeal. See State v. Speller, 230
N.C. 345, 347, 53 S.E.2d, 294, 295 (1949) (noting that the defendant was Negro and the
victim was a white woman); State v. Speller, 231 N.C. 549, 550, 57 S.E.2d 759, 759-60
(1950) (concluding that the defendant had no right to be tried by a jury that contained
members of his race but only the right not to be tried by a jury from which members of his
race have been unlawfully excluded, and concluding that the seven Negroes on the list
from which the jurors were summoned was sufficient to satisfy that requirement). The
Federal District Court denied habeas relief, finding
no discrimination against the negro race as such, and the ratio of negroes to whites
in the jury boxes, in the light of the well known fact that the proportion of whites
qualified for jury service is much higher than that of negroes who are so qualified,
is not sufficient ... to support the burden resting upon the petitioner to show
actual discrimination.
Speller v. Crawford, 99 F. Supp. 92, 97 (E.D.N.C. 1951). Speller was executed in 1953.
Charles Craven, Two Rapists Pay with Lives after Long Death Row Wait, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), May 30, 1953, at 1.
28. See infra Part II.B.3.
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ruled unconstitutional in Woodson v. North Carolina,29 a valid post-
Furman death penalty statute was not enacted until 1977.30 Over
twenty years passed between the last pre-Furman execution in 1961
and the resumption of executions in 1984.31 North Carolina executed
forty-two men and one woman under the new statute.32 As of July 1,
2010, 159 men and women were confined on North Carolina's death
row awaiting further review of their death sentences and execution.33
Part II traces the process leading to enactment of a
constitutionally valid death penalty statute in North Carolina and
renewed executions. It examines the development of the present
death penalty law, looking at both the changes made in the system
that existed before Furman and in the elements of that new system
that permit continuity of racially discriminatory practices. In general,
the new law limited but did not eliminate the operation of discretion
in decisions to seek and to impose the death penalty.
29. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
30. In 1977, North Carolina enacted an Act to Establish Procedures for Sentencing in
Capital Cases and to Fix the Punishment for Murder, ch. 406, sec. 2, § 15A-2000, 1977 N.C.
Sess. Laws 407, 407-08, which was ruled constitutional by the Supreme Court of North
Carolina in State v. Barfield, 298 N.C. 306, 343-55, 259 S.E.2d 510, 537-44 (1979).
31. Executions resumed with the execution by lethal injection of James Hutchins on
March 16, 1984. See N.C. Dep't of Corr., Executions Carried out Under Current Death
Penalty Statute, http://www.doc.state.nc.us/dop/deathpenalty/executed.htm (last visited
July 1, 2010) [hereinafter DOC Post-Furman N.C. Executions].
32. Id. North Carolina's forty-three post-Furman executions place it eighth among the
states. Nine of the top ten states in executions are in the South. In order of executions
since 1976, the states are: Texas-460, Virginia-107, Oklahoma-92, Florida-69, Missouri-
67, Georgia-47, Alabama-46, North Carolina-43, South Carolina-42, Ohio-38, Louisiana-
28, Arkansas-27, Arizona-23, Indiana-20, Delaware-14, California-13, Nevada-12,
Illinois-12, Mississippi-12, Utah-7, Tennessee-6, Maryland-5, Washington-4, Kentucky-
3, Montana-3, Nebraska-3, Pennsylvania-3, Oregon-2, Colorado-i, Connecticut-I,
Idaho-i, New Mexico-i, South Dakota-1, and Wyoming-1. See State by State Database,
Death Penalty Information Center, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-by-state (last
visited July 1, 2010).
33. North Carolina has the seventh largest death row population in the United States.
In order of death row population, the states are: California-690, Florida-403, Texas-340,
Pennsylvania-225, Alabama-199, Ohio-175, North Carolina-169, Arizona-129, Georgia-
108, Tennessee-92, Oklahoma-86, Louisiana-84, Nevada-78, South Carolina-63,
Mississippi-59, Missouri-52, Arkansas-43, Kentucky-36, Oregon-33, Delaware-19,
Idaho-18, Indiana-17, Virginia-15, Illinois-15, Nebraska-ll, Connecticut-10, Kansas,-10,
Utah-10, Washington-9, Maryland-5, Colorado-3, South Dakota-3, Montana-2, New
Mexico-2, New Hampshire-i, Wyoming-1. See id. Because of a difference in the
treatment of defendants who face possible resentencing, the number shown above for
North Carolina's death row (169) differs from that presented in the remainder of this
Article (159), which is based on North Carolina Department of Corrections data. North
Carolina's death row is the seventh largest using either total.
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Almost four hundred defendants have been sentenced to death
in North Carolina since the Furman and Woodson decisions.' This
Part traces the complex process that sorted these individuals into four
different groups. One large group comprises the current death row
population to which the RJA applies.35 Another slightly larger group
was granted relief by judicial action for a number of different reasons
or received executive clemency and has been removed from death
row. A small group died outside the judicial process while on death
row. The final group consists of forty-three defendants who were
executed. As in the previous two periods, only one white person in
this period was executed for the murder of an African American.36
Part II then examines the historical and continuing importance of
the race of the victim in the imposition of death sentences in post-
Furman executions.37 Today, while African Americans and minority
group members are disproportionately represented among
defendants relative to their population percentage, the disparity is
somewhat smaller than in earlier periods. However, the figures show
clear continuity for race of victims. White victims have predominated
in all periods for those executed and for those currently awaiting
execution despite the fact that a very heavy majority of murders are
committed by defendants against members of their own race. Indeed,
there is only a minor reduction in the percentage of white victims in
the death penalty cases examined before and after Furman.
Part II also examines the importance of unconscious racial
motivation in contemporary death penalty sentencing.38 As public
expressions of racially biased attitudes have become less frequent,
34. See infra Part II.B.1 (describing 391 defendants sentenced to death since the
Woodson decision). These defendants are listed in two documents developed by the North
Carolina Department of Corrections. See N.C. Dep't of Corr., Offenders on Death Row,
http://www.doc.state.nc.us/dop/deathpenalty/deathrow.htm (last visited July 1, 2010)
[hereinafter DOC Offenders on Death Row]; N.C. Dep't of Corr., Persons Removed from
Death Row, http://www.doc.state.nc.us/dop/deathpenalty/removed.htm (last visited July 1,
2010) [hereinafter DOC Persons Removed from Death Row]. The data presented in this
Article corrects a handful of errors found in these documents, which include a few
instances of double entries for defendants and several misidentifications of racial
categories. Racial descriptions are corrected using other DOC data and amplified as
described in specific footnotes. See infra notes 266, 268, 272.
35. The RJA also applies to defendants tried on capital charges after the enactment of
the statute. See Racial Justice Act, ch. 464, § 2, 2009 N.C. Legis. Serv. 1193, 1194 (West);
see also infra Part III.E. See Appendix for the full text of the Racial Justice Act.
36. See State v. Smith, 305 N.C. 691, 693-98, 292 S.E.2d 264, 266-69 (1982) (detailing
Kermit Smith's crimes of kidnapping, raping, and murdering an African American woman
which led to his execution in 1995).
37. See infra Part II.B.
38. See infra Part I.B.2.b.
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unconscious discriminatory motivation has taken on greater
significance. Such unconscious racial motivation, which is relevant
under the RJA, is often particularly important when considering race-
of-the-victim discrimination. Finally, this Part examines the continued
limited presence of African Americans on juries. While
discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges is more easily
challenged,39 relatively few African Americans have served on death
penalty juries. Moreover, many defendants on death row were tried
by juries without any African American members.4 °
Part III analyzes the legal issues involved in the interpretation
and application of the RJA. The critical provision of the statute is
that "[n]o person shall be subject to or given a sentence of death or
shall be executed pursuant to any judgment that was sought or
obtained on the basis of race. 41 As noted earlier, the legislature's
decision to allow defendants to present statistical evidence supporting
the disparate impact of race regarding the defendant, the victim, and
jury selection has enormous significance. It means that, unlike in
federal constitutional remedies in criminal law enforcement, proof is
not restricted to intentional discrimination. Instead, statistical
evidence regarding disparate impact may be used to meet the
defendant's burden for relief. If the defendant presents sufficient
statistical evidence, then the burden shifts to the prosecution to rebut
the inference of discrimination.
I. THE HISTORY OF RACE AND EXECUTIONS IN NORTH CAROLINA
A. From Slavery to the Twentieth Century
The death penalty process in North Carolina has changed a great
deal since colonial authorities first imposed it with the hanging of a
Native American man in 1726,42 but key features have shown
remarkable resilience. This Part briefly explores the interaction of
race with the death penalty between that hanging, which occurred
39. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 79 (1986) ("The principle ... that a State
denies a black defendant equal protection when it puts him on trial before a jury from
which members of his race have been purposefully excluded is reaffirmed."); see also infra
Part II.B.3.
40. See infra note 356 (listing thirty cases of death row defendants whose juries had no
African American members).
41. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2010 (2009).
42. See Espy File, supra note 8. For an early history of the death penalty and other
punishments in North Carolina, see generally DONNA J. SPINDEL, CRIME AND SOCIETY
IN NORTH CAROLINA, 1663-1776 (1989); Albert Coates, Punishment for Crime in North
Carolina, 17 N.C. L. REV. 205 (1939).
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when North Carolina was a colony, and 1910, when the state assumed
responsibility for executions.43 In this period, as in those that
followed, the death penalty was used primarily against African
Americans, principally in cases where whites were the victims, and
upon verdicts by tribunals or juries that excluded African American
participation.' Although the laws and practices that define the death
penalty have changed, the influence of race, though moderated, has
endured.
1. Colonial Settlement to Emancipation
In this limited space, it is possible to describe only the broad
features of the history of slavery and the death penalty. One such
feature is clear: those executed were principally African Americans.
African Americans, most of them slaves, constituted 71% of the 242
people executed from 1726 to 1865.46 For the minority of capital cases
43. See infra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
44. It is difficult to know how many, if any, African Americans served on juries trying
capital cases before the end of slavery because of the potential service of free blacks living
in the state. However, because the free black population in the state was very small,
ranging from less than 1% of the state's population in 1790 to a little more than 3% in
1860, a substantial presence by blacks on capital juries is not a realistic possibility. See
North Carolina-Race and Hispanic Origin: 1790 to 1990, http://www.census.gov/
population/www/documentation/twps0056/tab48.pdf. (last visited July 1, 2010) [hereinafter
1790 to 1990 Census]. Slaves would have been excluded from jury service until the end of
the Civil War by the requirement of early North Carolina constitutions that jurors be
"good and lawful men." See N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. IX. The Constitution of 1868 and
Reconstruction brought a brief era of black jury participation. One case in eastern North
Carolina saw fifty men, twenty-five white and twenty-five black, produced for jury
selection. State v. Holmes, 63 N.C. 18, 21 (1868). Four African Americans were picked for
the jury. Id. However, Reconstruction, which ended in stages, was over by 1875. See
Joseph A. Ranney, A Fool's Errand? Legal Legacies of Reconstruction in Two Southern
States, 9 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 1, 9-10 (2002) (describing the series of political events
that signaled its end). Following this brief period of participation by blacks, examination
of cases challenging exclusion of African Americans from jury service suggest that the
constitutional command established by Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879), had
little effect in putting African Americans on juries during this period. See id. at 309 ("It is
not easy to comprehend how it can be said that while every white man is entitled to a trial
by a jury selected ... without discrimination against his color, and a negro is not, the latter
is equally protected by the law with the former."); see also infra Part I.B.6.
45. See Espy File, supra note 8. Between 1790 and 1870, the African American
population ranged from 26.6% to 36.6% of the total population. See 1790 to 1990 Census,
supra note 44.
46. This figure excludes a group of wartime deserters who were executed in North
Carolina in 1864. A total of 172 African Americans and sixty-six whites (excluding the
deserters), which constitutes 25% of the total, were executed over this period. See Espy
File, supra note 8. If the twenty-two white deserters are included, 65% of those executed
were African American and 32% were white. Id. It is likely that the number of slaves
executed under state authority, and certainly with the tacit approval of law, was much
higher than this number. In addition to those slaves formally executed, many were killed
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that involved white defendants and victims, the death penalty during
slavery appears to have functioned much as it did in jurisdictions
without slavery.47 However, executions of whites were relatively
infrequent, and periods of up to twenty years passed without the
execution of a white person.48
These disparities arose in part from the way North Carolina's
court system dealt with slaves accused of crimes. Beginning in 1715
and continuing until shortly after statehood,49 punishment for crimes
committed by slaves, including the death penalty, was directed under
the state's slave code.50 The code established a separate tribunal to try
slaves, restricting its membership to slave owners. 1 Even after
by their owners, killed during attempts at apprehending them, killed after being
designated as outlaws, or killed during the commission of a crime. See MARVIN L.
MICHAEL KAY & LORIN LEE CARY, SLAVERY IN NORTH CAROLINA, 1748-1775, at 74,
77, 81-82, 136 (1995) [hereinafter SLAVERY IN NORTH CAROLINA] (confirming eighty-six
executions of slaves under state authority between 1748 and 1772 alone). The number of
slave executions was likely affected by the fact that owners were often compensated for
their economic loss. Between 1734, when the colony executed its first slave, and 1789,
slave owners appear to have been compensated for more than 80% of confirmed slave
executions. See Espy File, supra note 8 (listing payments but providing somewhat unclear
information because of the use of a single designator for slave compensations paid to
owners and fees paid to executioners). However, the frequent compensation to slave
owners is well documented. See Marvin L. Michael Kay & Lorin Lee Cary, "The Planters
Suffer Little or Nothing": North Carolina Compensation for Executed Slaves, 1748-1772,40
SCI. & SOC'Y 288, 306 (1976) (observing that compensation systems insured that "the
capital punishment of slaves did not directly harm slave owners economically").
47. White defendants were executed for crimes against the state and public order,
such as counterfeiting, insurrection, and assisting runaway slaves, occasionally against
property, such as horse stealing, and most frequently for crimes of violence. See Espy File,
supra note 8. The execution of whites for aiding runaway slaves provides one clear
difference between North Carolina and states without slaves. The death penalty for aiding
runaway slaves, like that for insurrection, punished a crime against the state committed by
one of its citizens who was a member of the ruling racial majority. See id.
48. See Espy File, supra note 8. No executions of whites occurred from 1752-1762 and
from 1773-1793. Id.
49. In 1793, jurisdiction was transferred to the county courts. See Act to Extend the
Right of Trial by Jury to Slaves, ch. 5, § 1, 1793 N.C. Sess. Laws 38, 38. In 1816, jurisdiction
of felony cases involving slaves was transferred to superior court. See Act to Amend the
Laws in Force Respecting the Trial of Slaves in Capital Cases, ch. XIV, § 1, 1816 N.C.
Sess. Laws 10, 10.
50. See Act Concerning Servants and Slaves, ch. 46, 1715 N.C. Sess. Laws 21, 21
(creating slave courts). Legislation enacted in 1741, inter alia, gave the tribunal the power,
upon a guilty determination, of discretion regarding the sentence imposed: "to pass such
judgment upon such offender, according to their discretion, as the nature of the crime or
offence shall require." Trial of Slaves, ch. XLVIII, 1741 N.C. Sess. Laws 65, 65. See
generally Ernest James Clark, Jr., Aspects of the North Carolina Slave Code, 1715-1860, 39
N.C. HIST. REV. 148, 148-51 (1962) (describing early development of the slave code from
Virginia law, being compiled in 1712 as the colony's first slave code).
51. See Alan D. Watson, North Carolina Slave Courts, 1715-1785, 60 N.C. HIST. REV.
24, 25 (1983) (describing slave courts as being made up of justices of the peace, "who were
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jurisdiction over slave trials was transferred to the regular courts in
the early nineteenth century, 2 slave defendants were tried by juries
composed of slave owners.5 3 Until the end of the Civil War, slaves
were barred entirely from jury service.54 Free blacks, although
extended some protections, were often treated differently than whites
under the law, and along with slaves, were subject to the death
penalty for rape committed against a white victim, which was not a
capital offense if committed by a white man. The role of race in the
imposition of the death penalty became particularly conspicuous
invariably slave owners," and slave owning freeholders). In proceedings before slave
courts and later in regular courts, the testimony of slaves and free blacks was not treated
equally with that of whites, who were considered "credible witnesses." In some situations,
such as when testifying against a white, testimony by African Americans was excluded
entirely. See Act for Establishing Courts of Law, and for Regulating the Proceedings, ch.
2, § XLII, 1777 N.C. 2d Sess. Laws 203, 217 (allowing African Americans to testify against
each other but not against whites); State v. Ben, 8 N.C. (1 Hawks) 434, 434-37 (1821)
(noting that under prior interpretations of the law a distinction had been drawn between
the testimony of a white witness, who was presumed credible, and a slave, whose
testimony had to be corroborated because he was not treated by the law as a "credible
witness"); Clark, supra note 50, at 152-53 (describing testimonial restrictions in various
periods and circumstances). Furthermore, conviction rates for accused slaves ran as high
as 97%. See SLAVERY IN NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 46, at 72; see also Daniel J.
Flanigan, Criminal Procedure in Slave Trials in the Antebellum South, 40 J.S. HIST. 537,
538-40 (1974) (describing slave owner rationale for separate slave courts).
52. See supra note 49.
53. See State v. Jim, 12 N.C. (1 Dev.) 142, 144-45 (1826) (rejecting slave's challenge to
a jury composed of entirely white slave holders on the basis that the practice was required
by law and protected not only the slave owner's property-the defendant-but also
protected the slave, who would benefit from the jury's experience with slaves). In State v.
Patrick, 48 N.C. (3 Jones) 443, 447 (1856), the Supreme Court of North Carolina ruled that
the slave defendant could waive his right to require only slave owners serve on the jury.
However, in State v. Arthur, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 217, 219-20 (1829), it held that the slave
defendant could not object to the prosecutor striking prospective jurors for cause because
they were not slave owners, which the statutory law specified as a qualification for service
on a jury that tried a criminal charge against a slave.
54. Slave status was incompatible with the basic definition of juror eligibility. See, e.g.,
N.C. CONST. of 1791, art. IX (limiting jury service to "good and lawful men").
55. Legislation enacted in 1823 clarified that assault with intent to commit rape upon
a white woman by any "person of colour" was punishable by death. Act Declaring the
Punishment of Persons of Colour, in Certain Cases, ch. LI, 1823 N.C. Sess. Laws 42, 42.
Free blacks, although extended some protections in North Carolina courts, were denied
much protection, including limitations to their testimony in court. See JOHN HOPE
FRANKLIN, THE FREE NEGRO IN NORTH CAROLINA 1790-1860, at 82 (1943) (describing
how the Supreme Court of North Carolina rejected the competency of a free black as a
witness). The law, if enforced, would have given free blacks the right to a trial by jury and
the privilege of counsel. See id. at 84-86 (describing free blacks' right to trial by jury and
representation by counsel for a variety of offenses). However, "the legal status of the free
Negro in North Carolina ... represented liberalism in some respects, extreme
conservatism in others, and contradictions in many." Id. at 95; see also id. at 81-101
(describing the complicated legal status of free blacks).
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during the execution process. Slaves were sometimes executed more
brutally than whites or were mutilated before execution, and their
bodies were sometimes displayed after execution as warnings to other
slaves.56
The disparities between whites and enslaved African Americans
under the law found vivid expression in State v. Mann.57 According to
this 1829 decision, a slave owner could not be punished for physical
assault against his slave,58 and so masters and those acting under their
authority were free to impose discipline short of death outside the
courts.59 They did so often.' However, the power of slave owners to
punish summarily did not formally include the right to execute.6' In
fact, beginning in 1774, the willful and malicious killing of a slave by
any white person was made punishable as a crime, with some
significant exceptions.62 Moreover, many slave owners believed that
public executions served an important purpose in deterring
56. Slaves were sometimes burned to death, see Espy File, supra note 8 (noting that
eight slaves were burned to death between 1760 and 1805), and some who were hanged
were first mutilated, including by castration. Nearly half of the slaves executed in the
colonial period suffered "comparatively brutal executions." See SLAVERY IN NORTH
CAROLINA, supra note 46, at 81. Historian Alan Watson describes the court-ordered
public display of the severed heads of executed slaves. See Watson, supra note 51, at 33-34
(1983) (describing orders in two specific cases and noting other decapitations); SLAVERY
IN NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 46, at 81 (describing the practicegenerally and noting
another instance of beheading); see also KIRSTEN FISCHER, SUSPECT RELATIONS: SEX,
RACE, AND RESISTANCE IN COLONIAL NORTH CAROLINA 180-81 (2002) (describing
castration as a substitute for execution in some cases).
57. 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263 (1829).
58. See id. at 266 (ruling that a master was not subject to indictment for battery upon
his slave, noting that "[t]his discipline belongs to the state of slavery").
59. See James M. Wynn, Jr., State v. Mann: Judicial Choice or Judicial Necessity, 87
N.C. L. REV. 991, 1005 (2009) (discussing the anomaly of whether a serious assault was
even a crime-based on the fortuity of whether the slave survived the assault; when the
slave survived, there was no crime; when the slave died, it was murder).
60. See SLAVERY IN NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 46, at 73-74 (describing slave
owner correction of slaves for various infractions under a system of "plantation justice").
61. See id. at 74-75.
62. Under the 1774 Act, the punishment for the willful and malicious killing of a slave
by a white person in the first instance depended upon whether the murderer was the slave
owner who was subject to imprisonment for twelve months. See Act to Prevent the Willful
and Malicious Killing of Slaves, ch. 31, 1774 N.C. Sess. Laws 189, 189. If he was not the
slave's owner, he was also to pay the owner the value of the slave and be committed to jail
until he made payment. See id. On the second conviction, the murderer was to be
sentenced to death without the benefit of clergy, regardless of whether he was the owner
or not. See Act to Amend 1774 Act, ch. 4, § III, 1791 N.C. Sess. Laws 8, 9. Three
exceptions were recognized for such killings: outlawed slaves, any slave in the act of
resistance to his owner or master, and slaves dying under "Moderate Correction." Id.
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misbehavior among the slave population at large.63 Thus, the state-
sanctioned death penalty was not only the required legal method of
executing slaves but also the ultimate method for slave owners to
enforce slave discipline. It sealed the strong link between capital
punishment, slavery, and race during this period of North Carolina's
history.M
Race-of-the-victim information has not been systematically
gathered for the slave period, but reported cases, historical studies,
information about the crimes in question,65 and the legal status of
slave victims as their owners' property show that whites were almost
exclusively the victims in cases where executions occurred. The
execution of a white person for any crime against an African
American was not authorized by law until the 1774 legislation, which
made the second conviction for willful and malicious killing of a slave
by a white person punishable by death.' However, enforcement of
this law, and similar laws that followed almost never resulted in
execution. For example, the first successful prosecution of a white
person charged with murdering an African American did not come
until after the enactment of a statute in 1791 that appeared to make
the willful and malicious murder of a slave a capital offense. 7
Nevertheless, ten years later, the Supreme Court of North Carolina
63. The 1715 slave code instructed slave owners to make sure their slaves were
executed publicly "to the Terror of other Slaves." SLAVERY IN NORTH CAROLINA, supra
note 46, at 91; see also Watson, supra note 51, at 33-34 (noting that masters sometimes
brought their slaves to witness executions "in hope of deterring possible future offenders"
and describing the public display of decapitated heads as part of the "object lesson" to
"impress slaves with the gravity of criminality").
64. How fully the statutory sanctions were enforced regarding lethal violence against
slaves by owners is impossible to assess as is quantifying the degree of extra-judicial lethal
violence that continued during slavery outside legal executions.
65. In his examination of slave courts, Alan Watson reports that, among cases from
1755 to 1790 in which executions occurred and claims for compensation were filed, "[m]ost
of the victims or intended victims were white, though they were infrequently masters or
mistresses." Watson, supra note 51, at 31 n.27. Also, the nature of the crime offers clues as
to the race of the victim. For example, under the law, all executions for rape involved
white victims. See Espy File, supra note 8 (showing African Americans executed for rape
in 1831 and 1837); supra note 55; infra note 77. Also, for the twenty-five African
Americans who were executed for slave revolt (twenty-three in 1802 and two in 1831), the
"victims" logically should be considered white. See id. The executions in 1802 and 1831
followed widely publicized revolts in Virginia led by Gabriel Prosser and Nat Turner. See
Jeffrey J. Crow, Slave Rebelliousness and Social Conflict in North Carolina, 1775-1802, 37
WM. & MARY Q. 79, 79-102 (1980) (describing the 1802 revolt in North Carolina).
66. See ch. 31, 1774 N.C. Sess. Laws at 189.
67. See § III, 1791 N.C. Sess. Laws at 9.
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declared the statute invalid.68 The legislature enacted a revised
statute, and, in 1820, the court affirmed the first white person's death
sentence for killing a slave.69 From then until emancipation, five white
men were sentenced to death for murdering slaves.7" But just one,
who murdered a slave belonging to another man, was executed.71
During this period, the word "victim," when applied to a slave,
did not have its modern meaning. State v. Hale,72 a non-capital case,
provides insight into a criminal system that effectively ignored slaves
as human victims and instead treated them as the damaged property
of their owner, who was considered the injured party or victim. In
Hale, the Supreme Court of North Carolina approved an indictment
for assault upon a slave by a white man other than his master.73 It
justified the prosecution to avoid a breach of the public peace
because the assault was "a great provocation to the owner" and also
noted that assaults on slaves by whites were usually committed by
"men of dissolute habits" from the underclass.74 The ruling explained
that such crimes required punishment because, "[i]f such offenses
may be committed with impunity, the public peace will not only be
rendered extremely insecure [because it "awakens" the owner's
resentment], but the value of slave property must be much impaired,
for the offenders can seldom make any reparation in damages."75
Thus, because of a slave's status as property, when a slave was injured
or even killed, his owner was considered the party who suffered the
68. See State v. Boon, 1 N.C. (Tay.) 191, 191-201 (1801) (finding inconsistencies
between statutory language and common law usage in capital cases).
69. See State v. Scott, 8 N.C. (1 Hawks) 24, 34-35 (1820) (interpreting chapter 18 of
the 1817 North Carolina session laws as creating a capital offense); see also State v. Reed,
9 N.C. (2 Hawks) 454, 456-57 (1823) (giving statute same application).
70. See State v. Robbins, 48 N.C. (3 Jones) 249, 254-55 (1855) (affirming sentence of
death for a master who killed his own slave); State v. Hoover, 20 N.C. (3 & 4 Dev. & Bat.)
365, 370 (1839) (affirming death sentence for a master killing his own slave); Reed, 9 N.C.
at 456-57 (affirming death sentence for the killing of a slave, and although not clearly
stated in the opinion, it appears that it was the defendant's own slave); Scott, 8 N.C. at 35
(affirming death sentence for killing a slave belonging to another person); State v. Walker,
4 N.C. (Taylor) 662, 667-68 (1817) (affirming sentence of death for killing a slave
belonging to another).
71. See Scott, 8 N.C. at 34-35; Espy File, supra note 8 (showing execution in 1820 of
Mason Scott, who was nineteen years old). Walker, who also killed a slave belonging to
another person, was pardoned. See Walker, 4 N.C. at 669.
72. 9 N.C. (2 Hawks) 582 (1823).
73. See id. at 582-86.
74. Id. at 584-85.
75. Id. at 585.
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loss.76 African American slaves were more than diminished victims;
indeed, in a modern sense, they were not victims at all."
North Carolina's death penalty law for slaves, although
undeniably harsh, was harsher as written than applied in practice:
even slave courts handed down fewer death sentences than was within
their authority.7 8 Furthermore, as slavery ended, the death penalty
76. See Andrew Fede, Legitimized Violent Slave Abuse in the American South, 1619-
1865: A Case Study of Law and Social Change in Six Southern States, 29 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 93, 130-31 (1985). The owner's status as the injured party operated as well when the
slave was killed, and owners often resorted to civil actions to receive compensation for
damages to their property rather than pursue criminal sanctions. See THOMAS MORRIS,
SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND THE LAW, 1619-1860, at 203 (1996) (noting the general use of
civil actions and that such actions, and the subsequent bypassing of criminal sanctions,
frequently occurred when the killing or injury to the slave was committed by someone who
had hired the slave from his owner). Outside the narrow confines of the statute, suits were
not intended as punishment for the homicide but for recovery of the value of the slave.
Clark, supra note 50, at 158 (describing security provided to slaves through civil suit while
also noting that such suits were intended, not as punishment, but to recover the slave's
value).
77. Whether or not rape was a capital offense when committed by an African
American man depended on the race of the victim. It was a capital offense when the
victim was white but not when the victim was African American. See FRANKLIN, supra
note 55, at 98-99 (noting that the capital status was based on the defendant's race rather
than slave status); SLAVERY IN NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 46, at 74. In contrast, for
instance, when the "victim" was a slave and the perpetrator was a white man, there could
be no conviction for fornication or adultery, "because such a woman had no standing in
the courts." JOHN SPENCER BASSETT, SLAVERY IN THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 28
(Herbert B. Adams ed., 1899), available at http://docsouth.unc.edu/nc/bassett99/bassett99
.html (providing this "curious case" based on a statement of Supreme Court Justice Ruffin
that the case was decided early in the nineteenth century but not published "in the interest
of public morality"). If the "victim" slave was owned by a different master than the
defendant slave, a criminal prosecution would proceed in theory, as in Hale, to support the
white owner's interests. When both "victim" and defendant slave were owned by the same
master, the master's property interest was divided. Indeed, he would have been obligated
to pay for the defense of the defendant slave. See Clark, supra note 50, at 152. However,
the owner should have had substantial control, particularly for crimes committed on his
plantation, over the decision to prosecute. See Watson, supra note 51, at 24 (noting that
slave discipline within the plantation was generally controlled by the owner or master). In
any case, executions served an instrumental interest of the owner "to impress slaves with
the gravity of criminality," so masters sometimes brought their slaves to witness the
executions, and courts sometimes directed the decapitated heads of executed slaves be
publicly displayed. See id. at 33. Once in court as a defendant, the slave did, in certain
situations, have some recognized independent voice. See State v. Poll, 8 N.C. (1 Hawks)
442, 444 (1821) (ruling that when a slave did object to removal of the case to another
county, the normal right of the slave owner or lawyer for the slave to consent was not
effective). However, as a victim, a slave did not appear to have any ability to seek
enforcement of the criminal law or civil remedies. See Clark, supra note 50, at 153 (noting
that slaves never received the privilege of instituting proceedings in state courts and had to
rely on assistance from supportive whites).
78. See Clark, supra note 50, at 153, 162-63 (noting that communities sometimes
petitioned the governor to grant clemency, that many pardons were granted, and that
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was narrowed appreciably. In 1868, the number of capital crimes was
reduced to four (murder, rape, burglary, and arson)7 9 under statutes
applicable to both African Americans and whites.
2. Reconstruction to 1910
In the aftermath of the Civil War, North Carolinians had to
reinvent their criminal punishment process as emancipation removed
slave owners' authority over newly freed African Americans."°
Seeking to reassert their mastery over these former slaves, white
lawmakers passed black codes that limited the rights and controlled
the labor of African Americans."1 At the same time, the federal
government offered African Americans practical help in the form of
the Freedmen's Bureau, 2 and it promised legal protections with the
enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment. 3
The Fourteenth Amendment was of particular importance to
African Americans seeking fuller protection from the law. Senator
Jacob Howard of Michigan, who introduced the Amendment,
explained that one of its purposes was "prohibit[ing] the hanging of a
communities increased efforts during the later years of slavery to grant rights to defendant
slaves); Watson, supra note 51, at 31-33 (describing unanimity in decisions to convict but
little uniformity in sentences, even for crimes such as fomenting a slave rebellion, with
"the slave courts fail[ing] to mete out the death penalty on a wholesale basis" but
generally limiting it to cases within a subset of capital crimes).
79. See N.C. CONST. of 1868 art. XI, §2. See generally Coates, supra note 42, at 205-06
(describing progression of capital punishment provisions).
80. EDWARD L. AYERS, VENGEANCE AND JUSTICE: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN
THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICAN SOUTH 150 (1984). Among the more profound
readjustments was the construction of a penitentiary, a move North Carolinians were slow
to make. See id. at 49-50 (describing North Carolina's referenda votes against construction
of a prison); see also N.C. STATE PRISON DEPARTMENT, BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE
STATE PRISON DEPARTMENT: JULY 1, 1930 - JUNE 30, 1932, at 7 (1932); Hilda Jane
Zimmerman, Penal Systems and Penal Reforms in the South Since the Civil War 30 (1947)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill) (on file with
North Carolina Collection, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill).
81. See James B. Browning, The North Carolina Black Code, 15 J. NEGRO HIST. 461,
461-73 (1930) (describing former slave owners' decision to enact black codes and assessing
the effects of these restrictions on personal, public, and economic life).
82. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION,
1863-1877, at 148-51 (1988) (describing freedmen's belief that the Freedmen's Bureau
would protect their new rights); Eric Foner, Rights and the Constitution in Black Life
During the Civil War and Reconstruction, 74 J. AM. HIST. 863, 880-81 (1987) (describing
freedmen's belief that the Fourteenth Amendment would protect their rights and protect
them from violence).
83. See FONER, supra note 82, at 256-57 (describing Republicans' intent that the
Fourteenth Amendment guarantee federal protection of the rights of freedmen).
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black man for a crime for which the white man is not to be hanged."'
In addition, congressional hearings addressed the unequal treatment
of African American victims, with witnesses recounting the
widespread but largely unpunished violence against newly freed
slaves.85 However, as Reconstruction ended, and with it federal
protection of black defendants and victims of violence, these concerns
were largely abandoned or deferred.86 When the federal government
withdrew from North Carolina, African Americans experienced a
resurgence of personal violence and legal discrimination.87
84. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866). For more on the black codes and
the Fourteenth Amendment, see Michael Kent Curtis, The Fourteenth Amendment:
Recalling What the Court Forgot, 56 DRAKE L. REV. 911, 991-92 (2008).
85. At congressional hearings on the inequities of the southern justice system, an
officer stationed in North Carolina from July 1865 until January 1866 testified:
Of the thousand cases of murder, robbery, and maltreatment of freedmen that
have come before me ... I have never yet known a single case in which the local
authorities or police or citizens made any attempt or exhibited any inclination to
redress any of these wrongs or to protect such persons.
REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON RECONSTRUCTION, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 209
(1866). Another officer testified: "There was a case reported in Pitt County of a man
named Carson who murdered a negro. There was also a case reported to me of a man
named Cooley who murdered a negro near Goldsborough. Neither of these men has been
tried or arrested." Id. at 213; see also Lisa Cardyn, Sexualized Racism/Gendered Violence:
Outraging the Body Politic in the Reconstruction South, 100 MICH. L. REV. 675, 701, 722,
788 (2002) (describing numerous incidents of unpunished violence against African
Americans in the South and, specifically, in North Carolina during Reconstruction and the
rise of Klan violence, including an inquiry by the United States Senate specially focused
on North Carolina before the establishment of the Senate Joint Select Committee in
1871); Jeffrey J. Pokorak, Rape as a Badge of Slavery: The Legal History of, and Remedies
for, Prosecutorial Race-of-Victim Charging Disparities, 7 NEV. L.J. 1, 20 (2006) (describing
unequal application of the law as particularly problematic in failing to prosecute white
perpetrators of serious crimes against African Americans).
86. The difficulty of guaranteeing equal treatment for victims and the strength of
racial prejudice shortly after the Civil War were shown by State v. McAfee, 64 N.C. 339
(1870), in which the court reversed the decision of the trial court to deny defense counsel's
proposal to ask the jurors on voir dire, in the trial of an African American man for rape,
whether they could "do equal and impartial justice between the State and a colored man."
Id. at 340. In the opinion, Justice Thomas Settle recounted his observations regarding a
case, tried shortly after emancipation, in which a victim was an elderly African American
killed while doing his farm chores. See id. at 340-41; see also ALBION W. TOURGtE, A
FOOL'S ERRAND 256-58 (John Hope Franklin ed., Harvard 1961) (1879) (recounting
details of the case described by Settle). Prospective jurors were asked if they had any
feelings which would prevent them from convicting a white man for the murder of an
African American. See McAffee, 64 N.C. at 340. Settle recounted that, in addition to the
regular panel, the trial court had to order three additional venires of fifty each before he
found twelve jurors who did not respond that "they would not convict a white man for
killing a negro." Id. at 340-41.
87. See EDWARD L. AYERS, THE PROMISE OF THE NEW SOUTH: LIFE AFTER
RECONSTRUCTION 153-59 (1992); LITWACK, supra note 11, at 280-325, 445-47.
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The use of the death penalty between the end of the Civil War
and the beginning of the twentieth century continued to demonstrate
the intersection of this violence and racial discrimination. As during
slavery, in this period just one white person was executed for a crime
against an African American. African Americans represented 74%
of the 160 people executed from the end of the Civil War to 1910,89
even though the African American percentage of the population
never exceeded 38%.90 Other African Americans were victims of
another kind of lethal punishment-lynchings. Lynchings, which are
discussed further in the next section,9" became increasingly frequent,'
brutal,93 race-based,94 and southern 9 in the 1880s and 1890s. In some
periods, lynchings outnumbered executions.96
The influence of race on the death penalty in North Carolina
between the colonial era and the twentieth century was complex, yet
it is clear that the state's implementation of the punishment was
88. See Michael L. Radelet, Execution of Whites for Crimes Against Blacks: Exception
to the Rule?, 30 So. Q. 529, 533, 539 (1989). In 1880, Daniel Keath was indicted for the
murder of a child whose "head was crushed as with a stone, and her body bore marks of
violent sexual connection." State v. Keath, 83 N.C. 626, 627 (1880). The victim was an
eleven-year-old African American. See Radelet, supra, at 539; see also Hanging in
Rutherford, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Dec. 19, 1880, at 2. The defendant, who
had previously served a prison term in Kentucky, was described as "a horse thief, swindler,
bigamist (with three wives), and rapist who drank heavily and had deserted from the
Confederate Army." Radelet, supra, at 539.
89. See Espy File, supra note 8. Among those executions in this group in which the
defendant's race is shown, the racial composition was as follows: African American-119,
White-25, Native American-2, Unknown-14. Id.
90. See 1790 to 1990 Census, supra note 44.
91. See infra Part I.B.l.d.
92. See AYERS, supra note 87, at 155-56.
93. See LITWACK, supra note 11, at 284-86.
94. See W. FITZHUGH BRUNDAGE, LYNCHING IN THE NEW SOUTH: GEORGIA AND
VIRGINIA, 1880-1930, at 7-8 (1993).
95. See id.
96. Scholars estimate that nearly 2,500 African Americans were killed in lynchings
between 1880 and 1930. See LITWACK, supra note 11, at 280-325; STEWART E. TOLNAY &
E.M. BECK, A FESTIVAL OF VIOLENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF SOUTHERN LYNCHINGS, 1882-
1930, at 17 (1995). Lynchings continued in North Carolina until at least 1941. See BRUCE
E. BAKER, THIS MOB WILL SURELY TAKE MY LIFE: LYNCHINGS IN THE CAROLINAS,
1871-1947, at 167-70 (2008) (listing confirmed lynchings in North Carolina); Espy File,
supra note 8 (listing executions in North Carolina for comparison to list of lynchings). The
relationship between lynchings and the death penalty is discussed in Part I.B.l.d. On a
yearly basis, neither lynchings nor executions in North Carolina were particularly frequent
in contrast with some states in the Deep South, but lynchings outnumbered legal
executions between the end of the Civil War and the beginning of state-run executions in
1910. See BAKER, supra, at 168. In some years during this period, the number of lynchings
dwarfed the number of legal hangings: in 1869 there were twenty-three lynchings but just
one legal execution, and, in 1888, ten lynchings took place but no executions. See id. at
167-70.
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cruelly unfair to both African American defendants and victims.97
From 1726 to 1910, 72% of those executed were African American.98
Various exceptions that benefitted both white and black defendants
reduced the total number of executions;99 however, operating
alongside the systematic exclusion of African Americans from the
criminal justice decision-making process, they did not make the
system fair or the process just.
B. Continuity and Change in a New Era
This Part examines executions between 1910, when North
Carolina transferred authority over executions from counties to the
state and replaced the gallows with the electric chair,"° and 1961,
when the state's last pre-Furman execution took place. 1' The change
from locally conducted hangings to electrocutions at a central
location made North Carolina among the region's, and indeed the
97. Moreover, African Americans were, except for a brief period during
Reconstruction, almost totally excluded from jury service. See supra note 44 (discussing
limited African American presence on juries).
98. Between 1726 (the first recorded legal hanging in the colony) and 1910 (the last
hanging under county authority), the record shows that North Carolina executed at least
424 people. Espy File, supra note 8. Race of the defendant is known in 404 cases. Id. Of
these executions, 291 were of African Americans, 110 were of whites, and three were of
Native Americans. See id. The race of twenty people during this period is unconfirmed.
The African American population percentage ranged from 26.8% to 38.0% over the
period. See 1790 to 1990 Census, supra note 44.
99. See, e.g., State v. Jim, 12 N.C. (1 Dev.) 142, 143 (1826) (voiding death sentence for
a slave because of the court's enforcement of strict rules requiring the sufficiency of
indictments); State v. Boon, I N.C. (Tay.) 191, 191-200 (1801) (interpreting a statute that
punished the murder of a slave by a white man as a capital offense to be invalid because of
a slight imperfection in its use of terminology); State v. Sue, 1 N.C. (Cam. & Nor.) 277,
281-84 (1800) (voiding a death sentence against a slave because the statute applicable to
slaves did not specifically provide for punishment and the common law applicable to free
men did not carry a death sentence). "[F]ear, compassion, formalism, material security,
and recognition of moral qualities played a role in each judicial finding," creating gaps that
allowed for occasional leniency for slave defendants. Reuel E. Schiller, Note, Conflicting
Obligations: Slave Law and the Late Antebellum North Carolina Supreme Court, 78 VA. L.
REV. 1207, 1251 (1992); see also Flanigan, supra note 51, at 557-58 (discussing such
leniency). Some courts were, however, willing to eschew this so-called formalism in order
to protect the interests of the slaveholding class. See Sally Greene, State v. Mann
Exhumed, 87 N.C. L. REV. 701, 727-50 (2009) (discussing the ideological context of the
decision).
100. N.C. GEN. ASSEMBLY, SENATE JOURNAL SESSION 1909, at 18 (1909) (noting the
introduction of Senate Bill 37 to establish a permanent place in the State Penitentiary for
executions and to change the mode of executions to electrocution); Act to Prescribe the
Mode of Capital Punishment in North Carolina, ch. 443, § 1, 1909 N.C. Sess. Laws 758,
758.
101. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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nation's, first participants in the process of "delocalization.' ' 10 2 North
Carolina's leaders hoped to regularize the execution process and
make it more humane, but their focus lay in how the death penalty
was applied,1 3 rather than to whom and in what circumstances it was
imposed. This Part ends in 1961 when North Carolina executed the
last prisoner under the death penalty system later invalidated by
Furman v. Georgia. 4
For much of this period, North Carolina law mandated a death
sentence for four crimes: first degree murder, rape, first degree
burglary, and arson.1 5 These mandatory laws were enacted shortly
after the end of the Civil War, and it was not until the 1940s that the
death penalty for these crimes became a matter of discretionary
judgment for the jury."° North Carolina's 362 executions during this
period placed it sixth nationally and third in the South.0 7
As developed in Part I.A, the death penalty prior to
emancipation was principally used for the execution of slaves, thus
closely linking the death penalty and race. After the end of slavery,
legal structures changed. However, the influence of race on
executions from the Civil War to 1910-a period that includes
Reconstruction, its termination, and the beginning of the Jim Crow
102. See WILLIAM J. BOWERS, EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA 37-38 (1974) (describing the
movement to state-imposed executions both nationally and in the South).
103. See Trina N. Seitz, The Killing Chair: North Carolina's Experiment in Civility and
the Execution of Allen Foster, 81 N.C. HIST. REV. 38, 39-40 (2004) (noting belief that the
electric chair was more civilized and humane than hanging). In 1936, North Carolina
began using the gas chamber to execute criminals. First Lethal Gas Victim Dies in Torture
as Witnesses Quail, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Jan. 25, 1936, at 1. For more on
this change and its implications, see generally Seitz, supra.
104. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
105. See Adcock, supra note 9, at 116 (providing the history of enactment for these
four mandatory death penalty crimes through constitutional provision and legislation in
1868 and 1869).
106. See id. at 117 (describing how mandatory death sentences were replaced with a
discretionary system, first for burglary and arson in 1941, and then for murder and rape in
1949). The mandatory nature of North Carolina's death penalty system likely added to the
number of executions, but clear cause and effect is difficult to determine since other parts
of that system, such as the frequent grants of clemency, see id. at 117-18, seemed to
respond to the obvious need to ameliorate its harshness.
107. North Carolina executed 362 people under state authority between 1910 and 1961.
The Espy File lists 360 of these executions but does not include the execution of Taylor
Love on December 1, 1911, or Edward Floyd on October 25, 1946. See Espy File, supra
note 8; Slayer Executed in Gas Chamber, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Oct. 26,
1946, at 10; Taylor Love Pays Death Penalty, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Dec. 2,
1911, at 5; DOC Persons Executed in N.C. 1910-1961, supra note 8. Additionally, this
count does not include the 1910 hanging of Henry Spivey, as Spivey was not executed
under state authority. See Seitz, supra note 103, at 40 (noting that Spivey's hanging in
Elizabethtown was the last judicial, county-based execution in the state).
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era-remained strong and pernicious. This influence persisted into
the twentieth century, as borne out by events and execution data. Of
the 362 people executed, 283 were African American and six were
Native American, meaning that 78% of those executed were African
American and 80% were minorities.0 8 By contrast, 75% of the
victims in these cases were white.' 9 Census figures show that North
Carolina's African American population during this period declined
from a high of 32% in 1910 to a low of 25% in 1960.110 The race-of-
the-defendant and race-of-the-victim percentages are so extreme as to
make explanation by non-racial factors very unlikely.
1. Racial Discrimination Against African American Defendants
The experiences of three African American defendants in capital
cases reveal the influence of race on the death penalty in North
Carolina. All three men were tried quickly in communities where
whites responded angrily to reports of attacks by African American
men against white females. Tom Gwyn was executed for rape in 1919,
only two months after his crime."' Alvin Mansel was convicted of
rape in 1925 but later had his sentence commuted and received
parole.' Larry Newsome was executed for murder and attempted
rape in 1928, less than a year after the crime, even though the reversal
of his first death sentence required a retrial.' These cases reveal the
strong, if not uniform, influence of race on the death penalty in the
twentieth century.
a. Tom Gwyn
On April 29, 1919, Tom Gwyn was arrested for raping Ruth
Hildebrand,"' a sixteen-year-old white girl near Hickory, North
108. See Espy File, supra note 8.
109. See id. Race-of-the-victim information is developed from the Espy File,
supplemented and corrected principally by examination of contemporary newspaper
reports. The race-of-the-victim calculation was performed using the 325 executions during
this period where the race of the victim could be confirmed. Of that total, 244 (75%) were
white, 78 (24%) were black, and 3 (1%) were Native American. See id.
110. Between 1910 and 1960, the percentage of African Americans in North Carolina
ranged from 31.6% to 24.5%, declining throughout the period; less than 1% of the
population was Native American. See 1790 to 1990 Census, supra note 44.
111. See infra notes 115-23 and accompanying text.
112. See infra notes 125-44 and accompanying text.
113. See infra notes 145-64 and accompanying text.
114. Indictment, State v. Gwyn, May Special Term (N.C. Super. Ct. 1919) (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review).
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Carolina.11 5 Gwyn was jailed in nearby Newton shortly after the
victim reported the crime, but he was "spirited away," first to
Lumberton and then to an undisclosed location, after a mob broke
down the doors of the jail in an effort to lynch him. 6 As Gwyn
awaited trial, a local newspaper reported that "there is no longer any
doubt that [Gwyn] was the guilty brute" whose "beast-like hands had
throttled" the neck of his victim."
7
The trial occurred at a special term of court 8 less than a month
later in Newton. Large crowds gathered around the courthouse, and
the Catawba County sheriff summoned all his officers and deputized
twenty-five soldiers in the area to protect Gwyn." 9 With tensions
running high inside and outside the courtroom,12 ° the trial was
completed in a single day, even with jury selection taking place that
morning and an adjournment for lunch. Jury deliberations took just
ten minutes."' Gwyn was rushed to the state prison to await his
execution. He died in the electric chair on June 27, 1919, less than
two months after the crime was reported.123
b. Alvin Mansel
On September 19, 1925, Alvin Mansel was arrested for the rape
of Lucy Cartee,124 a thirty-year-old white woman, near Asheville,
North Carolina. 12  Although Mansel, "thoroughly frightened,"
insisted to a reporter that he was innocent, many Asheville residents
thought otherwise, and because the alleged rape was the second such
incident in recent days, locals were on edge. 126 That night, sheriff's
deputies saved Mansel from a mob of as many as 1,000 people by
115. Mob Attempts to Lynch Negro Accused of Crime, HICKORY DAILY REC., Apr. 30,
1919, at 1.
116. Id.
117. Negro Thought Girl Would Not Tell, HICKORY DAILY REC., May 1, 1919, at 1.
118. Sentence of Death for Negro Assailant, HICKORY DAILY REC., May 28,1919, at 9.
119. Large Crowd at Newton for Trial, HICKORY DAILY REC., May 26,1919, at 1.
120. Gwin [sic] Is Sentenced to Die on June 27, HICKORY DAILY REC., May 26, 1919,
at 1.
121. Id.; Large Crowd at Newton for Trial, supra note 119.
122. Gwin [sic] Is Sentenced to Die on June 27, supra note 120; Large Crowd at Newton
for Trial, supra note 119.
123. Tom Gwyn Dies in Electric Chair, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), June 28,
1919, at 12.
124. Indictment, State v. Mansel, 192 N.C. 20, 133 S.E. 190 (1926) (No. 547) (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review).
125. Sheriff Takes Negro from the City as Big Crowd Begins to Form, ASHEVILLE
CITIZEN, Sept. 20, 1925, at. 1.
126. Id.
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secretly removing him from the jail where he had been confined 27
The deputies took Mansel several hours away to Charlotte,' 2 where
he remained until his trial date. After returning to Asheville for his
trial, he was escorted into the Buncombe County courthouse by
armed National Guardsmen.'29 Local whites gathered in large
numbers for the trial and were searched for weapons before entering
the courtroom; local African Americans were urged to stay out of
sight.3 The presiding judge warned jurors against letting race
influence their verdict,' and the press opined that the trial would
result in the most "perfect expression of right possible for fallible
mankind-we should accept it with confidence in its verity and its
justice.' 32
Hastened by night sessions, Mansel's trial proceeded swiftly.
33
On the morning of November 6, just two days after his arraignment,
Mansel was sentenced to death. "I hope to meet you all in heaven,"
he said. "I am not guilty, but the jury has come out, and said I was."' 34
Indeed, the facts of the case suggested that Mansel was innocent.'35
For instance, the survivor of the attack had described her assailant as
127. Asheville Mob Enters Jail in Quest of Negro Prisoner, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Sept. 20, 1925, at. 1; Quiet Sunday at Buncombe Jail, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Sept. 21, 1925, at 1; Report of Mob Proves Mistake, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Sept. 22, 1925, at 1; Sheriff Takes Negro from the City as Big Crowd
Begins to Form, supra note 125.
128. Negro Assailant of Woman Is Held in Charlotte Jail after All Night Ride with
Mitchell, ASHEVILLE CITIZEN, Sept. 21, 1925, at 1.
129. Negro Goes on Trial Today for Attacking White Woman of City, ASHEVILLE
CITIZEN, Nov. 2, 1925, at 1. Preston Neely, another African American man charged with
rape, was tried immediately after Mansel, but he was acquitted. See Preston Neely Goes on
Trial for His Life, ASHEVILLE CITIZEN, Nov. 6, 1925, at 1; Preston Neely Is Acquitted and
Rushed to South Carolina Under Guard, ASHEVILLE CITIZEN, Nov. 8, 1925, at 1.
130. See Negro Leaders Advise Race of Present Duties, ASHEVILLE CITIZEN, Nov. 2,
1925, at 1.
131. See Fate of Accused Negro Is in Hands of Jury, ASHEVILLE CITIZEN, Nov. 5, 1925,
at 1.
132. Editorial, Even Handed Justice, ASHEVILLE CITIZEN, Nov. 4, 1925, at 4.
133. Alvin Mansel Sentenced to Die in the Electric Chair, ASHEVILLE CITIZEN, Nov. 6,
1925, at 1.
134. Id.
135. Mansel's attorneys tried to demonstrate that Mansel could not have been present
at the scene of the crime, given that witnesses placed him at his workplace, and they
apparently had substantial evidence of that alibi. See Transcript of Record at 38-45, State
v. Mansell, 192 N.C. 20, 133 S.E. 190 (1926) (No. 547) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review) (describing testimony of witnesses that Mansel remained at work during the
time of the crime); id. at 63-65 (summarizing alibi evidence); Hugo Adam Bedau &
Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV.
21, 143 (1987) (describing evidence of Mansel's likely innocence).
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a thirty-five year-old, light-skinned black man.'36 Alvin Mansel was
dark-skinned, and he was seventeen years old.'37 The Supreme Court
of North Carolina heard Mansel's case a few months later, and, in
addition to arguing that Mansel was innocent, the young man's
attorneys claimed that Mansel was the target of an effort to meet the
demands of the mob with a legally sanctioned but illegitimate
execution.'38 The court rejected the arguments and affirmed the
conviction. 13 9
In a reversal of the sentiments that Mansel's lawyers had decried,
four thousand people, including the victim,14° wrote to Governor
Angus MacLean urging that he stop Mansel's execution.'4' MacLean
responded, commuting Mansel's death sentence to life imprisonment
and stating that only the execution of an innocent was more troubling
than the crime of rape. 42 Soon, Mansel's life sentence was reduced to
a thirty-year term, and in October 1930, he left prison on parole. 43
The News and Observer recognized his supporters for saving him
"from being killed for a crime he knew nothing about."' 4
136. See Transcript of Record at 48, State v. Mansell, 192 N.C. 20, 133 S.E. 190 (1926)
(No. 547) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (giving testimony of witness
regarding early description).
137. Id. at 65-66 (giving judge's summary of defense evidence).
138. The attorneys argued:
Under the circumstances, we respectfully submit the prisoner did not have a fair
trial; that it was impossible in the presence of armed Militia to remove the idea
from the public generally, including the Jury, that the Court was simply protecting
the defendant to the end not that he should have a fair trial, but, that the law
should have its course and that the law should execute him instead of the mob.
The whole atmosphere of the Court House spoke out and said: "Let the law have
him. It will do what ought to be done and let individuals stand back and let it have
its way."
Brief of Defendant at 7, State v. Mansell, 192 N.C. 20, 133 S.E. 190 (1926) (No. 547) (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review).
139. Mansell, 192 N.C. at 25, 133 S.E. at 193 (finding no errors of law and affirming the
judgment); see also Supreme Court Decides Alvin Mansel Must Die, ASHEVILLE CITIZEN,
May 28,1926, at 1.
140. Woman Victim Pleads to Spare Negro's Life, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 1925, at 2.
141. Bedau & Radelet, supra note 135, at 143.
142. Application for Pardon of Alvin Mansel (July 8, 1926), in PUBLIC PAPERS AND
LETTERS OF ANGUS WILTON MCLEAN, GOVERNOR OF NORTH CAROLINA 1925-1929, at
756 (David Leroy Corbitt ed., 1931).
143. Bedau & Radelet, supra note 135, at 143-44 (describing the Mansel case).
144. Mansel and His Benefactor, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Nov. 8, 1930, at
1. Meanwhile, although six thousand people-two thousand more than supported
Mansel-appealed to Governor MacLean on behalf of the imprisoned members of the
lynch mob, the governor announced that he would not pardon them. See Brock Barkley,
McLean Refuses to be Moved by Appeals for Participants in Riot, ASHEVILLE CITIZEN,
Feb. 11, 1926, at 1.
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c. Larry Newsome
On December 8, 1927, Larry Newsome was arrested in Wayne
County, North Carolina, for the murder of Beulah Tedder, a
fourteen-year-old white girl. 45 Although the county physician who
examined her body testified that she had not been raped, 46 sheriff's
deputies testified that Newsome, while being transported to
Goldsboro from the state prison in Raleigh where he had been placed
for safekeeping because of a threatened lynching, admitted
attempting to rape Tedder and killing her to keep her from telling her
father about the assault.
147
Newsome's trial began in Goldsboro just two days after the
murder, starting on Saturday and concluding in an unusual Sunday
session of superior court.' 48 Given the lynching threat and high
tensions in the community, the presiding judge took steps to protect
Newsome in case of violence at the trial.149 Nevertheless, during the
testimony of a deputy sheriff, the victim's father and her uncle
grabbed Newsome and, joined by others, attempted to drag him from
145. Tedder's father discovered the body late in the afternoon of that day. State v.
Newsome, 195 N.C. 552, 553, 143 S.E. 187,188 (1928).
146. See id.; Transcript of Record at 7, State v. Newsome, 195 N.C. 552, 143 S.E. 187
(1928) (No. 74) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). The News and Observer
went further and reported that the victim had been "criminally assaulted." Larry
Newsome Dies at Prison, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Sept. 29, 1928, at 1.
147. See Newsome, 195 N.C. at 554-56, 143 S.E. at 188-89 (stating that the evidence
"tended to show" that Newsome seized the victim around the waist, but she fought him off
and ran from him, and he killed her when he caught her because she said she would tell
her father); Transcript of Record at 14-16, State v. Newsome, 195 N.C. 552, 143 S.E. 187
(1928) (No. 74) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (setting out testimony of
Deputy Sheriff J.R Kornegay describing defendants confession of crime); id. at 16
(providing corroborating testimony of Deputy Carl Smith who witnessed the
conversation); see also id. at 18 (summarizing testimony of psychiatrist W. C. Linville
providing less detailed but similar description of crime). Newsome unsuccessfully
challenged the statements to the deputies as involuntary because they were made after the
deputies assured him they would protect him, see Newsome, 195 N.C. at 556, 143 S.E. at
190, and he unsuccessfully challenged a less detailed admission to a psychiatrist at the state
mental hospital that was secured through efforts by his attorney to testify to his mental
limitations, see Transcript of Record at 18, State v. Newsome, 195 N.C. 552, 143 S.E. 187
(1928) (No. 74) (classifying defendant as "high grade moron"), on grounds of physician-
patient privilege. Newsome, 195 N.C. at 558-59, 143 S.E. at 190-91.
148. Near Riot Marks Trial in Carolina, ATLANTA CONST., Dec. 12, 1927, at 2 (stating
that the trial included the only known Sunday trial session); see also Transcript of Record
at 35-36, State v. Newsome, 195 N.C. 552, 143 S.E. 187 (1928) (No. 74) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review) (setting out defense attorney's objection under category of
"Assignment of Error Not Noted as Exceptions" to the court "ordering a trial
immediately after the alleged homicide and before the prisoner could prepare himself for
trial").
149. The presiding judge sought to keep secret the news of Newsome's arrival from
Raleigh. See Girl's Alleged Slayer Faces Trial on Sunday, WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 1927, at 7.
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the courtroom to cries of "Take him! Take him!" 150 The sheriff rushed
into the crowd, wrestled Newsome away from the victim's uncle, and
took him into the relative safety of the jury room. 5' Returning to the
courtroom, he fired two shots into the ceiling to "quell the tumult.'
152
The presiding judge held a pistol on the crowd, warning that "[t]he
next man who undertakes to lay hands on this prisoner I will shoot
dead" and that "there will not be a lynching here."' 53 As the judge
held the crowd at bay, the prosecutor jumped onto a table and rang
the courthouse bell-the prearranged signal for members of a waiting
military company to give aid-bringing soldiers to the courtroom
within a few minutes.
154
The soldiers formed a cordon around Newsome when the trial
resumed on Sunday morning.'55 The defense relied on testimony of a
psychiatrist, who found that the defendant had the mental age of a
ten to twelve-year-old, to argue that Newsome was incapable of
appreciating the nature of the crime and therefore he was not
guilty.'56 But after eighteen minutes of deliberation, the jury found
Newsome guilty of murder, and after receiving a death sentence, he
was rushed from the courtroom and taken to death row.157 According
to the News and Observer, the speed of the conviction set a record: it
came just sixty hours after the victim's death.58
150. Newsome, 195 N.C. at 576, 143 S.E. at 199 (Brodgen, J., concurring) (quoting from
memorandum of trial judge submitted to the Supreme Court regarding events in the
courtroom); Transcript of Record at 30-31, State v. Newsome, 195 N.C. 552, 143 S.E. 187
(1928) (No. 74) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (setting out trial judge's
statement); Near Riot Marks Trial in Carolina, supra note 148, at 2.
151. Newsome, 195 N.C. at 576, 143 S.E. at 200 (Brodgen, J., concurring).
152. Id.
153. Judge Grady, Pistol in Hand, Foils Attempt to Lynch Negro Murderer, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Dec. 12,1927, at 1; Newsome, 195 N.C. at 576, 143 S.E. at 200
(Brodgen, J., concurring in result).
154. Newsome, 195 N.C. at 576, 143 S.E. at 200 (Brodgen, J., concurring); Judge, with
Pistol, Defies Court Mob at Trial for Life, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 1927, at 1.
155. Judge, with Pistol, Defies Court Mob at Trial for Life, supra note 154.
156. See Transcript of Record at 27-28, State v. Newsome, 195 N.C. 552, 143 S.E. 187
(1928) (No. 74) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (providing judge's summary
of defense contentions); Judge Grady, Pistol in Hand, Foils Attempt to Lynch Negro
Murderer, supra note 153; Newsome, 195 N.C. at 558-59, 143 S.E. at 189 (describing
psychiatrist's testimony regarding defendant's mental development).
157. See Governor Lauds Action of Grady in Foiling Mob, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Dec. 13, 1927, at 1.
158. See Judge Grady, Pistol in Hand, Foils Attempt to Lynch Negro Murderer, supra
note 153, at 1; Negro Scheduled for Death Today, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.),
Sept. 28, 1928, at 20 (describing the death sentence as coming quickly-within forty-eight
hours-of the victim's death).
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On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Carolina denied
Newsome's argument that a new trial should be granted because of
the attempt to drag him from the courtroom. The decision relied on
the trial judge's finding that "during the ... demonstration, the jury
sat in perfect order, and did not appear to be at all disturbed" and
concluded that nothing in the record showed that the jury disobeyed
the judge's charge not to be influenced by the courtroom incident. 15 9
However, the court granted Newsome a new trial because the trial
court failed to instruct the jury on second degree murder."6
Despite the reversal of his conviction and death sentence,
Newsome's story does not end like Mansel's. At his retrial, conducted
in another county to avoid the "intense feeling" in Wayne County,"'
he was again convicted of murder and sentenced to death.'62
Although his counsel filed a notice of appeal, the appeal was not
"prosecuted as required," and the supreme court dismissed it.'63 A
little over two weeks later, Newsome was executed.' 64 Less than ten
months had passed from the discovery of the victim's body to the
execution.
These three cases demonstrate not only the impact of race upon
the death penalty in this period, but also its complexity. Gwyn and
Newsome were quickly sentenced to death in trials pervaded by racial
hostility unique to the trials of African Americans accused of crimes
against whites.' The Supreme Court of North Carolina failed, at
159. See Newsome, 195 N.C. at 565-66, 143 S.E. at 194. Two members of the court
disagreed and would have held that the events in the courtroom required a new trial under
the principle of Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923), that a hurried conviction under
mob domination requires the corrective action of new trial. Id. at 567-68, 143 S.E. at 194-
95 (Stacy, J., concurring); id. at 568-75, 143 S.E. at 196-99 (Adams, J., concurring).
160. Id. at 564, 143 S.E. at 193-94 (majority opinion) (ruling that failure to submit this
charge was error because it was supported by the evidence).
161. Affidavit for Removal at 1, State v. Newsome (N.C. Super. Ct. June 5, 1928) (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review) (requesting removal to another county "to the
end that a fair and impartial trial may be had"); Order at 1, State v. Newsome (N.C. Super.
Ct. June 11, 1928) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (granting removal to
Chatham County, North Carolina).
162. See Larry Newsome Dies at Prison, supra note 146; Negro Scheduled for Death
Today, supra note 158.
163. State v. Newsome, 196 N.C. 16, 17, 144 S.E. 300, 300 (1928) (stating also that the
Supreme Court found no error on the face of the record).
164. See Espy File, supra note 8; North Carolina Negro Dies in Electric Chair,
ATLANTA CONST., Sept. 29, 1928, at 6 (noting the execution date as September 28, 1928).
The opinion dismissing the appeal is dated September 12, 1928. See Newsome, 196 N.C. at
16, 144 S.E. at 300.
165. By current standards, trials in this period were conducted quickly, but a very
different pattern appears in the cases of four executed white defendants: W.Y.
Westmoreland; J.T. Harris; and Joe and Gardner Cain, see Espy File, supra note 8, than
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least by any modern standards, to even consider the influence of
racial discrimination in these trials. Mansel, first the subject of a
rushed trial driven by racial animosity, became the beneficiary of an
act of mercy inspired by support from the white community. Mansel's
innocence, of course, was overlooked or ignored in the courtroom
and continued to be overlooked even after it became evident:
Governor 0. Max Gardner declined to pardon him despite being
"absolutely convinced" of his innocence. 166 Guilty and innocent,
executed and spared, these African American men stood trial,
received sentences, and mounted appeals in a death penalty system
strongly influenced by race.
d. Speedy Trials and Death Sentences under the Threat of
Lynching
Although cases proceeding from the date of the crime to
execution at the pace of Gwyn's or Newsome's were not typical,
neither were they unique.67 Available records show that African
for African Americans tried in an atmosphere influenced by the actions of a mob. Their
trials and appeals were completed over a period of as much as sixteen months and as little
as six months with the execution occurring at least a year and, in one case, close to two
years after the crime occurred. See State v. Westmoreland, 181 N.C. 590, 590, 107 S.E. 438,
439 (1921); State v. Harris, 181 N.C. 600, 600-01, 107 S.E. 466, 466 (1921); State v. Cain,
178 N.C. 724, 724-25, 100 S.E. 884, 884 (1919); Transcript of Record at 64, State v. Cain,
178 N.C. 724, 100 S.E. 884 (1919) (No. 346) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
166. Mansel and His Benefactor, supra note 144, at 1. Mansel spent five years in prison
for a crime he did not commit and left prison on parole, a convicted rapist.
167. See State v. Caldwell, 181 N.C. 519, 520, 523, 106 S.E. 139, 139, 141 (1921)
(describing a speedy trial, with the crime occurring November 21, the trial starting
December 2 in Goldsboro, North Carolina, a lynch mob attacking the courthouse that
night, and the verdict being received the next evening); Espy File, supra note 8 (showing
execution of Caldwell, an African American, on October 31); Lee Washington Dies in
Chair, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Dec. 29, 1923, at 2 (describing process lasting
less than two months from arrest to execution). Even with his successful appeal and retrial,
Newsome's execution was less than ten months from the date of the crime. In a number of
other cases during this period, African Americans were tried and executed with great
speed and in an atmosphere dominated by the threat of mob violence. Bob Williams Will
Die Today, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Mar. 1, 1923, at 11 (describing swift trial,
under guard, of Bob Williams for murder); Death Row Inmate Tells His Story of Life,
Death, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Apr. 5, 1934, at 14 (describing mob pursuit
and speedy trial and death sentence of a convicted murderer); Goldsboro Quiet After
Sentence of Five Negroes, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Dec. 4, 1920, at 1
(describing a crowd of thousands "clamoring for the blood" of five blacks on trial for the
murder of a white man, two weeks after the murder); His Life Forfeit for a Foul Crime,
NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Oct. 28, 1911, at 5 (describing electrocution of
prisoner for rape forty-one days after his arrest); Nathan Montague in Electric Chair,
NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Feb. 16, 1911, at 5 (describing trial in special term of
court for rape and murder that took just four hours; Montague was executed just under
two months after his arrest); Two Executions Scheduled Today, NEWS & OBSERVER
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American men executed in North Carolina, particularly for rape,
sometimes evaded lynch mobs or were saved from lynching by local
law enforcement officers in order to receive a state-sanctioned
execution. 168 These speedy trials, with the suggestion of judicial
propriety but with outcomes determined by popular anger, are
sometimes termed "legal lynchings."
' 169
Actual lynchings in the South occurred with some frequency in
this period, persisting at least until the 1940s.17 ° Many scholars view
lynchings as a component of a punishment system that included the
death penalty. Sociologist David Garland has observed that lynchings,
like legal executions, were regularly occurring, scripted public events
mounted in response to allegations of serious crime undertaken in the
presence of a functioning justice system, and attended and defended
(Raleigh, N.C.), Dec. 10, 1937, at 11 (describing guilty verdict and death sentence within
seventy-two hours of the commission of the crime).
168. Between 1900 and 1941, at least ten of the African American men executed for
rape of white women were saved from lynching before their trial. The absence of a
description of a mob arrest or near lynching does not mean that such an event did not take
place. See Brief for the Defendant at 15, State v. Arthur Montague, 190 N.C. 841, 130 S.E.
838 (1925) (describing captor of suspect declaring that he "ought to kill you right here.");
Howard Craig Pays Penalty, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Dec. 5, 1914, at 2
(describing pursuit of suspect by "infuriated whites"); John Goss Dies Admitting Crime,
NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Dec. 8, 1925, at 9 (noting the need for troops to keep
order in the community where the crime took place); Lee Washington Dies in Chair, supra
note 167, at 2 (describing suspect's capture by posse and need for troops to keep him safe);
Mob Attempts to Lynch Negro Accused of Crime, HICKORY DAILY REC., Apr. 30, 1919, at
1 (describing effort to lynch suspect); Negro Boy Ends in Death Chair, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Aug. 11, 1931, at 2 (describing pursuit of suspect by a posse of
700); The Wages of Sin Death by Rope, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Nov. 17,
1904, at 1 (describing "enraged" posse and efforts to keep suspect alive for trial); Will
Black Dies in Electric Chair, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), July 22, 1916, at 2
(noting that there was such anger over a rape that the suspect's father was lynched); Will
Graham Goes to Death Coolly, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Dec. 19, 1906, at 4
(noting "hot pursuit" of suspects and effort to keep him safe after capture). Men suspected
of other crimes might also be pursued by armed posses. See, e.g., Negro West in Swamp
Surrounded by Posse, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Feb. 8, 1911, at 1 (describing
manhunt for murder suspect).
169. For some examples of legal lynchings, see Charles J. Ogletree, Making Race
Matter in Death Matters, in FROM LYNCH MOBS TO THE KILLING STATE: RACE AND THE
DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 55, 59-60 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds.,
2006). See generally GEORGE C. WRIGHT, RACIAL VIOLENCE IN KENTUCKY, 1865-1940:
LYNCHINGS, MOB RULE, AND "LEGAL LYNCHINGS" (1996) (exploring the relationship
between "legal lynchings" and other forms of violence against African Americans).
170. See BRUCE E. BAKER, supra note 96, at 4. Many instances of mob murder of
African Americans were not designated as lynchings. North Carolina's total placed it
above Virginia and Missouri, but it was not among the leaders in lynchings in the South.
See S. COMM'N ON THE STUDY OF LYNCHING, LYNCHINGS AND WHAT THEY MEAN 29
(1931).
2010] THE RACIAL JUSTICE ACT 2065
by respectable members of a community. 171At the time, many
supporters and opponents of lynchings alike saw executions and
lynchings as complementary in punishing African Americans for
crimes against white victims. Opponents of lynchings, hoping to
persuade the mob to let formal justice run its course, argued that
courtroom trials could yield the same result as mob killings.
Supporters threatened lynching as they demanded death sentences
for certain capital defendants. 172 The demand for a lethal result,
regardless of how it was reached, undoubtedly affected jurors'
decision-making process. 173 As one judge termed it, there was a right
way and the wrong way to administer justice,'74 but the outcome was
the same.
171. See David Garland, Penal Excess and Surplus Meaning: Public Torture Lynchings
in Twentieth-Century America, 39 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 793, 797-98 (2005) (describing six
ways in which lynchings defied conventional wisdom that imagines them as violent acts of
criminal deviance). For more on the relationship between these two forms of lethal
punishment, see Stuart Banner, Traces of Slavery: Race and the Death Penalty in Historical
Perspective, in FROM LYNCH MOBS TO THE KILLING STATE 96, 99-106 (Charles J.
Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds., 2006); James W. Clarke, Without Fear or Shame:
Lynching, Capital Punishment and the Subculture of Violence in the American South, 28
BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 269 passim (1998); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Black Man's Burden: Race
and the Death Penalty in America, 81 OR. L. REV. 15, 18 (2002). For more on this
relationship in North Carolina, see E.M. Beck, James L. Massey & Stewart E. Tolnay, The
Gallows, the Mob, and the Vote: Lethal Sanctioning of Blacks in North Carolina and
Georgia, 1882 to 1930, 23 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 317 passim (1989); Charles David Phillips,
Exploring Relations Among Forms of Social Control: The Lynching and Execution of
Blacks in North Carolina, 1889-1918, 21 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 361 passim (1987).
172. Columnist Nell Battle Lewis wrote that "the mob lynches, the State electrocutes."
Nell Battle Lewis, Incidentally, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Sept. 17, 1922, at 6.
173. At Harvey Lawrence's 1930 trial for first degree burglary, his attorney argued that
the armed national guardsmen present only heightened a dangerous atmosphere in which
Lawrence's fate was clear. Lawrence's attorney described jurors' mindsets thus:
[Lawrence] surely must be guilty of a capital offense, otherwise their demands
could not be so pronounced. They want him killed; and if we do not find him guilty
of a capital offense so that he may be legally executed, then we have made a gross
miscarriage of justice, and the populace will hold us in contempt. To save our own
reputations we must by our verdict take his life. Therefore we, for our verdict, find
the accused guilty as charged, which finding carried with it a legal death sentence;
and we have saved the State a lynching!
Brief for Appellant-Defendant at 4, State v. Lawrence, 199 N.C. 481, 154 S.E. 741 (1930)
(No. 90) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). The Supreme Court of North
Carolina denied Lawrence's appeal, Lawrence, 199 N.C. at 483, 154 S.E. at 742, and he was
executed on October 10, 1930, see Espy File, supra note 8. Lawrence's crime was first
degree burglary and contained the component of sexual threat against a white female
victim. See Transcript of Record at 9, State v. Lawrence, 199 N.C. 481, 154 S.E. 741 (1930)
(No. 90) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); infra Part I.B.2.
174. See State v. Caldwell, 181 N.C. 519, 522-26, 106 S.E. 139, 140-43 (1921) (quoting
statement of trial judge celebrating the successful efforts to prevent the lynching of the
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2. Race and Execution for Rape and First Degree Burglary
For two crimes, rape and burglary, the percentage of African
American defendants executed was particularly high. The fact that
rape was a capital crime at all and the racially disproportionate way in
which execution for rape was applied were products of fear among
many whites of black male sexual aggression against-or even social
contact withl'T-white women. 7 6 Thus, execution for rape was
reserved almost exclusively for black men with white victims. Sixty-
seven of the seventy-eight men executed for rape during this period
were African American, and among those executions, it is possible to
confirm that the victims were white in fifty-eight cases.'77 White men
were rarely punished for rape, whether their victims were white or
black. No white man was executed for the rape of an African
American woman in this period, and just ten whites were executed for
defendant and adding the endorsement of the appellate court to the trial court's decision
to try the defendant in such a charged atmosphere, which was within two weeks of the
crime's commission); see also Woodrow Price, Negro Facing Life Term Confesses Role in
Crime, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), June 28,1947, at 1.
175. See BOWERS, supra note 102, at 56 (suggesting the essential role of race in the
death penalty for rape in the South).
176. See JACQUELYN DOWD HALL, REVOLT AGAINST CHIVALRY: JESSIE DANIEL
AMES AND THE WOMEN'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST LYNCHING 145-49 (rev. ed. 1993)
(explaining the unique social role of black-on-white rape in the American South).
177. In the remaining nine cases, the victims were African American in six, Native
American in one, and cannot be determined in two. See Espy file, supra note 8; Death
Chair Claims Two Confessed Negro Slayers, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Nov. 8,
1930, at 14 (identifying murder victim as a "Negress"); Greensboro Slayer Dies, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), July 16, 1955, at 1 (noting execution of black defendant
without identifying race of victim); The First Electrocution Ends Walter Morrison's Life,
NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Mar. 19, 1910, at 5 (identifying race of rape victim
was Native American).
The lives of condemned African American men were sometimes spared when
their white victims had defied social mores. In other words, in some contexts, the racial
subjugation that most often denied blacks protection denied whites protection, too. For
example, Governor Cherry in 1947 commuted the death sentences of four African
American defendants who raped a white woman, explaining his decision arose from the
victim's "failure to observe a sense of propriety." Cherry Commutes Terms of Four
Robeson Rapists, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), May 3, 1947, at 1. For more on the
complexities of race, rape, and gender in the American South and in North Carolina, see
generally LISA LINDQUIST DORR, WHITE WOMEN, RAPE, AND THE POWER OF RACE IN
VIRGINIA, 1900-1960 (2004) (revealing how class and gender could interrupt the standard
narrative of white use of the legal system against African Americans in interracial rape
cases); ERIC W. RISE, THE MARTINSVILLE SEVEN: RACE, RAPE AND CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 51 (1995) (describing the complexities of a case of interracial rape wherein
black defendants received consideration contrary to the traditional use of punishment to
subordinate African Americans); Diane Miller Sommerville, The Rape Myth in the Old
South Reconsidered, 61 J. S. HIST. 481 (1995) (revealing that postbellum whites were more
fearful of black-on-white sexual violence than were antebellum whites).
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particularly horrific crimes against exclusively white victims, most of
them adolescents or young girls.178
Although the crime of burglary lacks the potent symbolism of
rape, it provides a stark example of the racial character of the death
penalty during this period, particularly the important impact of both
the race of the defendant and the race of the victim. Noted University
of North Carolina sociologist Guy B. Johnson explained that
execution for first degree burglary represented a response to "a
threat" of blacks entering white residences after dark.179 The
connection between burglary and sexual threat was so strong that one
condemned burglar won a commutation after Governor Locke Craig
determined that there was "no element of rape in this case."' 180
Indeed, of the twelve people who were executed for first degree
burglary in North Carolina between 1910 and 1961, all were African
Americans, and available reports of the crimes show that the homes
they entered were likely exclusively occupied by whites.18 1 It is
difficult to contest the view widely held among scholars that the
execution of African Americans for first degree burglary and rape-
and the retention of these capital crimes into the twentieth century,
unique to southern and border states-is attributable to race.18
These crimes, where race-of-the-defendant and race-of-the-
victim effects occur in combination and are exacerbated by the
178. No recorded case can be found in North Carolina of the execution of a white man
for raping an African American woman. Five black men were executed for raping black
women. Three of the victims in these cases were young, and one was a respected middle
class woman. See Espy file, supra note 8.
179. Guy B. Johnson, The Negro and Crime, 217 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC.
SCI. 93, 95 (1941).
180. Reasons for Pardons, Commutations, and Reprieves, 1912-1917, Locke Craig
Papers, G.O. 55, at 371, N.C. State Archives, Raleigh, N.C. North Carolina was among just
a handful of states (Alabama, Kentucky, and Virginia) that maintained burglary as a
capital crime. See HUGO ADAM BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 44-45 (rev.
ed. 1967).
181. See Memorandum of Race of Victim Information for African Americans
Executed from Assorted Newspapers Supplementing Espy Data (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review); see also Espy File, supra note 8; supra note 173 (noting that the
case of Harvey Lawrence fit this profile).
182. See, e.g., BOWERS, supra note 102, at 56 (attributing the persistence of capital rape
in southern and border states to the influence of racial prejudice); see also McCleskey v.
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 332 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that, although it did not
explicitly cite race in its opinion, the Court's ruling in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584
(1977), striking down the death penalty for rape was no doubt based on the fact that an
extreme majority of those subject to capital punishment for rape were black men,
particularly in cases where the victim was white, citing, inter alia, evidence that federally
compiled statistics revealed that from 1930 to 1977 Georgia had executed sixty-two men
for rape, fifty-eight of whom were black and four were white).
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volatile element of sexual assault, present the strongest examples of
the effect of race on the death penalty. However, the effect of race on
the death penalty in North Carolina was not limited to cases of rape
and burglary. Between 1910 and 1961, excluding executions for rape
and first degree burglary, African Americans constituted nearly 74%
(202 of the 272) of the defendants executed for murder, and in those
cases in which it is possible to confirm the race of the murder victims,
62% of these victims were white. 183 Just one white person was
executed for a crime, murder, committed against an African
American, a result that the News and Observer reported was not only
a rarity but also a "quirk of fate."'' "
3. Racial Stereotypes of Black Criminality
The depiction of black capital suspects and criminals in North
Carolina's newspapers reveal the social context that made this kind of
disparity possible. Newspaper coverage of executions during this
period showcased stereotypes about African American criminality.'85
Throughout this period, journalists regularly represented black
prisoners as subhuman, including in the News and Observer, which
reported on nearly every execution conducted in Raleigh. For
instance, the paper reported that John Goss "looked the part of the
picture that 'mean nigger' conjures up." '186 Goss was "short, squat,
183. See Espy File, supra note 8. It is possible to confirm the race of 179 victims of
murders by black defendants. Id. Of these, 107 had white victims. Id.
184. Two White Men Face Gas Death Here Today, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh,
N.C.), Feb. 18, 1938, at 1 (reporting that the execution for murder was avoidable but for
the "quirk of fate").
On February 18, 1938, Milford Exum, a white man, was executed for the murder
of an elderly, African American basket-maker while robbing him in his home. Id.; State v.
Exum, 213 N.C. 16, 18, 195 S.E. 7, 8 (1938). Neither Exum nor his co-defendant testified,
but they offered evidence that they had been drinking heavily and were incapable of the
intent required for first degree murder. Id. at 21, 195 S.E. at 10. After the jury returned
guilty verdicts against both men for first degree murder, with their automatic death
sentences, Exum's co-defendant avoided the mandatory death penalty when the trial judge
set aside the verdict and accepted a guilty plea as an accessory, giving the man a life
sentence. See id. at 18, 195 S.E. at 8. Exum later explained that his intoxication at the time
of the murder meant he could remember little that might give the judge reason for mercy.
See Two White Men Face Gas Death Here Today, supra. Instead, he may have missed his
opportunity for mercy by gambling on his appeal of a substantial voluntariness issue
regarding his incrimination statement without which he may have been acquitted on
retrial. See Exum, 213 N.C. at 19-22, 195 S.E. at 9-11 (describing challenge to admission of
Exum's statement that was secured when the sheriff agreed to take him from jail in a
secret location to meet with his family).
185. See also infra Part II.B.2.b (discussing influence of stereotypes and subconscious
racism on death penalty decisions in the modem era).
186. John Goss Dies Admitting Crime, supra note 168, at 9.
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thick-bodied, and with the face of a gorilla. Even the eyes were
muddy with the diffusion of the color of his skin."1"7 After four shocks
in the electric chair, no life remained "in the black carcass," which
was "dumped into a basket" to be taken to a local medical school for
dissection.18
That men convicted of brutal crimes were described in vile terms
would not be notable if not for the fact that white perpetrators
received very different treatment. Rather than ascribing white
perpetrators' crimes to innate animal impulse, newspaper coverage of
the executions of white criminals who committed similarly
horrendous crimes against similar victims was characterized by a good
deal more sobriety and even sympathy. For example, according to the
News and Observer, Claude Shackelford, a white man sentenced to
death for raping a ten-year-old girl sat "straight and calm" awaiting
his asphyxiation. "He's a nice-looking fellow," one witness
observed.
189
4. An African American Call for Equal Treatment of African
American Defendants and Victims
The African American community reacted to discrimination in
capital cases with demands for equal justice. For example, an editorial
in Durham's Carolina Times objected to the fact that African
American women received scant protection from the law against
sexual violence by white men."9 The Times was a black newspaper,
but its editors aimed its words equally at whites, arguing that
tolerating white men's attacks on black women bred general
187. Id.
188. Id.; see also Ed. Dill Groans Between Shocks, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh,
N.C.), June 29, 1923, at 5 (reporting that Ed Dill entered the death chamber "[c]hanting a
wildly incoherent incantation that must have echoed the savage death-madness of his
tribal ancestors"); Howard Craig Pays Penalty, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Dec.
5, 1914, at 2 (describing a "gorilla-like negro" who "crept like a wild beast upon his
innocent, unsuspecting victim"); Two More Pay Penalty of Death, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Dec. 4, 1920, at 1, 2 (describing a lower lip hiding "huge white tusks").
Other portrayals suggest additional stereotypical images. See, e.g., Asheville Negro Is
Electrocuted, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Apr. 27, 1918, at 1 (describing eighteen
year-old Willie Williams as going to the electric chair "[s]inging happily").
189. Charles Craven, State Finally Claims Life of Guilford County Rapist, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), July 22, 1950, at 1. Murderers received even more generous
treatment. See, e.g., Boy Who Led His Class Dies in Lethal Chamber, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Sept. 23, 1939, at 14 (noting that the defendant calmly smoked a cigarette
as he made his way to the death chamber and that "no trace of fear appeared in his clear,
pale blue eyes").
190. See Editorial, Attackers of Negro Women and the Law, CAROLINA TIMES
(Durham, N.C.), Apr. 15, 1939, at 4.
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lawlessness in the white community and that fairness would benefit
both whites and African Americans. The editor of The Carolinian, a
Raleigh-based black newspaper, agreed. The paper condemned rape
"as one of the most detestable and inexcusable of all felonies. [The
Carolinian] agrees with the southern white man and any other man
worth his salt in calling for severe treatment of every case of actual
rape, but entirely regardless of the ramifications of racial lines." '191 In
these and similar statements, African Americans called for
punishment that was racially fair to both defendants and victims."9
5. The Death Penalty and Race in Pre-Furman North Carolina
Empirical Research
Given the limited availability of some sources of information on
the death penalty system in North Carolina, contemporary
scholarship is a boon. This examination benefits from the work of two
highly regarded researchers who focused on this basic issue during the
1930s and 1940s.
Sociologist Harold Garfinkel gathered data on homicide cases
for an eleven-year period from 1930 through the end of 1940. His
study, obtained from superior court records in ten North Carolina
counties, covered 673 homicide cases involving 821 defendants. 193 He
followed these cases from indictment through sentencing, grouping
the results according to race of the defendant and race of the victim
combinations. Starting with indicted first degree murder cases
available in his data, the death sentences that result include the
prosecutor's decision to charge the case as a capital offense and the
jury's decision to convict for a capital crime. 94 Of course, such basic
191. See Editorial, Toward Straight Thinking, CAROLINIAN (Raleigh, N.C.), Jan. 4,
1947, at 4.
192. See, e.g., Asks Governor to Commute Sentence to Life, CAROLINIAN (Raleigh,
N.C.), Feb. 22, 1947, at 1; Editorial, Avoid Hysteria, CAROLINIAN (Raleigh, N.C.), June
14, 1947, at 4; Editorial, Governor to Rescue Again, CAROLINIAN (Raleigh, N.C.) May 17,
1947, at 4; Editorial, Inviting More Trouble, CAROLINIAN (Raleigh, N.C.), Aug. 23, 1947,
at 4; Editorial, Justice Not Yet Color Blind, CAROLINIAN (Raleigh, N.C.), Nov. 2, 1946, at
4; Editorial, "Miscarriage" Not Unexpected, CAROLINIAN (Raleigh, N.C.), Aug. 16, 1947,
at 4.
193. See Harold Garfinkel, Research Note on Inter- and Intra-Racial Homicides, 27
Soc. FORCES 369, 369 (1948).
194. Prosecutors' decisions to seek and juries' decisions to impose capital punishment
are covered by the Racial Justice Act. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2011(b) (2009)
(focusing on whether race was "a significant factor in decisions to seek or impose the
sentence of death"). In Garfinkel's study, prosecutors' decisions resulted in either the
reduction of charges between indictment and trial or the acceptance of guilty pleas to
lesser charges, and jury decisions to impose the death sentence were reflected in the
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groupings do not control for other variables, but given the magnitude
of the differences, they support the proposition that differences in
results are the consequence of the groupings themselves.
Garfinkel Data on North Carolina Homicides, 1930-40195
fBlack White Black White
Defendant Defendant Defendant Defendant
& White & White &-Black & Black
.... ... Victim Victim Victim Victim
i ta? Cases 5? 165 51 24
Indicted as




Indicted 31.2% 7.9% 2.7% 01%
Cases
The data show a tenfold difference in the rate of conviction for
capital murder resulting in an automatic death sentence between
cases involving black defendants and white victims and those
involving black defendants and black victims. White defendant/white
victim cases are almost three times more likely to result in death
sentences than black defendant/black victim cases. Combining
Garfunkel's data to examine race of the defendant differences shows
a pronounced difference that explains some of that variation. Black
victim cases resulted in death sentences only 2.5% of the time
whereas white victim cases did so at a rate of 12.0%.196
verdict of guilty or not guilty of first degree murder, which carried an automatic death
sentence. See Garfinkel, supra note 193, at 371 n.3.
195. These computations are obtained either directly or derived from Garfinkel, supra
note 193, at 371 tbl.2. In his table, Garfinkel computes similar percentages from all
homicide cases rather than from only those that were indicted for first degree murder.
Similar analysis of data from the same period and from five of the ten counties that
Garfinkel studied was performed in Johnson, supra note 179, at 99 tbl.1.
196. There are 216 white victim cases of which twenty-six were sentenced to death.
There were 605 African American victim cases, of which fifteen resulted in death
sentences. See Garfinkel, supra note 193, at 371 tbl.2 (presenting data from which these
figures are computed).
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Sociologist Guy B. Johnson examined the impact of race of the
victim on decisions to execute in the years from 1933 through 1939.
He found that, in cases with black defendants and white victims,
80.5% of cases resulted in execution as compared with 68.3% of cases
with white defendants and white victims.'97 This difference in
execution rates reveals the likely impact of the race of the victim in
execution outcomes, whatever the race of the defendant. These
detailed studies are consistent with the overall results in the data
presented in this Part for the entire period. 98
6. African American Jury Participation
The racially disproportionate results for defendants and victims
occurred in trials conducted with few if any African Americans on the
juries. The exclusion of African Americans from decisions about guilt
and innocence began during slavery, when slaves were barred from
service even if a slave was the defendant and charged with a crime
against another slave. 199 The legal exclusion of newly freed African
Americans was remedied as a formal matter by legal changes soon
after the Civil War that gave freed slaves a right to sit on juries.1°°
However, neither this change in the law nor other legal remedies
removed the barriers to African American participation or resulted in
actual change.0 1 In the first half of the twentieth century, African
Americans lacked a meaningful opportunity to serve on juries in
North Carolina because they were not included in the jury pool in
significant numbers, when not excluded entirely, and therefore had
little chance to be drawn from the jury box as a potential juror to be
questioned in voir dire.2°2
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court of
North Carolina granted relief in one case where the defendant alleged
197. See Johnson, supra note 179, at 100 tbl.2.
198. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text (noting that, even in the court
system, the jury was to be comprised of slave owners).
200. Exclusion from jury service on account of race was eliminated as a legal matter by
the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. In 1879, the United States Supreme
Court in Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879), struck down a state law that
excluded African Americans from jury service, and it declared under the Fourteenth
Amendment a clear constitutional right, enforceable against the states, against de jure
exclusion. See id. at 310-12 (ruling that Congress has the power, as it did, to authorize
enforcement of this right by removal to federal court).
201. See supra note 44.
202. See infra notes 212-16 and accompanying text.
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purposeful exclusion of African Americans from the venire and the
state had no explanation. 203 The court's language was unequivocal:
It is incomprehensible that while all white persons entitled to
jury trials have only white jurors selected by the authorities to
pass upon their conduct and their rights, and the negro has no
such privilege .... How can the forcing of a negro to submit to
a criminal trial by a jury drawn from a list from which has been
excluded the whole of his race purely and simply because of
color, although possessed of the requisite qualifications
prescribed by the law, be defended? Is not such a proceeding a
denial to him of equal legal protection? There can be but one
answer, and that is that it is an unlawful discrimination.2°
However, inclusion of African Americans in the venire, and
particularly participation in rough approximation to their proportion
of the population of a jurisdiction, did not follow from this court
ruling.20 5
Exclusion resulted from superficially neutral jury qualification
provisions, combined with discretionary discriminatory practices. The
statutory requirements for jury service during the first half of the
century were simple, and on their face, they were not racially
discriminatory: (1) payment of taxes for the preceding year; (2) good
moral character; and (3) sufficient intelligence. 26  The first
requirement had the effect of excluding a large percentage of African
Americans from jury service. 27  The other two requirements
permitted the exercise of virtually unlimited discretion through which
officials could exclude African Americans without effective challenge,
203. See State v. Peoples, 131 N.C. 784, 784-91, 42 S.E. 814, 814-16 (1902) (reversing
conviction based on challenge to grand jury composition, alleging use of jury list that was
revised with partiality to exclude African Americans in Mecklenburg County, which had a
one-third African American population who were qualified to serve under statutory
requirements); see also State v. Perry, 248 N.C. 334, 335-39, 103 S.E.2d 404, 405-08 (1958)
(reversing conviction where defendant alleged and supported with an affidavit that
African Americans had been systematically excluded from grand jury service and from the
grand jury that indicted him in Union County and the claim was denied without sufficient
time to investigate).
204. Peoples, 131 N.C. at 790, 42 S.E. at 816.
205. It was not until after World War II that the Court granted relief when those
responsible for jury selection produced evidence of non-discriminatory application of
procedures regardless of their substantial disparate impact on African American
participation. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
206. See Peoples, 131 N.C. at 788, 42 S.E. at 815.
207. See, e.g., State v. Daniels, 134 N.C. 641, 643-44, 46 S.E. 743, 744 (1904) (noting
that there were only 528 African American males over the age of twenty-one in Jones
County who had paid taxes the previous year out of a total African American population
of 3,760).
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unless the use of explicit racial grounds for exclusion was admitted.2' 8
Wide disparity between the proportion of African Americans in the
county and the proportion in the venire generally resulted,20 9 and "the
well known fact" that a higher proportion of whites qualified for
service constituted a satisfactory basis for accepting exclusion of
Africans Americans from the venire. ° Instead, courts focused on the
neutrality of the final selection process by having a child pick names
from a box.21'
Reported cases where practices were challenged come from a
number of counties and demonstrate the widespread and extreme
underrepresentation of African Americans: few were included in
most venires and those few might all have been deemed
unqualified, 2  never being selected to be questioned on voir dire for
potential jury service. However, by mid-century, aided by the
elimination of payment of taxes as a prerequisite to service,1 3 the
208. See id. at 645, 46 S.E. at 745 (finding procedures valid where commissioners
making eligibility decisions "discussed the qualifications of various negroes and white men
and rejected their names when they decided they were not competent or fit" and did not
"think of or discuss the race question"). When the commissioners responsible for
producing the names of county residents from which the venire was selected denied the
allegation of intentional discrimination and showed any inclusion of African Americans on
the venire from which either the grand jury or the petit jury was picked, relief was denied.
See State v. Perry, 250 N.C. 119, 129, 108 S.E.2d 447, 452 (1959) (finding no violation
where two African Americans served on grand juries in Union County over the course of
eight years); State v. Henderson, 216 N.C. 99, 104, 3 S.E.2d 357, 360 (1939) (finding it
sufficient that a number of names were added to the jury box in New Hanover County two
years earlier).
209. See State v. Koritz, 227 N.C. 552, 553-54, 43 S.E.2d 77, 79 (1947) (finding no
violation despite the fact that only 255 names of African Americans were in the jury box
out of 4,900 eligible African Americans in Forsyth County); State v. Walls, 211 N.C. 487,
493, 191 S.E. 232, 237 (1937) (finding no violation where the names of only 650 African
American were included in the jury box as compared with 10,000 names of whites in
Mecklenburg County when local officials denied intentional discrimination despite their
use of different colors of ink to designate jurors by race, the explanation being accepted
that the colors made it helpful if the name were selected to "know whether to look for a
white man or a colored man").
210. See Speller v. Crawford, 99 F. Supp. 92, 97 (E.D.N.C. 1951) (recognizing "the well
known fact" that the proportion of African Americans qualifying for jury service in
rejecting claim of purposeful discrimination based on proportion included in jury box).
211. See Walls, 211 N.C. at 494, 191 S.E. at 238 ("A more perfect system could hardly
be devised to insure impartiality," which was the statutorily mandated selection system
specified in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 9-3 (1943)).
212. See State v. Lord, 225 N.C. 354, 355, 34 S.E.2d 205, 206 (1945) (rejecting
defendant's complaint that all African Americans in the venire were successfully
challenged by the prosecutor for cause as not being "freeholders" in Cabarrus County
where the trial was held).
213. See Perry, 250 N.C. at 125, 108 S.E.2d at 451-52 (describing changes in statutory
requirements enacted in 1947 in response to a state constitutional amendment adopted in
1946 that made women eligible to serve on juries).
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number of African Americans in the venire began to increase.1 4
Thereafter, the reported cases began to reflect that some African
Americans served on grand juries that indicted,215 or on petit juries
that convicted the defendant.216
Thus, by the middle of the twentieth century, the entry-way
barrier to meaningful participation-inclusion of African Americans
in the jury pool-was beginning to fall. In a series of subsequent
cases, the United States Supreme Court demonstrated a sustained
interest in enforcing equal protection at this point in the selection
process.217  Using statistical evidence on differences between
identifiable groups in the jury pool and the population and burden
shifting, along with other factors,218 the Court's ruling had the effect
214. See State v. Speller, 231 N.C. 549, 550, 57 S.E.2d 759, 759 (1950) (including seven
African Americans in venire selected from Vance County); State v. Reid, 230 N.C. 561,
562, 53 S.E.2d 849, 850 (1949) (noting that four or five African Americans were
summoned for the trial venire in Wilson County where the defendant was tried).
215. See State v. Brown, 233 N.C. 202, 205, 63 S.E.2d 99, 101 (1951) (noting that one
African American served on the grand jury that indicted the defendant in Forsyth
County); Reid, 230 N.C. at 562, 53 S.E.2d at 850 (noting that one African American served
on the grand jury in Wilson County where the defendant was indicted and tried).
216. In Miller v. State, 237 N.C. 29, 74 S.E.2d 513 (1953), a case involving an African
American executed in 1953 for murder, three African American jurors served on the jury.
Id. at 40, 74 S.E.2d at 521. In State v. Roman, 235 N.C. 627, 70 S.E.2d 857 (1952), four
African Americans served on the jury that convicted the defendant executed in 1953 for
murder. Id. at 628, 70 S.E.2d at 857; cf Brown, 233 N.C. at 205, 63 S.E.2d at 101 (noting
that the defendant, who was executed in 1953, was tried by a jury containing no African
Americans, but also noting that one African American was tendered to the defendant for
service but excused by his counsel). Moreover, Clyde Brown, who was executed in 1953,
was denied relief even though the statutory command was not followed and only names on
the previous year's tax lists were used because intentional exclusion, which, the court
required, was not shown. Id. at 206, 63 S.E.2d at 101 (stating that there was no right to
relief in the absence of a showing of intentional exclusion and that the statute's provisions
were "directory, and not mandatory, in the absence of proof of bad faith"); see also Miller,
237 N.C. at 46, 74 S.E.2d at 525 (stating there was no constitutional basis for a challenge
based on disproportionate representation as to jury service).
217. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84 n.3 (1986) (listing some of the "numerous
decisions of this Court" related to the issue).
218. A number of cases set the foundation for this body of law. See, e.g., Sims v.
Georgia, 389 U.S. 404, 407-08 (1967) (per curiam) (ruling that procedures purportedly
implementing neutral statutes are void when the results demonstrate substantial
disparities between racial composition of the lists used and the resulting venire); Whitus v.
Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 548-49 (1967) (same); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 598-99
(1935) (declaring a practice invalid that assumed members of the defendant's race were
not qualified to serve). Others developed the operative standard that is generally applied
in contemporary litigation. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979) (setting out
three-factor test). Finally, the Court has explained the place of these cases in its
framework for use of statistical evidence, disparate racial impact, and burden shifting. See
Batson, 476 U.S. at 85-87 (basing justification for rigorous adherence to broad and equal
inclusion on the requirement that the jury represent the broader society and its various
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of requiring the use of broadly inclusive lists of the jurisdiction's
eligible jurors to make up the jury pool from which venires are
selected. 219 The result neither eliminated deviations between the
African American percentage in the population and in the jury pool
nor ended legal challenges on this issue220 but more African
Americans began making their way into the jury pools as a result of
changes in the law and practice. Nevertheless, progress in removing
this previously critical legal barrier did not eliminate the effect of race
in jury selection. Instead, as examined in the next Part, exclusion
through peremptory challenges provided a new barrier to African
American participation on juries.221
7. Race and the Death Penalty 1910-1961 and Implications for the
Present
Between 1910 and 1961, race played a major role in the use of
the death penalty in North Carolina. The influence of overt racially
motivated community conduct, the disproportionate execution of
African American defendants, and the equally disproportionate use
of the death penalty in cases where the victim was white demonstrate
the remarkable continuity in the racially prejudicial application of
death sentences over the course of this period. Indeed, despite
substantial changes in legal structures, not to mention enormous
social and political changes, execution patterns remained largely
unchanged between the colonial period and the dawn of the civil
components); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (justifying this virtually
automatic finding by the fact that "Jilt is also not infrequently true that the discriminatory
impact-in the jury cases for example, the total or seriously disproportionate exclusion of
Negroes from jury venires-may for all practical purposes demonstrate unconstitutionality
because in various circumstances the discrimination is very difficult to explain on nonracial
grounds").
219. For example, counties in North Carolina have compiled their master list using lists
of taxpayers, registered voters, and those with driver's licenses. See State v. McCoy, 320
N.C. 581, 584, 359 S.E.2d 764, 766 (1987) (noting that Rutherford County used voter
registration and driver's license lists); State v. Avery, 299 N.C. 126, 129, 261 S.E.2d 803,
805 (1980) (noting use of tax and voter registration lists in Mecklenburg County).
220. See, e.g., Avery, 299 N.C. at 134-35, 261 S.E.2d at 808 (rejecting challenge where
disparity between population percentage and inclusion in the jury pool approached but
was less than 10%); see also State v. Golphin, 352 N.C. 364, 394, 533 S.E.2d 168, 192 (2000)
(noting that claims had been rejected in the state with absolute disparities of over 10%).
221. See infra Part II.B.3. A similar discretionary selection issue also arose as to racial
discrimination in selection of a grand jury foreman by the superior court judge who selects
the foreman. See State v. Cofield, 320 N.C. 297, 309, 357 S.E.2d 622, 629 (1987) (finding
discrimination in the selection of one African American foreman out of thirty-three
chosen over an eighteen year period in a county that had a 61% African American
population).
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rights era, demonstrating the resilient, and indeed dominant, power of
race on the death penalty.
Historical evidence unmistakably demonstrates the enduring
influence of racial prejudice on the death penalty process and its
persistent impact well into the twentieth century. This evidence
includes the mandatory death penalty for rape and burglary, a
punishment almost exclusively reserved for African American
criminals with white victims; the imposition of death sentences for all
crimes on African Americans in vast disproportion to their
percentage of the population; and African Americans' consistent
outsider status in the criminal justice process, maintained most
effectively by their exclusion from jury service.22 The endurance of
race as a defining factor in the state's death penalty system suggests
the tendency of the influence of racial prejudice to persist despite
legal changes designed to eliminate it and social and political changes
that diminish its acceptability.
This Article next turns to an examination of the changes that
occurred in the death penalty structure and the judicial principles
intended to guide discretion and limit discrimination after the
Supreme Court's decision in Furman. It concludes with an
examination of the RJA. The next Part does not reach a conclusion
regarding the persistence of the influence of racial prejudice into the
modern period. Instead, it examines not only the potential of legal
changes to reduce the role of race in the death penalty, but also the
clear opportunities for racial prejudice to continue to influence that
process. The central question that this analysis poses is whether the
powerful force of racial discrimination has finally been eliminated.
The answer to that question will come through the operation of the
RJA.
II. THE DEATH PENALTY AND RACE
Furman v. Georgia223 set aside the existing death penalty system
and demanded the creation of a new system.224 The changes were
indeed substantial. However, as demonstrated below in Part II.A, the
new legal framework did not eliminate the exercise of discretion and
222. The one exception that proved the rule occurred when juries were briefly
integrated under federal military rule. See supra note 44. As the period ended, some
promise existed that under federal constitutional command African American
participation on juries would increase. However, as seen in Part II.B, those promising
developments were limited by the continued use of peremptory challenges.
223. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
224. Id. at 240.
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judgment by prosecutors and jurors. Instead, opportunities continued
for racial motivation to operate through the expansive scope of death-
eligible cases and the loose definition, multiplicity, and frequent
presence of aggravating factors upon which a death sentence could be
charged and imposed under North Carolina law.
Part II.B examines the results of the death penalty process after
Furman, which, as of July 1, 2010, had placed 159 defendants on death
row. It focuses in turn on issues of race as they affected which
defendants were sentenced to death and how jurors were excluded
through peremptory challenges. This examination reveals an
intriguing pattern of some change or moderation but also substantial
continuity.
A. The Legal Framework of the Modern Death Penalty
In 1973, the year after the Furman decision, the Supreme Court
of North Carolina ruled in State v. Waddell,225 which involved a
conviction for rape, that the portion of the rape statute that gave the
jury discretion on the sentence was unconstitutional. However, with
that provision eliminated, the statute survived as a constitutional
mandatory death penalty statute for rape. The court applied the same
rationale to recast the murder statute as similarly requiring a death
sentence upon a conviction for first degree murder.226 In 1974, the
North Carolina General Assembly followed the court's lead and
enacted a statute that made the death penalty mandatory for first
degree murder,227 which was invalidated as noted above228 by the
United States Supreme Court in Woodson .229 The legislature then
enacted a new death penalty statute that adopted aspects of the
225. 282 N.C. 431, 194 S.E.2d 19 (1973).
226. Id. at 445, 194 S.E.2d at 28-29.
227. The murder statute, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Cum. Supp. 1975), defined first
degree murder and stated that it "shall be punished with death." A similar statutory form
was adopted for rape. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-21 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
228. See supra notes 14, 29-31 and accompanying text (discussing North Carolina's
mandatory death penalty provision and its subsequent invalidation).
229. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976). A mandatory death penalty
could theoretically reduce the impact of race on the death penalty. See, e.g., Randall L.
Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1434 (1988) (arguing that one potential remedy for the racial
disparities found in McCleskey would be for the Court to revise its rejection of mandatory
death penalties for specified crimes although questioning whether it would eliminate race-
of-the-victim discrimination since juries would likely continue to extend greater leniency
to killers of African Americans). But see LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN & MARK V.
TUSHNET, REMNANTS OF BELIEF 160-61 (1996) ("Even a mandatory system does not
eliminate prosecutorial and police discretion, jury nullification, or bias built into the
definitions of the underlying crimes.").
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systems approved by the United States Supreme Court, 3 ° which, with
some modifications, is the present-day law.23'
The command of Furman combined with Woodson was to
constrain discretion but not to do so woodenly. The result, as
developed below, was the creation of a statutory structure that
imposed some restrictions on discretion but permitted substantial
leeway in interpretation and application, allowing the continuation of
both substantial discretion and broad definitions of death eligible
cases. However, in a way that was unusual among the states, North
Carolina attempted to strictly restrain the prosecutor's discretion. In
its interpretation of the state's death penalty statute, the Supreme
Court of North Carolina sought to impose a different mandatory
element requiring trial of death-eligible cases by restricting
prosecutorial discretion in plea bargaining. The court prohibited plea
agreements to first degree murder with a resulting sentence of life
imprisonment in cases where the evidence established an aggravating
factor because the plea agreement avoided a jury verdict on whether
the death penalty should be imposed.232 That restriction, which could
be evaded at greater cost to the prosecution's interest to punish
severely those who commit first degree murder,233 was eliminated by
230. See State v. Barfield, 298 N.C. 306, 343-55, 259 S.E.2d 510, 537-44 (1979)
(comparing aspects of the North Carolina statute to various aspects of Georgia's, Texas's,
and Florida's systems in finding it constitutional).
231. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000 (2009).
232. This restriction was either unique to North Carolina or quite uncommon. In State
v. Johnson, 298 N.C. 47, 257 S.E.2d 597 (1979), Justice James Exum rejected the
defendant's claim that the trial judge erred by refusing to approve a plea agreement
whereby the defendant would plead guilty to first degree murder and the state would
recommend a life sentence. Id. at 77-80, 257 S.E.2d at 619-20. The court ruled that the
intention of the legislature, as manifested in the capital punishment statute's language, was
to submit the question of sentencing to the jury whether guilt was determined after trial or
upon a guilty plea and that the alternative sought by the defendant might make the statute
unconstitutionally arbitrary or impose an unconstitutional additional burden on a
defendant exercising the constitutional right to trial. Id.; see also State v. Case, 330 N.C.
161, 163, 410 S.E.2d 57, 58 (1991) (finding reversible error where the State agreed not to
submit an aggravating circumstance in return for the defendant's plea to felony murder
because to permit such discretion would render the statute arbitrary and therefore
unconstitutional).
233. Under the court's interpretation, a guilty plea that avoided a death penalty in a
first degree murder case could only be imposed if the plea was to a reduced charge, such as
second degree, or no statutory aggravating factor was found by the prosecutor. See State v.
Britt, 320 N.C. 705, 710-11,360 S.E.2d 660, 662-63 (1987) (ruling that, although not having
the discretion to determine whether a first degree murder case was capital or not capital,
the district attorney could declare the cases non-capital where the record showed no
evidence of an aggravating factor). The alternative of a second degree murder plea was
occasionally employed, although it had the cost of reducing the potential sentence and the
severity of the crime too much to satisfy the prosecutor's interest in public safety, which
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legislation in 2001 .234 The effect of limiting discretion appears to have
been that many defendants were placed on death row unnecessarily
since a death penalty trial often could not be avoided by a plea
bargain acceptable to the prosecution. 35
1. The Continued Operation of Discretion under Expansive
Definitions of Death-Eligible Murders
Furman, on its face, appeared to demand a radical departure
from the previous system that was characterized by a death penalty
broadly applicable to murder and to some additional crimes, chiefly
rape, and gave largely unfettered discretion to the jury as to its
imposition.236 Although the system has been changed to limit jury
sometimes made a plea bargain unreachable even in a case without any real contest on the
issue of guilt.
This mechanism of a prosecutor who failed to submit an aggravating fact when it
was arguably, but not clearly, available reputedly occurred, although at some point it was
not legally authorized, see id. at 711, 360 S.E.2d at 663 (stating that the failure to submit an
aggravating factor must be based on a genuine lack of evidence), and in cases where an
aggravating factor was clear, it was not an option. Using this mechanism could be justified
by the public interest in not only the certainty of a conviction but a conviction for first
degree murder with the ensuing heavy sentence while avoiding the cost of a trial. For the
defendant, it had the disadvantage of a certain conviction by the plea of guilty, but it
avoided any risk of a death penalty.
234. Title 15A, section 1004 of the General Statutes of North Carolina, which explicitly
gave prosecutors the discretion to try a first degree murder capitally or noncapitally
regardless of the presence of aggravating factors and to agree to accept a plea of guilty and
a sentence of life imprisonment for such a capital felony, became effective on July 1, 2001.
It has not been challenged successfully on constitutional grounds, and there is little reason
to believe the argument meritorious.
235. How much this restriction did to limit arbitrariness in the entire system,
particularly with the authorized and unauthorized mechanisms for avoidance, is unclear. A
major indirect impact was apparently the large number of death sentences during the
period this interpretation was operative among cases that might never have gone to trial if
the alternative of a guilty plea had been available. The differences are dramatic, and the
likely important impact of the legal change in reducing unnecessary death sentences is
hard to discount. The change became effective on July 1, 2001, and for simplicity, that
transition year (fourteen death sentences) is omitted. In the eight years from 2002 through
2009 after enactment of the law, defendants were sentenced to death in thirty-four cases
for an average of 4.2 death sentences a year; in the eight years before 2001, defendants
were sentenced to death in 194 cases, for an average of 24.2 a year. See DOC Offenders on
Death Row, supra note 34; DOC Persons Removed from Death Row, supra note 34; see
also Adcock, supra note 9, at 137-46 (describing reasons, including the statutory change
noted above, for the decline in death penalties imposed in North Carolina beginning in
1997).
236. See generally Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts:
Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109
HARV. L. REV. 355, 364-66 (1995).
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discretion to a narrower group of murder cases237 and procedural
regulations have been imposed, the overall general pattern nationally
and in North Carolina is that death eligibility remains remarkably
broad.238 The broad reach of the death penalty statute is particularly
important with respect to the potential impact of race because
researchers have found race to have little impact on the "worst"
murders and murderers. In such cases, a death sentence is regularly
imposed irrespective of race, but on those that are in an intermediate
or low range of aggravation and culpability, sentences are more
variable and discretionary and race plays a potentially decisive role.239
In Furman, the United States Supreme Court commanded that
theoretically the death penalty was to be limited to those most
deserving of receiving it, which is termed a "just deserts" theory.24
The narrowing of death eligible cases was intended to eliminate the
problem of "over inclusion" and help ensure that the death penalty
was only sought and imposed on those for whom the larger political
community believed it was merited. 24' The Court ultimately
authorized narrowing death eligible cases either through a restricted
definition of capital murder, or by identifying aggravating factors
beyond the definition of capital murder,242 with North Carolina
choosing the latter method.
237. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S .... 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2650-51 (2008) (ruling
that the death penalty could not be imposed under the Eighth Amendment for the
aggravated rape of a child where death did not result and was not intended); Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 660 (1977) (eliminating the death penalty for the rape of an adult).
The application of the death penalty to extraordinary crimes, such as terrorism, that do
not actually involve death but threatened it on a massive scale has not been determined
and may prove constitutional.
238. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 236, at 373 (arguing this point and stating that
"indeed, [eligibility is] nearly as broad as under the expansive statutes characteristic of the
pre-Furman era"); see also Scott W. Howe, The Futile Quest for Racial Neutrality in
Capital Selection and the Eighth Amendment Argument for Abolition Based on
Unconscious Racial Discrimination, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2083, 2095-106 (2004)
(describing the post-Furman death penalty system as characterized by four factors, which
play central roles and permit the continued influence of racial discrimination: (1) broad
application of the death penalty to non-negligent homicides; (2) decentralized decision-
making by prosecutors and juries; (3) extreme deference by courts to prosecutors in
charging and plea bargaining; and (4) expansive discretion afforded to capital sentencers).
239. See David C. Baldus & George Woodworth, Race Discrimination and the
Legitimacy of Capital Punishment: Reflections on the Interaction of Fact and Perception, 53
DEPAUL L. REV. 1411, 1456 n.166 (2004) (setting out studies); Howe, supra note 238, at
2098-99; infra note 318 and accompanying text (discussing how further narrowing can
eliminate or substantially curtail racial discrimination).
240. See Howe, supra note 238, at 2139-43.
241. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 236, at 364-66, 372.
242. As to the function of aggravating factors in narrowing, see Zant v. Stephens, 462
U.S. 862, 877 (1983), which found that requiring the jury to find an aggravating factor in
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Two aspects of the system that the United States Supreme Court
approved allow the definition of capital murder to broaden despite
the intended effort to narrow it. This broad definition permits
discretion to be exercised by the prosecutor in the charging decision
and by the jury in its decision to impose the death penalty. The first is
that some approved aggravating factors are vaguely defined,
potentially expandable, and allow the exercise of largely undefined
judgment.2 43 The second is that the United States Supreme Court
placed no limitation on the number of aggravating factors that could
be authorized, some of which may be individually quite broad.2"
2. The Broad Range of Circumstances that Permit Murder Cases to
be Charged Capitally and Juries to Impose the Death Penalty
If only certain types of cases, objectively determined, could be
submitted to the jury for its judgment as to whether death was the
proper punishment, then prosecutorial discretion to charge
inappropriate cases and juries to sentence in inappropriate cases
could be eliminated, solving the problem of over-inclusion.245
addition to guilt worked to "genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death
penalty and ... reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the
defendant compared to others found guilty of murder."
243. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 236, at 373.
244. See id. at 373-74. The actual narrowing impact of the Court's apparent restrictions
was further diminished when it ruled that, if the jury reached a death verdict utilizing an
invalid aggravating factor, the death sentence could still be affirmed upon an appellate
court's determination that the error was harmless. See Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S.
738, 754 (1990) (ruling that where error occurs in submission of an aggravating factor the
result may be affirmed if the state appellate court engages in either harmless error analysis
or reweighing of aggravating and mitigating factors); see, e.g., State v. Anthony, 354 N.C.
372, 433-34, 555 S.E.2d 557, 596 (2001) (utilizing harmless error review); State v. Alston,
341 N.C. 198, 255, 461 S.E.2d 687, 719 (1989) (same); State v. Taylor, 304 N.C. 249, 285-86,
283 S.E.2d 761, 784 (1981) (same). The finding of harmlessness can be made despite the
impossibility of a reviewing court actually knowing what role the erroneously submitted
aggravating factor played in the jury's determination. This is because
[njothing in the Sixth Amendment construed by our prior decisions indicates that
a defendant's right to a jury trial would be infringed where an appellate court
invalidates one of two or more aggravating circumstances found by the jury, but
affirms the death sentence after itself finding that the one or more valid
remaining aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating evidence. Any argument
that the Constitution requires that a jury impose the sentence of death or make
the findings prerequisite to imposition of such a sentence has been soundly
rejected by prior decisions of this Court.
Clemons, 494 U.S. at 745.
245. This remedial measure would not eliminate the potential for racial discrimination,
particularly race-of-the-victim discrimination, which could occur if prosecutors chose not
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However, that is not the nature of post-Furman death penalty
jurisprudence nationally or in North Carolina.
In particular, the aggravating factor that the murder is
"especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel ',2 1 is potentially quite poor in
meaningfully narrowing death eligible cases.247 For the class of
murders that lay observers would call brutal, this aggravating factor
allows much the same discretionary judgment to be made in post-
Furman days as existed pre-Furman 4. 2 ' The United States Supreme
Court theoretically imposed an important limitation on that
aggravating factor by requiring that it be limited to "core" cases,249
but it subsequently removed most of the real impact of that ruling by
approving lax enforcement of the requirement.25 °
to prosecute capitally and/or jurors decided not to sentence to death defendants who
committed crimes against African American victims.
246. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e)(9) (2009) ("The capital felony was especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel.").
247. See Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Aggravating and Mitigating Factors: The Paradox of
Today's Arbitrary and Mandatory Capital Punishment Scheme, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.
J. 345, 367-68 (1998) (describing academic literature that shows this aggravating factor is
both applied broadly and to virtually every type of capital murder); Richard A. Rosen,
The "Especially Heinous" Aggravating Circumstance in Capital Case-The Standardless
Standard, 64 N.C. L. REV. 941, 970-88 (1986) (describing the experience in eleven states in
which either the effort to limit discretion has been defeated by inconsistent judicial
interpretations or in which the aggravator operates effectively as a catch-all aggravating
factor without any meaningful effort to limit its scope). See generally Michael Mello,
Florida's "Heinous, Atrocious or Cruel" Aggravating Circumstance: Narrowing the Class of
Death-Eligible Cases without Making It Smaller, 13 STETSON L. REV. 523 (1984)
(examining the inadequacy of this aggravating factor in the specific context of the Florida
death penalty statute).
248. See Randall K. Packer, Struck by Lightning: The Elevation of Procedural Form
Over Substantive Rationality in Capital Sentencing Proceedings, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 641, 657-58 (1993-94) (describing how North Carolina's aggravating factor gives
the jury no guidance in distinguishing a murder that should be considered especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel from any other brutal murder).
249. In Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980), the Court, reviewing a statutory
aggravating factor that the murder was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or
inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind; or an aggravated battery to the
victim," id. at 422 (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b)(7)(1978)), held that this
aggravating factor was constitutional but must be limited to "core" cases. Id. at 428-31; see
also Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 359, 364-65 (1988) (reversing an Oklahoma
death sentence that involved a statutory provision that the murder was "especially
heinous, atrocious or cruel" (quoting OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§ 701.12(2), (4) (1981)).
250. See Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 465, 471 (1993) (determining Idaho death
sentence valid because of a judicial construction that interpreted its statute that defined an
aggravating factor that "the defendant exhibited utter disregard for human life" to mean
"cold-blooded, pitiless slayer" (quoting IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2515(g)(6) (1987));
Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 654-55 (1990) (finding an Arizona application of a
similar statutory provision constitutional because of a construction that required
"especially cruel" to mean infliction of mental anguish or physical abuse before death and
2084 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88
North Carolina adopted this aggravating factor, which the
Supreme Court of North Carolina subsequently found constitutional
under the limiting interpretation it provided.25 ' The court's decisions,
however, did not in fact impose significant restrictions on the use of
this aggravating factor but rather allowed the factor to apply quite
broadly, taking advantage of the laxity afforded by the United States
Supreme Court's inconsistent rulings. 2
"mental anguish" to include the victim's uncertainty as to his ultimate fate). Even with
these judicial interpretations, the statutes are substantively similar in operation to those
ruled invalid in Godfrey and Maynard in that they do not genuinely narrow the class of
death-eligible individuals, and they still apply potentially to a broad range of murders. See
Steiker & Steiker, supra note 236, at 373-74.
251. The Supreme Court of North Carolina approved use of this statutory factor both
before Godfrey, see State v. Goodman, 298 N.C. 1, 24-26, 257 S.E.2d 569, 585 (1979)
(approving limits to the effect of this aggravating factor), and after the decision given its
prior interpretations, see State v. Rook, 304 N.C. 201, 225-26, 283 S.E.2d 732, 747 (1981)
(concluding that the problem identified by Godfrey had been avoided by requiring
infliction of unusual suffering on the victim); see also Rosen, supra note 247, at 970-88
(arguing that despite stating that the factor is to be given a limiting effect, multiple and
inconsistent rulings of the state courts have rendered this admirable intention effectively a
nullity and that under approved instructions jurors are free to approve a death sentence
merely by finding that the killing was evil, wicked, or fierce). California is one of a limited
number of states that has found this aggravating factor to violate a constitutional
guarantee. See People v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County (Engert), 647 P.2d 76, 81
(Cal. 1982) (striking down the statute on vagueness grounds); see also Steven F. Shatz &
Nina Rivkin, The California Death Penalty Scheme: Requiem for Furman?, 72 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1283, 1283, 1315-18 (1997) (noting that although other aggravating factors in
California's death penalty statute give the appearance of narrowing the class of death
eligible cases without meaningfully doing so, the state supreme court did find this
particular aggravation factor invalid).
252. Although purporting to impose a narrowing interpretation, the Supreme Court of
North Carolina has approved a broad construction of the factor. See, e.g., State v. Brown,
315 N.C. 40, 66-67, 337 S.E.2d 808, 827-28 (1985) (concluding that the aggravating factor
was justified where the victim was kidnapped at gun point, therefore suffering terror
before her death, and according to the medical examiner, may have lived as long as fifteen
minutes after being shot); State v. Oliver, 302 N.C. 28, 61, 274 S.E.2d 183, 204 (1981)
(approving an especially heinous finding where one of the defendants shot the victim after
he opened the cash register and said, "Please don't shoot me. Go ahead and take the
money," because the victim begged for his life). Moreover, rather than requiring a
rigorous screening of the evidence presented to determine if it could satisfy the statutory
language to narrow its potentially dangerous reach, the court has mandated a generous
analysis of the facts:
In determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support a finding of essential
facts which would support a determination that a murder was "especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel," the evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to
the State, and the State is entitled to every reasonable inference to be drawn
therefrom.
Brown, 315 N.C. at 66, 337 S.E.2d at 827 (citing State v. Moose, 310 N.C. 482, 313 S.E.2d
507 (1984); State v. Stanley, 310 N.C. 332, 312 S.E.2d 393 (1984)).
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Similarly, the felony murder element of the North Carolina death
penalty statute opens the possibility of a death sentence for a broad
array of murders beyond those that are intentionally committed.
Within this range of murders, it allows discretionary decisions to be
made on who will be sentenced to death by the jury when one of the
statutory aggravating facts can be supported by a reasonable
construction of the evidence. Among these cases, prosecutors have
the ability to choose which to charge capitally. Thus, discretionary
decisions and the operation of a racial element may enter the
judgment to seek or impose the death penalty under current law. 3
Finally, the North Carolina death penalty statute provides a
broadly available aggravating factor for many felony murders through
its "pecuniary gain" aggravating factor that, if charged by the
prosecutor and found by the jury, makes a murder case "death
eligible. '254 This aggravating factor is a fruitful site for the exercise of
discretion since a single aggravating factor will suffice. Unlike the
narrow interpretation applied in some other states, which limit this
aggravating factor to murders for hire or for murders targeted at
obtaining known specific liquid assets, such as insurance proceeds or
an inheritance,255 this provision has been very broadly interpreted by
253. See Richard A. Rosen, Felony Murder and the Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence
of Death, 31 B.C. L. REV. 1103, 1117-20, 1131-33 (1990) (discussing the dangers of a
felony murder in connection with the constitutionally mandated task of constraining
discretion in the imposition of the death penalty, specifically its potential racial impact and
the dangers of a statutory framework that includes a broadly defined "pecuniary gain"
aggravating factor to create an illusion, rather than a reality, of meaningfully and
rationally narrowing the class of death-eligible cases).
254. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e)(6) (2009) ("The capital felony was committed
for pecuniary gain."). In State v. Cherry, 298 N.C. 86, 257 S.E.2d 551 (1979), the Supreme
Court of North Carolina concluded that there was a disproportionately higher possibility
that a defendant convicted of a felony murder will be sentenced to death than a defendant
convicted of premeditated murder "due to the 'automatic' aggravating circumstance
dealing with the underlying felony." Id. at 113, 257 S.E.2d at 568. Addressing this flaw, the
court held that "when a defendant is convicted of first degree murder under the felony
murder rule, the trial judge shall not submit to the jury at the sentencing phase of the trial
the aggravating circumstance concerning the underlying felony." Id. In State v. Oliver, 302
N.C. 28, 274 S.E.2d 183 (1981), the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that pecuniary
gain could be used as an aggravating factor, in addition to robbery being used as an
element of felony murder, without violating its prohibition against using an essential
element of felony murder again as an aggravating factor because it considered the
motivation of pecuniary gain that constituted the aggravating factor as distinct from the
role of robbery within felony murder. Id. at 62-63, 274 S.E.2d at 204-05. Accordingly,
felony murder when committed to gain funds--e.g., an armed robbery-is automatically
death eligible.
255. See Rosen, supra note 253, at 1132 (describing narrow "pecuniary gain" provisions
in a number of states).
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North Carolina courts.256 It potentially makes the death penalty
applicable to all murders committed with the apparent intention of
monetary gain, including those committed during robberies,
attempted robberies, and many, perhaps most, first degree
burglaries.257
Thus, despite important changes in the post-Furman legal
framework that were intended to constrain discretion and therefore
might have had the effect of restricting or eliminating the impact of
race, discretion continues to operate. As a result, opportunities
continue to exist that allow race to significantly affect the prosecutor's
decision to charge particular defendants with capital offenses and
influence the jury's decision to impose death among those charged.
For example, while aggravating factors must be charged by the
prosecutor, reviewed by the court, and found by the jury for a crime
to be charged as a capital offense and for the death penalty to be
recommended by the jury, aggravating factors are not always clearly
present in the facts of the case for charging purposes. The effort to
develop marginal or non-obvious aggravators may be either
vigorously or tepidly pursued in the investigation of the case and in
making legal arguments to the court for their inclusion. Similarly, for
the jury, proof of aggravation may not be clearly shown by the
evidence, or it may be inherently a matter of judgment as to whether
a murder is "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel."
B. Race in the Modern Death Penalty System
In the roughly fifty years of executions conducted by the state of
North Carolina before Furman, primarily African American
defendants were executed for crimes committed against primarily
white victims. Part II.A examined the differences in death penalty
procedures developed in the wake of Furman, showing substantial
change in form and highlighting the potential for continuity in the
effect of race on the death penalty. This Part examines the operation
of the modern system, which has resulted in a death row population
of 159 and forty-three executions as of mid-year 2010. It analyzes the
256. See, e.g., State v. Irwin, 304 N.C. 93, 96, 106-07, 282 S.E.2d 439, 442, 448 (1981)
(finding killing that occurred during the robbery of a drug store for drugs established the
aggravating factor or pecuniary gain).
257. See Rosen, supra note 253, at 1132. Albeit in a more subtle way, the effect can be
the same as existed at an earlier time when first degree burglary was a capital crime and
had a strong racial identification with the threat of sexual violence by African American
males against white females when the house burglarized at night was occupied by a white
female. See infra Part I.B.2.
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process by focusing on issues of race and defendants, then victims,
and finally jurors. As in earlier periods, more African Americans than
whites were sentenced to death after Furman,258 but the degree of
disparity has moderated.2 9 However, with regard to victims, the
picture remains much as it was in the earlier period, with the death
258. The significance of the race-of-the-defendant figures must await careful statistical
analysis. Only 21.6% of the state's population in 2000 was African American. See U.S.
Census Bureau, North Carolina-County, Census 2000 Summary File, available at
http://factfinder.census.gov/servet/GCTable?-bm=y&-geo-id=04000US37&- box-head
_nbr=GCT-P6&-dsname=DEC_2000_SFlU&-redoLog=false&-format=ST-2&mtname
=DEC 2000_PLUGCTPLST2) (last visited July 1, 2010) [hereinafter 2000 Census].
The much larger figure of African Americans sentenced to death does not necessarily
indicate discrimination. This is because a much larger percentage of murders that qualify
under the death penalty statute are generally committed by African Americans than by
whites. See Baldus & Woodworth, supra note 239, at 1432 (noting that, in many areas of
the country, African Americans constitute over 50% of those arrested for death-eligible
homicides).
Race-of-the-defendant discrimination has been most frequently found post-
Furman in cases where the defendant is African American and the victim is white. See
David C. Baldus & George Woodworth, Race Discrimination in the Administration of the
Death Penalty: An Overview of Empirical Evidence with Special Emphasis on Post-1990
Research, 39 CRIM. L. BULL. 194, 213 (2003) (noting that in relatively recent post-Furman
studies in Kentucky and Maryland researchers documented that African American
defendants whose victims were white were at particular risk of more punitive treatment);
cf. Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Looking Deathworthy: Perceived Stereotypicality of Black
Defendants Predicts Capital-Sentencing Outcomes, 17 PSYCHOL. SCi. 383, 385 (2006)
(finding stereotypical image of African American defendants most powerful in cases
where the victim was white). Of the 159 defendants on North Carolina's death row, thirty-
eight of them are African Americans convicted of killing a white person (three of these
also killed one or more African Americans during the same crime), and an additional
seven are Native Americans convicted of killing whites. See DOC Offenders on Death
Row, supra note 34; Memorandum Detailing Race of Victim of Death Row Defendants
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
259. Professor David Baldus summarizes post-Furman studies as a group showing that,
although it continues in some localities, the death penalty is no longer generally
characterized by systemic discrimination against African American defendants that
existed in many states before Furman. See Baldus & Woodworth, supra note 239, at 1412;
see also id. at 1419-22 (describing equivocal results from many studies regarding race-of-
the-victim discrimination but a strong "main effect" for race-of-the-defendant in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and in occasional other studies). See generally Heather T.
Keenan et al., Race Matters in the Prosecution of Perpetrators of Inflicted Traumatic Brain
Injury, 121 PEDIATRICS 1174 (2008), available at http://www.pediatrics.org/cgi/content/full/
121/6/1174 (reporting the results of an empirical study showing that in North Carolina,
when children died as a result of traumatic brain injury, the initial charges and the final
charges were principally related to the death of the child, but that the sentencing decision,
even after controlling aggravating and mitigating factors, was best predicted by the
defendant's minority status). But see David C. Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination and the
Death Penalty in the Post-Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview, With Recent
Findings from Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1638, 1675-79 (1998) (detailing analysis
that shows racial discrimination against African American defendants in Philadelphia
death penalty prosecutions based on jury decision making).
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penalty largely reserved for crimes against white victims. 26 African
American participation on juries has clearly increased over earlier
periods but remains limited, the analysis giving particular emphasis to
the role of peremptory challenges by the prosecution in limiting that
participation. For a substantial number of defendants on death row,
no African Americans sat on their juries.26'
1. The Continuing Predominance of African American Defendants
Sentenced to Death
The results of the death penalty sentencing process in North
Carolina since it was reinstated after the Furman decision show
substantial continuity with the past in the predominance of African
Americans sentenced to death but significant diminution in the
percentage of African Americans executed. Since the death penalty
was reinstated in North Carolina after Furman and Woodson, 391
defendants have been sent to death row.262 Of these, 49% are African
American (55% are minority263), and 44% are white. 2' As of the July
1, 2010, the death row population was 159.265 Of these, 54% are
African American (62% are minority), and 38% are white.266 A
260. In contrast to the mixed picture with race-of-the-defendant discrimination, post-
Furman analysis in other jurisdictions has continued to find relatively consistent race-of-
the-victim discrimination. See Baldus & Woodworth, supra note 239, at 1413; see also id. at
1419-22 (detailing strong evidence in many jurisdictions that, after controlling for a
number of alternative explanations, cases with white victims are substantially more likely
to result in death sentences and that the most common source of the effect is the
prosecutor's charging decision).
261. See infra note 356 (listing thirty such cases).
262. See DOC Offenders on Death Row, supra note 34; DOC Persons Removed from
Death Row, supra note 34.
263. "Minorities" include defendants who are African American, Native American,
and Latino.
264. The numbers are 193 African Americans, 171 whites, 18 Native Americans, 6
Latinos, 2 Asians and 1 of Middle Eastern origin. The Department of Corrections lists
Latinos, Asians, and those of Middle Eastern origin as "other." DOC Persons Removed
from Death Row, supra note 34.
265. DOC Offenders on Death Row, supra note 34. The group of defendants who left
death row because of reversals and clemencies and those remaining on death row are
roughly the same size. Among all defendants sentenced to death nationally from 1973 until
2004, these groups are also roughly the same size. See Samuel R. Gross & Barbara
O'Brien, Frequency and Predictors of False Conviction: Why We Know So Little and New
Data on Capital Cases, 5 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 927, 944 (2008) (showing that 41% were
removed from death row because their sentences or convictions were reversed and 42%
remain on death row).
266. The numbers are eighty-seven African American, sixty white, eight Native
American, three Latino, and one Asian; of the four listed as "other" by the Department of
Corrections, three are Latino (Fernando Garcia, Ryan Garcell, and Angel Guevara), and
one is Asian (Clifford Miller). See DOC Offenders on Death Row, supra note 34.
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slightly larger group of 163 were either granted executive clemency or
won reversal of either their conviction or death sentence. 267 Among
this group, 51% are African American (58% are minority) and 42%
are white.268
Twenty-six prisoners have left death row because they died of
natural causes or committed suicide.269 A majority of this group was
white, principally the result of a higher suicide rate among white
defendants on death row. 270 Forty-three defendants have been
executed. 271 Among those executed, 30% were African American
(33% are minority) and 65% were white. 2
Executive clemency and judicial action reversing convictions
and/or death sentences removed 163 from death row. Most
defendants were either automatically excluded from eligibility for
execution or sent back into the process where they were either
sentenced to a prison term or granted their freedom, although a few
still face resentencing.273 The examination of these cases begins with
clemency exercised by the governor.
267. See DOC Persons Removed from Death Row, supra note 34.
268. The numbers are eighty-three African American, sixty-nine white, seven Native
American, three Latino, and one Asian. Of the four listed as "other" by the Department
of Corrections, three are Latinos (Frederick Camacho, Francisco Tirado, and Bernardino
Zuniga), and one is Asian (Johnny Benson). See id.
269. Id.
270. Id. Nineteen died of natural causes: Elwell Barnes, Gary Greene, George
Heathwole, David Huffstetler, Caeser Johnson, John Jones, George Kelly, Daniel Lee,
Edward Lemons, Thurman Martin, Doc McKoy, Jr., LeRoy McNeill, General Miller,
Charles Munsey, George Page, William Porter, James Roper, Norris Taylor, James
Vereen, and Robert Wall. Id. Nine were white, nine were African American, and two
were Native American. Id. Nine of the total spent more than ten years on death row
before their deaths. See id. Some avoided an earlier execution by winning a new trial or
sentencing hearing through a successful legal claim under due process (Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963); see infra note 279), ineffective assistance of counsel (Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984); see infra note 280), or a violation of the Eighth
Amendment (McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 442-43 (1990); see infra note 285).
Six committed suicide: Eddie Howell, Randy Payne, Rayford Piver, Ricky Price, Eric
Queen, and Daniel Webster. DOC Persons Removed from Death Row, supra note 34.
Five of the six were white, the other was African American. Roughly half of those who
died of natural causes and suicide spent more than ten years on death row before they
took their own lives. Id.
271. Id.
272. See id. One other defendant, Elias Syriani, was of Middle Eastern origin. Id. He is
listed under the category of "other" by the Department of Corrections and was executed
on November 18, 2005, for murdering his wife, who, like him, was Jordanian. Id.; see also
Facing Controversy: Struggling with Capital Punishment in North Carolina, Biographies,
Elias Syriani, http://www.lib.unc.edu/mss/exhibits/penalty/syriani.html (last visited July 1,
2010).
273. Reversal rates by the Supreme Court of North Carolina were higher in the period
before the mid-1990s than they have been since that time. See Adcock, supra note 9, at
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While clemency was used quite broadly in the earlier period, 274 it
has been used only sparingly by North Carolina governors since the
resumption of executions in the wake of the Furman decision. 275 Five
defendants were granted clemency by Governors James Martin,
James Hunt, and Michael Easley after all avenues of relief available
under the legal system had apparently been fully exhausted. 276 Four of
these defendants were African Americans and one was Native
American.277 The fact that all of these defendants were minorities
poses an intriguing question: are the most serious abuses of the death
penalty that escape all legal mechanisms linked to race?278 If so,
131-32 (noting that some of the difference can be explained by the McKoy case in the
earlier period that resulted in a large number of reversals and perhaps can be explained in
the later period by the law becoming more settled). The information provided by the
Department of Corrections for approximately a dozen persons lacks indication that
resentencing is pending. See DOC Offenders on Death Row, supra note 34.
274. As noted earlier, in pre-Furman days, clemency was a major way in which the
rigidity and harshness of the death penalty law was moderated. See supra note 9 and
accompanying text. Those who note that the current death row population is out of step
with the apparent lack of contemporary enthusiasm for the death penalty have argued that
clemency should be reinvigorated. See, e.g., Adcock, supra note 9, at 148-52, 155
(describing various ways in which clemency powers should be used).
275. Id. Had this group, which was approaching imminent execution when clemency
was granted, been executed, the total number of executions would have increased to forty-
eight and the racial composition of the executed group would have changed slightly, with
twenty-eight (58.3%) whites, seventeen (35.4%) African Americans, two (4.2%) Native
Americans, and one (2.1%) "other." These modest changes in percentages would not have
meaningfully altered the unusual racial composition of the group of those executed.
276. Id. at 133, 141-43, 148.
277. See id.
278. The first was Anson Maynard, a Native American, who was granted clemency by
Governor James Martin in 1992. Id. at 133. Governor Jim Hunt granted clemency to
Wendell Flowers in 1999 and Marcus Carter in 2000, both of whom were African
American. Id. at 141-42. Governor Mike Easley granted clemency to Robert Bacon, Jr. in
2001 and Charles Alston in 2002, who were also both African American. Id. at 142-43,
148.
In granting clemency to Anson Maynard, Governor Martin explicitly cited his
uncertainty about Maynard's guilt. Although he was not convinced that Maynard was
"totally innocent," he was also "not convinced that Anson Maynard pulled the trigger to
kill [the victim]." Anson Maynard: Governor Commutes Death Sentence, WILMINGTON
MORNING STAR, Jan. 11, 1992, at A4. The basis for Charles Alston's successful clemency
presentation was also based on his innocence. See Clemency Petition for Charles M.
Alston (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). The centerpiece of Robert Bacon's
petition, supported by an affidavit of one of the jurors who described overtly racial
discussions among jurors during deliberations, was that race played a critical role in the
jury's decision to impose the death sentence, which was supported circumstantially by the
disparity between Bacon's death sentence and the life sentences for the arguably more
culpable white co-defendant. See Adcock, supra note 9, at 148 (describing racial influences
in the Bacon case and clemency); Eric Frazier, Juror: Race Tainted Decision on Execution,
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, May 13, 2001, at 1A; Clemency Petition of Robert Bacon, Jr.
and Affidavit of Pamela Bloom Smith (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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should we be worried that the limitations of review in the clemency
process means that other problematic cases have escaped correction?
In addition to disproportionate removal by clemency, African
Americans were disproportionately removed from death row because
they were denied rights going to the basic fairness of the trial process
or to values fundamental to the integrity of the death penalty. Denials
of basic fairness include violations of due process by prosecutors or
criminal investigators in failing to turn over potentially exculpatory
evidence that is material to guilt or punishment 79 and ineffective
assistance of counsel.20 Both require a finding that the error likely
had an impact on the outcome of the trial, which means that the
fundamental issue of guilt and innocence should have been placed in
doubt.28' Denials of values fundamental to the integrity of capital
punishment include the prohibition against executing the mentally
279. Rights flowing from Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963), which require the
government to provide helpful evidence to the defense that is material to guilt or
punishment, and corresponding denials of this right produced reversals in at least eleven
cases. Those removed from death row on this basis include: Steven Bishop, Glenn
Chapman (also ineffective assistance of counsel found and case ultimately dismissed),
Jamey Cheeks, Alan Gell (acquitted on retrial), Stephan Goode (also ineffective
assistance found), Jerry Hamilton, Jonathan Hoffman (case dismissed), Robert McDowell,
Charles Munsey (natural death), John Oliver, Michael Pinch, Charles Walker, and Curtis
Womble. See Opinions and Orders in Specific Cases (July 1, 2010) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter Opinions & Orders]. Seven of these are African
American, and six are white. See DOC Persons Removed from Death Row, supra note 34.
280. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984), the Court held that a new
trial must be granted only when evidence not introduced or actions taken because of the
incompetence of counsel create "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different," id., stating
that to grant relief, the judgment should be that "counsel's conduct so undermined the
proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having
produced a just result," id. at 686. Violations of the right to effective assistance of counsel
resulted in the reversal of at least twelve death penalties. Those who were granted relief
on this ground include: Kyle Berry, Thomas Brown, Glenn Chapman (also Brady violation
found and case dismissed), Willie Gladden, Stephan Goode (also Napue/Brady violation),
William Gray, Melvin Hardy, Levon Jones (case dismissed), Elmer McNeill, LeRoy
McNeill (natural death), Michael Pinch, Phillip Robbins, James Roper (natural death),
and Donald Scanlon. See Opinions & Orders, supra note 279. Seven of these defendants
are African American, and seven are white. DOC Persons Removed from Death Row,
supra note 34.
281. As described in the preceding note, the Court in Strickland set out the
requirement of "a reasonable probability" that, except for counsel's unprofessional errors,
"the result of the proceeding would have been different." In United States v. Bagley, 473
U.S. 667, 682 (1985), the Supreme Court adopted the Strickland standard for Brady
violations. A reversal on either ineffective assistance or Brady grounds does not prove that
the defendant was innocent, but the required finding means that these are cases where, but
for the error, the jury could find reasonable doubt, which are the types of cases where
innocent defendants would be located, and absent rarely available dispositive evidence
reasonable doubt is likely all that many innocent defendants can demonstrate.
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retarded and juveniles. Executing the mentally retarded violates the
Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment. 2 2 A
similar pattern of differential treatment of defendants based on race
is found for the expansion of the prohibition against executing
defendants who were minors at the time of their crimes. 283 The
statistics suggest that the defendant's mental retardation and youth,
which could on their own produce a jury judgment of life
imprisonment, have had less significance as mitigating factors to
predominantly or exclusively white jurors when the defendant is
African American. Almost two-thirds of the forty-four defendants
denied these fundamental rights were racial and ethnic minorities,
with all but two being African American; including clemencies, 69%
were minority defendants.281 The actions of governors and reviewing
282. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). In apparent anticipation of the United
States Supreme Court's ruling, the North Carolina General Assembly enacted Act of July
25, 2001, ch. 346, § 4, 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws 1038, 1041, effective October 1, 2001, banning
execution of the mentally retarded as a matter of state law and defined the proof required
at trial to warrant relief. See id. The next year, in Atkins, the United States Supreme Court
ruled that executing the mentally retarded violated the Eighth Amendment's ban on
"cruel and unusual punishment." Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321. In combination, the effect of the
statutory and constitutional remedies removed approximately fourteen cases from death
row and, for appropriately decided cases, required the substitution of a life sentence for
the previously imposed death sentence without further litigation. At least fourteen of
those on death row were removed as a consequence of either the statutory or the
constitutional development. See Opinions & Orders, supra note 279. Those granted relief
on this ground include: Melanie Anderson, Anthony Bone, Renwick Gibbs, Anthony
Hipps, Russell Holden, Jonathan Leeper, Robert McClain, Elton McLaughlin, Lorenza
Norwood, Dwight Robinson, Sherman Skipper, Clinton Smith, Johnnie Spruill, and Larry
Williams. Id. Twelve of these defendants are African American, and two are white. See
DOC Persons Removed from Death Row, supra note 34.
283. In Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005), the United States Supreme Court
declared capital punishment unconstitutional for defendants under eighteen. Thus, a final
group whose death sentences were converted automatically to life imprisonment consists
of those who committed their crimes before they became adults. These defendants
include: Thomas Adams, LeMorris Chapman, Kevin Golphin, Francisco Tirado, and
Travis Walters. Opinions & Orders, supra note 279. Of these five, three are African
Americans, one is Latino, and one is white. See DOC Persons Removed from Death Row,
supra note 34.
284. A total of at least forty-nine cases were removed from death row by clemency or
these four types of claims. See id.; Opinions & Orders, supra note 279. Of those, thirty-two
involved African American defendants, with one Latino defendant, and one Native
American defendant for a total of thirty-four defendants who are minority group members
(69.4%). See DOC Persons Removed from Death Row, supra note 34. Fifteen members of
the group are white (30.6%). Id. The African Americans are: Charles Alston (clemency),
Robert Bacon, Jr. (clemency), Anthony Bone (mental retardation), Marcus Carter
(clemency), Glenn Chapman (Brady and ineffective assistance and dismissal of charges),
LeMorris Chapman (juvenile status), Wendell Flowers (clemency), Renwick Gibbs
(mental retardation), Willie Gladden (ineffective assistance), Stephan Goode
(Napue/Brady violation and ineffective assistance), Kevin Golphin (juvenile status),
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courts may have moderated the unfairness to minority defendants,
but they also suggest the operation of a pernicious impact of race on
the initial process of reaching a death sentence.
One set of figures is anomalous-the racial makeup of those
executed since the reinstatement of the death penalty. Prior to
Furman, the vast majority of those executed were African
American.2 86 Among the forty-three defendants executed after
Furman, only 30.2% (thirteen) were African American, while 65.1%
Melvin Hardy (ineffective assistance), Anthony Hipps (mental retardation), Jonathan
Hoffman (Brady), Russell Holden (mental retardation), Levon Jones (ineffective
assistance and dismissal of charges), Jonathan Leeper (mental retardation), Robert
McClain (mental retardation), Robert McDowell (Brady), Elton McLaughlin (mental
retardation), Elmer McNeill (ineffective assistance), LeRoy McNeill (ineffective
assistance and natural death), Lorenza Norwood (mental retardation), John Oliver
(Brady), Phillip Robbins (ineffective assistance), Dwight Robinson (mental retardation),
Clinton Smith (mental retardation), Johnnie Spruill, (mental retardation), Charles Walker
(Brady), Travis Walters (juvenile status), Larry Williams (mental retardation), and Curtis
Womble (Brady). See id.; Opinions & Orders, supra note 279. Two additional African
American defendants, Francis Anthony and Andrew Craig, might appropriately be
included in this list, but the orders in their cases do not specify the grounds upon which
relief was granted, although the court in each case had previously ordered an evidentiary
hearing on what were apparently among the defendants' strongest claims, Brady and
ineffective assistance of counsel. See Orders & Opinions, supra note 279. One Latino,
Francisco Tirado (juvenile status), and one Native American, Anson Maynard (clemency),
are in the group. See id. The white defendants are Thomas Adams (juvenile status),
Melanie Anderson (mental retardation), Kyle Berry (ineffective assistance), Steven
Bishop (Brady), Thomas Brown (ineffective assistance), Alan Gell (Brady and acquittal
on retrial), Jamey Cheeks (Brady), William Gray (ineffective assistance), Jerry Hamilton
(Brady), Elmer McNeill (ineffective assistance), Charles Munsey (Brady and natural
death), Michael Pinch (Brady and ineffective assistance), James Roper (ineffective
assistance and natural death), and Donald Scanlon (ineffective assistance), and Sherman
Skipper (mental retardation). See DOC Persons Removed from Death Row, supra note
34; Opinions & Orders, supra note 279.
285. The decision of the United States Supreme Court in McKoy v. North Carolina,
494 U.S. 433, 442-44 (1990), had the greatest impact on North Carolina's death row
population. McKoy concluded that the North Carolina death penalty statute improperly
restricted individual jurors in considering a mitigating factor, supported by the evidence, in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 435. Forty-five defendants received new
sentencing hearings as a result of McKoy, of which five were executed after being
sentenced to death at a subsequent sentencing hearing (Kenneth Boyd, Harvey Green,
William Jones, Ricky Sanderson, and Pierre Simpson), and five are currently on death row
(Jerry Cummings, Roland Hedgepeth, Jeffrey Meyer, Eddie Robinson, and James
Thomas). See Memorandum of McKoy Litigation Outcomes (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review). The remaining thirty-five either received life sentences or died
while on death row or are pending resentencing. Id. The cumulative impact of all judicial
rulings is that eighty-nine minority defendants (56.3%) and sixty-nine whites (43.7%) were
removed from death row. See DOC Persons Removed from Death Row, supra note 34.
286. See supra text accompanying note 108.
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(twenty-eight) were white.287 Of course, the African American
majority among those removed by judicial action from death row and
the white majority among those executed are not independent of each
other. Executions occur when legal processes, review of compliance
with legal standards, and clemency review have been completed. This
suggests that more white defendants were executed in the initial years
after the death penalty was resumed because reviewing courts found
errors in a lower percentage of their cases. The compliance with death
penalty law and procedure was higher in the cases of white
defendants than of minorities.
Anyone who might be tempted to conclude from this initial
execution pattern that the historical connection between race and the
death penalty has been eliminated should delay judgment.288 The
percentage of minority group members, African Americans in
particular, among those executed is likely to increase substantially in
future executions as documented below, 89
Those most likely to be executed in the next cohort can be
roughly identified, and, unlike those executed, they are
predominately African American and other minorities. The further a
case has proceeded through the review process without relief being
granted, the more likely the defendant will be executed. A
particularly significant point in the process is reached when state
court review has been completed, and the case enters the stage where
federal court review begins. The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
287. See DOC Post-Furman N.C. Executions, supra note 31. In addition, one Native
American, Henry Hunt, and one defendant of Middle Eastern origin, Elias Syriani, were
executed. See id. Thus, minorities constituted 32.6% (fourteen) of those executed since
1984. See id.
288. Cf Joint Caucus Press Release, Phil Berger, North Carolina Senator, and Paul
Stam, North Carolina Representative, Legislature Must Not Interfere With Resumption of
Death Penalty 3 (May 5, 2009) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) ("Sixty-five
percent of those actually executed have been white, which puts a new light on the claim
most were minorities."); Written Statement of Special Deputy Attorney General Barry S.
McNeill, The Death Penalty in North Carolina: Case Law & Statutory Protections 7 (Dec.
13, 2006) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (presenting these figures on race
of the defendant to the N.C. House of Representatives Capital Punishment Study
Committee as part of the "Overview of North Carolina's Death Row Population").
289. Another reason for concern about the upcoming executions is that more than one
hundred of those facing execution were sentenced before 2001 and would likely not have
been sentenced to death currently because of both changed attitudes and enhanced
procedural protections. See Thomas K. Maher, Worst of Times, and Best of Times: The
Eighth Amendment Implication of Increased Procedural Reliability on Existing Death
Sentences, 1 ELON L. REV. 95, 96, 99-102 (2009) (listing a number of reforms including:
expanded discovery, post-conviction DNA testing, creation of Indigent Defense Services
and its efforts to remedy problems of inadequate appointed counsel, authorization of life
without parole, and allowance of plea bargaining covering first degree murder).
[Vol. 882094
2010] THE RACIAL JUSTICE ACT 2095
Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") commands deference to the results
of state-court review at this point,2 ° and although relief can be
granted at this stage or in the clemency process, based on past
experiences, this group of cases comprises the probable cohort of
those next executed. The racial composition of the defendants who
have reached or completed federal court review is quite different
from the forty-three who have been executed. The group numbers
fifty-five.291 African Americans and Native Americans constitute a
majority, 58.1% (thirty-two), and the white percentage is 41.9%
(twenty-three) .292
The execution pattern, with regard to the race of defendants for
the first forty-three executed since 1977, appears largely inexplicable.
This change in racial makeup of North Carolina's post-Furman
executions follows the general trend nationally and in the South, but
it is more extreme.293 The most striking fact is that the execution
pattern started with an even more dramatic break from past history-
the first twelve inmates executed were all white.294 As detailed in
290. See Antiterrorism & Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22, 28, and 42 U.S.C.). In
Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1, 10 (2007), the Supreme Court stated: "The requirements of
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 [AEDPA] ... create an
independent, high standard to be met before a federal court may issue a writ of habeas
corpus to set aside state-court rulings." In addition, the federal courts overseeing North
Carolina cases, particularly the Fourth Circuit, have not shown an eagerness to overturn
death sentence cases. See Adcock, supra note 9, at 132 n.100 (noting that no relief was
granted to a North Carolina capital defendant by the Fourth Circuit between 1992 and
2000).
291. See Memorandum of Death Row Defendants with Federal Court Filings (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review).
292. See id. The majority, twenty-nine (52.7%), are African American, and three
(5.5%) are Native American. See id. One defendant who abandoned his appeals after an
initial federal court filing is also included. Id.
293. Nationally, 34.6% (421 of 1,217) of those executed between 1976 and June 30,
2010 were African American, and 56.0% (682 of 1,217) of those executed were white.
Death Penalty Information Center, Searchable Execution Database, http://deathpenalty
info.org/executions (last visited July 1, 2010). The 34.6% figure for African Americans in
the post-Furman period compares to 53.5% (2,066 of 3,859) African Americans for all
offenses and 48.9% (1,630 of 3,334) African Americans of those executed for murder from
1930 through 1968 nationally. See U.S. BUREAU OF PRISONS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT:
1930-1968, NAT'L PRISONER STAT. BULL. NO. 45, at 10 tbl.3 (Aug. 1969). In the South, in
the post-Furman period, 36.6% (367 of 1,003) of those executed were African American,
53.2% (534 of 1,003) were white, 8.5% (85 of 1,003) were Latino, 1.1% (11 of 1,003) were
Native American, and 0.7% (7 of 1,003) were of other races. See Death Penalty
Information Center, supra. This percentage is substantially lower than the 71.9% (1,659 of
2,306) figure for African Americans for all offenses and 67.4% for murder in the South
from 1930 to 1968. See U.S. BUREAU OF PRISONS, supra, at 11 tbl.3.
294. Three of these men self-selected by dropping their legal challenges: Phillip Ingle,
Ricky Sanderson, and James Rich. See Information on Persons Executed Since 1976 and
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earlier figures, the executed group does not resemble in racial
composition those sent to death row from 1977-2009, those removed
from death row by legal action of the courts, or those on the present
death row. It resembles only the group that died on death row, a
majority of who were white because of those who committed
suicide.295
In broad sweep, more African Americans and other minorities
than whites entered North Carolina's death row after Furman.
Among those removed from death row because errors were made in
Designated as "Volunteers," Death Penalty Information Center, http://www.deathpenalty
info.org/information-defendants-who-were-executed-1976-and-designated-volunteers (last
visited July 1, 2010). Charles Roache, who was executed in 2004, was also a "volunteer."
Id.
Timing issues do play a role in defendants leaving death row other than through
execution, but timing and case selection may have played a role in who has been executed.
The first three executed, who were white, moved through the entire process in less than six
years, which has not been equaled since that time except with those who abandoned their
appeals. See DOC Removed from Death Row, supra note 34 (showing less than six years
on death row for James Hutchins, Margie Barfield, and John Rook, the first three
executed, and less than five years for Ingle, Sanderson, and Rich).
Also, in the North Carolina system, prosecutors largely control the selection of
cases to be advanced and somewhat control the pace that cases move. Defense counsel
generally do not seek a speedy resolution of cases once a death sentence has been
affirmed by the Supreme Court of North Carolina since those cases have a presumption of
finality and the movement forward is toward the ultimate punishment, so the passage of
time while the client is confined in prison is not to be avoided but is often the entire goal
of the litigation-the passage of time until the defendant dies a natural death in prison at
the end of a life sentence.
Avoiding a quick execution can also mean more than a slight extension of life
before execution. For many of those who died a natural death, won a new sentencing
hearing, or automatic life sentence when courts recognized the legal significance of the
issues their cases presented (such as McKoy error, mental retardation, or the prohibition
against executing minors), remaining alive for a longer period meant not being executed at
all. For example, half of the fourteen who received life sentences because they were
mentally retarded were on death row for more than ten years before their claims were
granted because of a developing societal recognition that mental retardation was an
important limitation on the death penalty, which was not recognized at the time their
sentence were imposed or during much of the period they awaited execution. See supra
note 282. These defendants are Renwick Gibbs, Elton McLaughlin, Dwight Robinson,
Sherman Skipper, Clinton Smith, Johnnie Spruill, and Larry Williams. Id.
295. White defendants comprise 44% of all those sent to death row during this period.
See supra note 264 and accompanying text. However, that percentage jumps to 65% of
those executed, see supra text accompanying note 272, and it falls to 38% of those on
death row, supra text accompanying note 266. Thus, racial and ethnic minorities comprise
a majority of the 391 defendants sent to death row since 1977 but only approximately one-
third of those executed. By contrast, these figures show that racial and ethnic minorities
then increase to represent over three-fifths of those awaiting execution. Specifically, of the
159 inmates on death row, only sixty (37.7%) are white, eighty-seven (54.7%) are African
American, eight (5.0%) are Native American, and three (1.9%) are Latino. See DOC
Offenders on Death Row, supra note 34.
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the death penalty proceedings, more were members of minority
groups than whites. Many more whites than African Americans left
death row through executions. As a result of these processes, the
current death row population is weighted more toward minorities
than the entering population, as is the group most likely to face
execution next. Therefore, African Americans are likely soon to
predominate among those executed. Also, perhaps more significantly,
the race-of-the-victim pattern among those executed has remained
virtually constant even when race-of-the-defendant percentages have
changed.296
2. The Continuing Heavy Predominance of White Victims in Death
Sentences
Since slightly more than 70% of the state's population is white,
the fact that a heavy majority of victims are white among those
sentenced to death and executed in North Carolina should not come
29as a surprise. 7 In addition, the vast majority of murders occur
between members of the same race (intra-racial crime) rather than
with victims and defendants from different racial groups (inter-
racial). 298  Thus, one would normally expect that most white
296. Both with respect to the race of the defendants executed after Furman and with
regard to the race of the defendants on the current death row, North Carolina's
percentages move in a common direction with the South as a region. However, North
Carolina's percentage deviations are somewhat more exaggerated, with a larger
percentage of whites among those executed post-Furman and a higher percentage of
African Americans among those currently on death row awaiting execution than in the
region generally. In the South, 53.2% of those executed post-Furman were white and
36.6% African American, see supra note 293, whereas in North Carolina 65.1% were
white and 30.2% were African American, see DOC Post-Furman N.C. Executions, supra
note 31. At the end of September 2009, a plurality, 45.3%, of the defendants currently on
death row in the South were white and 43.7% were African American. See NAACP
LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATION FUND, INC., DEATH Row U.S.A. 32-33 (Fall 2009),
available at http://www.naacpldf.org/content/pdf/pubs/drusaIDRUSAFall 2009.pdf
(giving state data from which statistics for those in the South under U.S. Census definition
were computed). In North Carolina, the majority, 54.7%, is African American and a
minority, 37.7%, is white. See DOC Offenders on Death Row, supra note 34.
297. In 2000, 72.1% of the population was white, 21.6% was African American, and
1.2% was Native American. See 2000 Census, supra note 258.
298. According to the most recent national data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics,
over 85% of homicides in 2005 were intra-racial with 44.6% (4,755) of the cases having
white victims and perpetrators and 42.2% (4,497) involving African American victims and
perpetrators. Inter-racial homicides constituted less than 15% of murders in that year,
with African American victims and white perpetrators involved in only 3.2% (337) of the
cases and white victims and African American perpetrators in 8.8% (934) of the cases. A
total of 1.3% (137) involved defendants and/or victims of other racial groups. Where
African Americans are the perpetrators, the victims are white in only 17.1% (934) of the
cases, African American in 82.4% (4,497) of the cases, and other in 0.5% (25) of the cases.
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defendants would have murdered white victims, and most African
American defendants murdered other African Americans and not
whites. However, since African American and other minority
defendants predominate on death row, the overall heavy majority of
white victims suggests a disparate impact based on race.299
When race of the victim is examined, similar patterns emerge in
executions conducted during the first fifty years of the period
examined and those carried out since executions resumed in 1984
after the Furman decision. In the 1910 to 1961 period, despite the
high percentage of African American defendants, 75% of the victims
were white.3" In the forty-three post-Furman executions, 76.8%
(thirty-three) were executed for the murder of white victims. 301 In
only 18.6% (eight) of those cases were the victims African
See Bureau of Justice Statistics, Dep't of Justice, available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/
content/homicide/race.cfm.
These basic racial characteristics of inter-racial and intra-racial crime statistics are
largely stable over time and are reflected generally in state data around the country,
including North Carolina. States differ in the main, varying principally and in predictable
directions as the percentages of African Americans and other minorities increase in the
state's population. From 1993-1997 in North Carolina, for example, racial data is available
for 3,592 of the 3,990 homicides that occurred in the state. See ISAAC UNAH & JOHN C.
BOGER, RACE AND THE DEATH PENALTY IN NORTH CAROLINA-AN EMPIRICAL
ANALYSIS: 1993-1997 (Initial Findings) 18, 23 (2001), available at http://www.deathpenalty
info.org/race-and-death-penalty-north-carolina (providing data for the period 1993-1997
in North Carolina). Of the total, cases involving white defendants and white victims
constitute 35.9% (1291), those involving non-white defendants and victims constitute
46.5% (1670), those with white defendants and non-white victims constitute 3.2% (116),
and finally, those involving non-white defendants and white victims constitute 14.3%
(515). See id.
299. Although these figures are suggestive of race-of-the-victim discrimination, their
significance must await careful statistical analysis. This is because of factors involving the
nature of the crimes involved and the characteristics of the defendants and victims, which,
in other statistical studies, have been shown to reduce the apparent significance of these
figures. See Baldus & Woodworth, supra note 239, at 1447-48. However, they have
generally not eliminated that significance. Id.
300. Although complete data on victim race cannot be found and is sometimes a bit
uncertain, of the 325 cases where race can be determined, the victim was white in 244
(75%) of the cases, African American in 78 (24%) of the cases, and Native American in 3
(1%) cases. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
301. See DOC Post-Furman N.C. Executions, supra note 31; supra note 272 (showing
Elias Syriani's victim as Middle Eastern rather than white). This percentage is consistent
with figures for executions in the South generally in the post-Furman period with 77.0%
(772 of 1,003) having at least one white victim. See Death Penalty Information Center,
supra note 293. Nationally, since executions were resumed, 78.3% of the defendants
executed (953 of 1,217) had at least one white victim. Id. Only 13.6% (165 of 1,217) were
executed when exclusively African Americans were the victims. Id.; see also DEATH Row
U.S.A., supra note 296, at 7 (showing that through the end of September 2009, in cases
where the defendant was executed, 78.0% of victims (1357) were white and 14.5% (252)
were African American).
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American.3" Only one of the twenty-eight white defendants, Kermit
Smith, was executed for killing a non-white victim.3 3 Of the thirteen
African Americans executed, six were executed for murdering white
victims, and seven were executed for murdering African American
victims.
3°4
The murder victims of those on death row were also
predominately white with little change from earlier eras. In 67.3% of
the cases (107), at least one victim was white, and in 64.2% of the
cases (102), the victim(s) were exclusively white,30 5 with the other five
involving multiple victims of whom one or more were white.3" Thus,
two-thirds of the defendants on death row (67.3%) are there for
murders that involved at least one white victim. Only 30.8% of the
cases (forty-nine) involved exclusively African American victims."
In contrast to the situation with white victims, who predominate
with most defendant racial groups,30 8 when African Americans are
exclusively the victims and the defendant is on death row, the
302. In one case (2.3%), the victim was Native American. See DOC Post-Furman N.C.
Executions, supra note 31.
303. Id. (showing Smith as alone among white defendants executed in having a non-
white victim).
304. The six African American defendants executed for murdering white victims are
David Brown, Desmond Carter, Harvey Green, Robbie Lyons, Michael Sexton, and
Perrie Simpson. The seven executed for murdering African American victims are Willie
Brown, John Daniels, Willie Fisher, William Jones, Sammy Perkins, Earl Richmond, and
David Ward. See DOC Post-Furman N.C. Executions, supra note 31.
The victim of the one Native American executed was Native American, id, and
the lone victim of Middle Eastern descent was also killed by a defendant who was Middle
Eastern. Henry Hunt, who was Native American, was executed for the murders of two
Native Americans. Both Elias Syriani and his victim were Jordanian. See id.; supra note
272.
305. See Memorandum Detailing Race of Victim of Death Row Defendants, supra
note 258. The medical examiner's racial identification is followed where available. Two of
the victims identified as white, Robert Buitrago and Macidonio Gervacio, have an added
notation, "hispanic." Id.
306. Four of the cases involved either one or two additional African American victims
(Linwood Forte, Mitchell Marcos, Abner Nicholson, and Davy Stephens), and one
involved an additional victim who was Asian (Jerry Connor). Id.
307. In the three remaining cases, the victims were Native American in two and Latino
in one. Id.
308. Among the sixty whites on death row, fifty-four were sentenced to death for
killing exclusively white victims and two more cases involved a white victim along with
victims who were Asian and African American. Id. One white defendant on death row
currently was sentenced to death for killing an African American (female) and one for
killing two Native Americans. Id. Among the eleven Native Americans and Latino
defendants on death row, their victims were white in nine cases (81.8%), and one was an
African American and one Native American. Id. Only among African American
defendants do white victims not form the majority, but even there a substantial
percentage, 43.6% (38) of the cases, involved white victims. Id.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
defendant is almost always African American. Of the forty-nine cases
in this group where African Americans were exclusively victims (no
additional white victims), forty-seven of the defendants are African
Americans. °9 Cumulatively, examination of the victim's race shows
great continuity in the predominance of white victims across changes
in legal structures and defendant groups. The next section examines
the developing recognition of the frequency and the theoretical and
practical importance of race-of-the-victim discrimination in death
penalty decisions. One potential explanation of unconscious
motivation among prosecutors and jurors, a majority of whom are
white, is then explored in Part II.B.2.b.
a. The Significance of Race-of-the-Victim Discrimination
Race-of-the-victim discrimination violates the ordinary demands
of the law by basing the decision as to whom is executed on an
irrelevant characteristic: the race of the victim. When the victim's race
determines the result of a capital trial, it is just as irrelevant to the
principles that justify execution as would be the race of the
defendant.31 ° Moreover, the race of the victim can be decisive; it can
constitute the but-for cause of the charging decision of the prosecutor
or the decision of the jury to impose the sentence.311
This type of racial discrimination does not ground the death
penalty decision in animus toward African American defendants.
However, it shares the moral opprobrium of race-based distinctions
that cause them to be rejected by society. The major moral failing of
race-of-the-victim discrimination can be seen in the long history of
the governing white society diminishing the importance of African
American crimes and African American victims, both specifically in
North Carolina and generally on a national level.312
309. Of the other two, one defendant is white (Eric Lane) and the other is Native
American (Darrell Strickland). Id.
310. See Baldus & Woodworth, supra note 239, at 1446.
311. See id. at 1450-51.
312. These attitudes reveal themselves occasionally in the words of even some of the
state's most accomplished leaders. Then-Judge Susie Marshall Sharp, who later served as
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of North Carolina, wrote in private correspondence
the following: " 'In Greensboro last week I put a colored woman who was guilty of murder
in the first degree on probation and a colored man who was guilty of rape got off with a
suspended sentence after a week in jail. You simply cannot judge animals by human
standards.'" ANNA R. HAYES, WITHOUT PRECEDENT: THE LIFE OF SUSIE MARSHALL
SHARP 198 (2008). The race of the victims is not given but cannot be understood to have
been anything other than African American in this context of racial stereotype and
diminishment. See also supra note 77 and accompany text (discussing the much diminished
status of African American victims during slavery); supra Part I.B.2 (describing the failure
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Race-of-the-victim discrimination has a real impact upon African
Americans in three ways. First, the losses suffered by African
American murder victims and their families are undervalued because
they are treated less seriously than the losses to white victims and
their families.313 Second, this discrimination results in unfair treatment
of the African American community because it undermines the goals
of retribution and deterrence that justify the use of capital
punishment.314 Third, this discrimination sends the unacceptable
message that the overriding objective of capital punishment is the
protection of white victims.315
Although apparently widespread in post-Furman death penalty
decisions, race-of-the-victim discrimination can be vastly reduced.
This is because racial factors have been shown to have little impact on
sentencing of the most culpable defendants.3 6 Limiting death
sentences to such cases generally reduces arbitrariness while
preserving the retributive goal of capital punishment for the most
deserving crimes.3t 7 Moreover, such cases are generally the ones that
reviewing courts affirm and that actually result in execution.318
b. The Importance of Unconscious Racial Motivation in
Contemporary Death Penalty Sentencing
Conscious, intentional, or purposeful racism is sometimes still
seen in contemporary death penalty cases. For example, apparently
conscious racial animus appeared in Robert Bacon's clemency
to punish whites for rape of African American women and the exclusive execution of
blacks for burglary of white occupied homes); supra Part I.B.4 (discussing the call of
African American newspapers for equal justice for African American victims of rape).
313. See Baldus & Woodworth, supra note 239, at 1446.
314. See id. at 1451.
315. See id. at 1450.
316. See id. at 1456-57, 1484.
317. See id.
318. See id. Professor Baldus finds evidence in the experience of several states using
different procedural mechanisms that such limitation is also feasible. See id. at 1458-66; see
also supra note 239 and accompanying text (discussing the general impact of narrowing
death eligibility on reducing arbitrariness articulated generally in Furman).
Another way to theoretically eliminate racial disparities would be to increase the
number of executions among those who kill African American defendants; however the
"remedy" is likely unworkable as a constitutional matter because it would require either
suspect racial consciousness by the prosecution or an increase in the likelihood of
arbitrariness by expansion of death eligibility. Moreover, this "remedy" is at odds with the
societal trend to reduce, rather than expand, executions. See Howe, supra note 238, at
2132-35; Kennedy, supra note 229, at 1436-39. A further, even more substantial problem
is that this "remedy" could only work for future death sentences and executions and
cannot cure the effects of past race-of-the-victim discrimination where it existed.
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motion, which described the racially discriminatory statements and
conduct of jurors against this African American defendant.319 Similar
allegations of purposeful racial motivation are found in the case of
Kenneth Rouse, an African American. In that case, a juror expressed
racial animus against African Americans and purposefully failed to
disclose his mother's murder under very similar circumstances to
those in Rouse's case in order to avoid being dismissed for cause
during jury selection.32° Racially motivated conduct is unfortunately
not a relic of the past,321 but it is rarely displayed openly in
contemporary death penalty cases. Instead, racial prejudice more
often operates covertly rather than openly, and it often goes
unrecognized even by the individual who responds unconsciously to
such motivation.322 One of the important features of the RJA is that it
does not require proof of intentional racial motivation and instead
authorizes proof by use of statistical and disparate impact evidence.
The result is that relief is to be granted when race was a significant
factor in the decision on death both if the evidence of racial
319. For a discussion of the basis of Bacon's successful clemency petition, see supra
note 278.
320. See Rouse v. Lee, 339 F.3d 238, 266 (4th Cir. 2003) (Motz, J., dissenting)
("Kenneth Rouse faces his death with reason to believe that one of the twelve citizens
entrusted with doing impartial justice in his case sought so eagerly to condemn him that
the juror deliberately misled the court, hiding basic facts as to his particular bias against
Rouse and his contempt for all African Americans."); see also Affidavit of Joseph Scott
Baynard, State v. Rouse, No. 91 CRS 3316-17, No. 92 CRS 2 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 2,
1996) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (containing juror's own description of
his conduct and attitudes); Affidavit of Renee Wathall, State v. Rouse, 91 CRS 3316-17, 92
CRS 2 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 17, 1996) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review)
(providing investigator's conversations with juror).
321. Former District Attorney Kenneth Honeycutt wore a gold lapel pen shaped like a
noose and awarded similar pins to assistant prosecutors who won death penalty cases. See
John Stevenson, Condemned Man "Delusional": Lawyers Trying to Save His Life Say He
Won't Talk to Them, HERALD-SUN (Durham, N.C), Nov. 23, 2006, at Al. The use of this
symbol is obviously more ambiguous than the other examples given, but it is suggestive of
attitudes that were at one time common and openly expressed but are more infrequently
encountered currently. The decisions made by superior court judges in the discretionary
decision of selecting grand jury foreman resulted in one of thirty-three grand jury foremen
being African American over an eighteen year period in a county with a 61% African
American population. See State v. Cofield, 320 N.C. 297, 308-09, 357 S.E.2d 622, 629
(1987). Even if based solely on inference from statistics, the decisions seem unlikely to
have been unconscious.
322. See generally Charles R. Lawrence, The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 323 (1987) (seminal article
criticizing the requirement in much constitutional litigation that requires proof of
intentional motivation because it ignores much of what is understood about the working of
the human mind and its disregard for both the irrationality of racism and the profound
effect of the history of American race relations on individual and collective
unconsciousness).
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discrimination was effectively hidden from view and even if its
operation was unconscious.323
As described in Part II.A, both the prosecutor and the jury retain
broad discretion under the current structure. This discretion provides
opportunities for racial considerations to affect those decisions. This
may occur through racially stereotypical thinking, which is generally
experienced by the individual as a factual perception rather than a
biased stereotype and thus operates unconsciously.324 Unconscious
racial motivation may be observed in fears of the threat posed by
African American defendants or in judgments regarding the
heinousness of crimes that differ when the crime is committed against
a white victim rather one who is African American. 3' These
unconscious racial reactions can operate against a defendant who may
be perceived as an unfamiliar outsider or feared. Conversely,
unconscious motivation in the form of empathy is more likely
experienced by prosecutors or jurors of the majority race on behalf of
victims of that same race.326
Unconscious racial motivation can operate in a number of ways.
Prosecutors may seek and jurors may impose the death penalty in
response to their perception that community sentiment supports more
punitive action when the victim is white than when African
American.3 27 If the defendant is African American, prosecutors may
323. See infra Part III.A-D.
324. See generally Lawrence, supra note 322 (describing theoretical basis and operation
of unconscious racial motivation).
325. See Baldus et al., supra note 259, at 1652.
326. To be powerful, racial influences need not be intentional and explicitly
entertained or even perceived by the individual subject to those influences. Unconscious
racial bias, known in the psychological field as implicit bias or implicit social cognition,
operates "without conscious awareness or conscious control but nevertheless influences
fundamental evaluations of individuals and groups." Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji,
Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of "Affirmative Action," 94 CAL. L. REV.
1063, 1064 (2006). A substantial body of scholarship and research document these effects
in a variety of settings, including the death penalty. See, e.g., Eberhardt et al., supra note
258, at 383, 385 (concluding that stereotypes regarding African Americans can affect jury
evaluation of blameworthiness and was a significant predictor of death sentences where
the victim was white, rendering race and stereotyping especially salient); Kang & Banaji,
supra, at 1073-75 (reviewing studies that document implicit bias in hiring behavior and
medical diagnosis); Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1491-
1535 (2005) (describing recent social cognition research that provides evidence of the
existence of the operation of implicit racial bias and describing how it alters behavior). See
generally Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking,
and Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345 (2007) (describing the process of unconscious bias
and jury misremembering of facts because of racial stereotyping).
327. See Baldus et al., supra note 259, at 1653. Lack of public pressure from the black
community for capital punishment could account for reduced pressure on prosecutors and
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be influenced to seek the death penalty more frequently in cases
where the victim is white because of a belief of the likely higher jury
support for execution in such cases. If an African American commits
a crime against another African American, the prosecutor may
conclude that it must be highly aggravated to actually receive the
death penalty.3 28 All of these are situations in which racial motivation
can enter the decision without conscious intention to discriminate.
Whether a decision, driven by unconscious racial motivation, to treat
an African American defendant more punitively than a white
defendant, constitutes purposeful discrimination under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment may be open to
question. However, the use of statistical proof under the RJA makes
those judgments relevant when the result is that death penalty
decisions are more frequently sought against or imposed on members
of one race than another race.329
The very heavy predominance of white victims described in Part
II.B.2 strongly suggests that race-of-the defendant discrimination has
continued in contemporary death penalty cases. Unless it is explained
by non-racial factors in a careful statistical analysis, then this result
should be considered the product of racial motivation of a prosecutor
to seek the death penalty or jurors to impose it. While race-of-the-
defendant discrimination is often explained as a result of conscious
racial animus directed against the defendant, generally termed
intentional or purposeful discrimination, it can also result from
unconscious motivation such as stereotypical assumptions about the
dangerousness of an African American defendant. On the other
hand, race-of-the-victim discrimination is usually not based on racial
antipathy and is therefore not on conscious racial motivation.
Empirical results show that race-of-the-victim discrimination
results most frequently from decisions by the prosecutor at the time
of charging.33 ° For example, prosecutors may sincerely-but
erroneously-perceive that families of white victims more strongly
support the imposition of a death penalty or that such families have
expressed their views of support more strongly to the prosecutor.3
jurors to seek the death penalty. See Howe, supra note 238, at 2121 (citing Hans Zeisel,
Race Bias in the Administration of the Death Penalty: The Florida Experience, 95 HARv. L.
REV. 456, 467 (1981)).
328. See Baldus & Woodworth, supra note 239, at 1422.
329. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §15A-2011(b)(1)-(2) (2009) (defining evidence relevant to
find race as a significant factor in death penalty decisions).
330. See Baldus & Woodworth, supra note 239 at 1426.
331. See id. at 1449-50.
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However, such perceptions may result not from actual differences in
the families' actions but instead from factors associated with social
standing, notoriety of the offense, and assumptions correlated with
race.332 Elected prosecutors may pursue the death penalty more
vigorously for murderers of whites, not because of the personal
inclinations of these prosecutors, but because of their understanding
of the likely reactions of the electorate.333 While observed less
frequently in past studies, discrimination may also be the result of
jury decision making when jurors view white victims more
sympathetically than African American victims. 334 As noted above,
the roots of such results are not in race-based hostility but rather in
race-based empathy. 35 Both racial antipathy and empathy violate the
RJA's command to remove the effects of racial motivation from the
operation of North Carolina's death penalty.336
The greater participation of members of all races in the criminal
justice system and better representation of defendants are clearly
having a positive effect in reducing the operation of racial motivation.
However, the influences of race have not necessarily been eliminated.
Most prosecutors nationally and in North Carolina, despite changes in
the electorate, remain white.337 Also, for demographic and other
332. See Stephen B. Bright, Discrimination, Death and Denial: The Tolerance of Racial
Discrimination in Infliction of the Death Penalty, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 433, 452-54
(1995) (describing evidence from cases in Georgia, particularly one county, where the
prosecutor did not contact most of the families in cases involving African American
victims to determine the sentence preferred while in cases involving prominent white
victims family contact was prompt).
333. See Evan Tsen Lee & Ashutosh Bhagwat, The McCleskey Puzzle: Remedying
Prosecutorial Discrimination Against Black Victims in Capital Cases, 1998 SUP. CT. REV.
145, 155.
334. See Baldus & Woodworth, supra note 239, at 1448.
335. See id. at 1438.
336. See id. at 1482. This race-related motivation may be unconscious or conscious. Id.
337. During much of the relevant period, there were at most two African American
District Attorneys in North Carolina (Carl Fox and Belinda Foster in an earlier period and
currently Tracey Cline and Robert Evans), sometimes one, see Amanda S. Hitchcock,
Recent Development, "Deference Does Not by Definition Preclude Relief': The Impact of
Miller-El v. Dretke on Batson Review in North Carolina Capital Appeals, 84 N.C. L. REV.
1328, 1344 & n.106 (2006) (noting that thirty-eight of thirty-nine prosecutors in the state
were white in 2006), and for a brief period none (from the departure of Belinda Evans
until the election of Tracey Cline). See Mike Hixenbaugh, Perdue Chooses New DA,
ROCKY MOuNT TELEGRAM (Rocky Mount, N.C.), Apr. 30, 2009, at 1A (describing
appointment of Robert Evans in April 2009); cf Matt Saldana, District Attorneys Differ on
Racial Justice Act, INDEP. WKLY. (Durham, N.C.), June 10, 2009, at 9 (describing support
for the Racial Justice Act by Durham County District Attorney Tracey Cline in contrast to
opposition of the N.C. Conference of District Attorneys).
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reasons,338 most jurors in North Carolina are white. Greater media
attention may accompany the murder of a white victim than one who
is African American and may result in greater pressure on the
prosecutor to charge the case capitally. 39 Differences in sentencing
policies between jurisdictions may be the consequence of differences
in policy or in racial motivation in the form of differing views
regarding the worth of victims or defendants related to race. n° The
key point is that the continued role of discretionary judgments by
prosecutors and jurors permits the operation of unconscious racial
motivation to affect death penalty decisions, and the RJA includes
consideration of that motivation, whether it is founded on racial
animus or racial empathy, when it affects the frequency that members
of one race are prosecuted capitally or sentenced to death in
comparison with members of another race.
3. The Continuing Exclusion of African Americans from Jury
Selection
Undeniably, North Carolina and the nation have moved a
considerable distance in guaranteeing African Americans the right to
serve on juries and defendants of all races to have juries drawn from a
fair cross-section of their communities since Strauder v. West
Virginia.41 However, its declaration that de jure exclusion was
unconstitutional had little effect on practices in many jurisdictions. In
a series of cases, the Court focused on discrimination largely with
regard to selection of the jury pool from which jury venires are
selected, effectively demanding broad inclusion of citizens of all races,
thereby doing much to bring about a meaningful African American
presence and a chance for jury service."
However, until its decision in Batson v. Kentucky 3 in 1986, the
Supreme Court had given relatively weak protection against racially
338. See infra Part II.B.3 (discussing apparent failure of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
79 (1986), effectively to police peremptory strikes).
339. See Baldus & Woodworth, supra note 239, at 1449.
340. See Baldus & Woodworth, supra note 258, at 213-14 (describing results from
Nebraska where urban jurisdictions were the harshest, which produced a substantial
disparity in race-of-the-defendant sentencing, and New Jersey where suburban
jurisdictions had the harshest policies that produced race-of-the-defendant disparities).
341. 100 U.S. 303 (1879); see supra Part I.B.6.
342. See, e.g., Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979); Simms v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 404
(1967) (per curiam); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S.
587 (1935); supra note 218.
343. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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motivated selection of the trial jury from the venire.34 Until Batson,
although discrimination by the prosecutor in selecting a trial jury,
which would principally occur by use of peremptory challenges, was
unconstitutional, showing a pattern of striking African American
jurors in the present case was not sufficient to warrant relief or even
require judicial inquiry. Previously, the Court in Swain v. Alabama,"45
recognizing that historically peremptory challenges are exercised
without statement of reason or need for justification, had required
proof of discrimination. This requirement could be satisfied only
through direct evidence of racial motivation or proof of a systemic
pattern of removal of African Americans by the prosecutor in the
particular jurisdiction."46 As Batson recognized, this was a crippling
burden that made prosecutors' peremptory challenges largely
immune from constitutional scrutiny.347
Batson altered the picture somewhat by recognizing that a prima
facie showing of discrimination could be established in the
peremptory challenges made in an individual case, but it required
only a reasonable, non-racial explanation for the prosecutor to
overcome the challenge. 48 The Batson decision certainly made it
easier to establish a claim that peremptory challenges were racially
motivated, and conceptually it should also have made those
challenges easier to win. However, while the prosecution is frequently
344. Id. at 88 (acknowledging its focus on the venire and relative lack of attention to
the selection process for the petit jury despite the fact that racial discrimination in the trial
jury's selection was also clearly prohibited).
345. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
346. See id. at 202-12.
347. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 92-93. State v. Jackson, 322 N.C. 251, 368 S.E.2d 838
(1988), provides an example of the type of broad justification that can excuse racial
discrimination. The prosecution defended the exercise of its peremptory strike against
"one black woman because she was unemployed [and] ... the prosecution did not feel that
an unemployed person had as significant a stake in an orderly society as an employed
person." Id. at 253, 368 S.E.2d at 839. The supreme court affirmed the trial court's ruling
that the justification was racially neutral. Id. at 258-59, 368 S.E.2d at 841-42. It was part of
the prosecutor's stated criteria for selecting jurors who were " 'stable, government
oriented, employed and had sufficient ties to the community, and a mind-set ... that
would pay more attention to the needs of law enforcement than the fine points of
individual rights.' " Id. at 255, 368 S.E.2d at 840. In his concurring opinion, Justice Frye
protested that accepting such profiles could have the effect of systematically excluding
African Americans, thwart the purpose of Batson, and turn the equal protection clause in
this context into a right without a remedy. Id. at 259-61, 368 S.E.2d at 842-43 (Frye, J.,
concurring).
348. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-98 ("Once the defendant makes a prima facie showing
[of racial discrimination through the use of peremptory challenges in his or her case], the
burden shifts to the State to come forward with a neutral explanation for challenging black
jurors.").
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required to provide a non-racial explanation, rarely does the defense
prevail as long as the response includes any of a substantial number of
accepted justifications.3 49 The result is a relatively ineffective
framework established by federal constitutional law. Indeed, some
knowledgeable commentators argue that, in modern death penalty
practice, race discrimination is most deeply embedded and most often
manifest in jury selection practices that are designed to reduce or
hold African American participation as jurors to a minimum."
Racially motivated peremptory challenges are often particularly
effective because the number of minorities in the original panel is
small. Minorities can be removed from the panel by "for cause"
challenges for a number of predictable reasons.35' Typically, the most
349. See Hitchcock, supra note 337, at 1345, 1351-55 (cataloging some of the
justifications approved by the Supreme Court of North Carolina in capital cases); State v.
Wright, 189 N.C. App. 346, 353-54, 658 S.E.2d 60, 64-65 (2008) (granting a new trial on
Batson grounds where the prosecutor failed to provide any justifications for several
peremptory strikes and the trial court did not make findings as to each strike as required
by precedent); see also Baldus et al., The Use of Peremptory Challenges in Capital Murder
Trials: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 3, 123 (2001) (observing in
empirical research on Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, trials that Batson and its progeny have
had only marginal effect).
350. See, e.g., Bryan A. Stevenson & Ruth E. Friedman, Deliberate Indifference:
Judicial Tolerance of Racial Bias in Criminal Justice, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 509, 515-27
(1994) (detailing prosecution practices that despite Batson continue to produce juries in
which all or most African Americans have been excluded).
351. See State v. Noell, 284 N.C. 670, 701, 202 S.E.2d 750, 770 (1974) (upholding
conviction and death sentence and rejecting challenge to them based on the prosecutor's
use of peremptory strikes to remove all African Americans from the jury); Brief for
Defendant Appellant at 21-22, State v. Noell, 284 N.C. 670, 202 S.E.2d 750 (1974) (No. 10)
(challenging exclusion of jurors of defendant's race because of their knowledge of the
defendant) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); see also State v. Cole, 343 N.C.
399, 412-14, 471 S.E.2d 362, 367-69 (1996) (recounting defendant's request for change of
venue, inter alia, because so many of the potential African American jurors in the rural
county were likely to know the victims or the defendant that it would be difficult to seat
any African American jurors, which proved true in that thirteen of the sixteen jurors who
were questioned during voir dire indicated such knowledge, nine of them being stricken
for cause, and ultimately no African American serving).
Litigation in the Motion for Appropriate Relief (MAR) in the challenge to the
death sentence of John Oliver in Robeson County illustrates some of the ways in which
African American jurors can be excluded during jury selection. A combination of
processes resulted in the exclusion of all African Americans in a jurisdiction where
approximately one-fourth of the population was African American from a jury that in
1982 recommended death sentences for two African American defendants charged with
murdering two white men. See Motion for Appropriate Relief, Exhibit VIII, State v.
Oliver, No. 78 CRS 25575 (N.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 12, 1986) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review) (recounting racial characteristics of defendants, victims, members of the
venire, and the voting age population, 23% of whom were African American at that time).
The death sentence was vacated on the basis of a violation of the defendant's due process
rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). See Order at 56-62, State v. Oliver,
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significant is the "death qualifying" of the panel members for service
on a capital jury,352 which precedes the peremptory strike process and
excludes a disproportionate number of minorities with "for cause"
challenges.353  As demonstrated in research in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, by Professor Baldus, the limited number of African
Americans in the typical jury pool magnifies the impact of any
discriminatory pattern of strikes by the prosecution that cannot be
offset by a compensating strategy of defense counsel. 4 Moreover,
No. 78 CRS 25575 (N.C. Super. Ct. Jan. 25, 1994) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
In the death qualifying process, sixty-eight jurors were questioned, and thirty-
three of them were excused for cause, many with only three highly leading questions from
the prosecutor and no allowance of clarification. See Motion for Appropriate Relief at 41-
45, State v. Oliver, No. 78 CRS 25575 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 27, 1988). This high
percentage of jurors unable to impose a death sentence appeared unlikely given the
attitudes of the public and according to interviews with jurors by counsel during
development of the Motion for Appropriate Relief and was more likely attributable to the
opportunity the procedure provided to simply avoid jury service. Id. at 45-46. That process
eliminated seven of the fourteen African American jurors who were questioned during
voir dire. One additional juror was eliminated by a challenge for cause for another
purpose. The prosecutor used five of his nine peremptory challenges against African
Americans. The final African American juror was excused on a peremptory challenge by
the co-defendant's attorney. See id. at 53-55. Despite the expenditure of weeks of work
amassing the data on the race of jurors, which is usually not available or noted in any
fashion in criminal case records, and its presentation in the MAR supported by affidavits,
the issue was never addressed by the trial court judge who heard the motion because they
were dismissed on the State's motion on procedural grounds. See Order at 6, State v.
Oliver, No. 78 CRS 25575 (N.C. Super. Ct. Jan. 25, 1994) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review) (affirming earlier rulings of another superior court judge who ruled on the
pleadings to bar the majority of claims on grounds of procedural bar).
352. A venire member is considered "death-qualified" if the prospective juror is not
incapable of fairly imposing a death sentence under appropriate facts. In Witherspoon v.
Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 521-22 (1968), the Court set out the standards for striking venire
members for cause because of their opposition to, and reservations about, capital
punishment. See also Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 416-26 (1984) (more recent
discussion of same issue). In Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992), the Court
established standards for the less frequently encountered situation of striking venire
members for cause because they would automatically sentence a defendant to death upon
his conviction for capital murder.
353. Although the United States Supreme Court has rejected the challenge to death
qualification that it denies the defendant the right to a fair cross section of the community,
see Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 174-77 (1986), researchers demonstrate that the
process of death qualification predictably removes a larger percentage of African
Americans than whites because of the relatively greater opposition to capital punishment
among African Americans. See, e.g., Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 187 (1986)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting the findings of researchers that death qualification
removes a disproportionate percentage of African Americans and women); Frank P.
Williams III & Marilyn D. McShane, Inclinations of Prospective Jurors in Capital Cases, 74
Soc. ScI. REV. 85, 87-89 (1990).
354. See Baldus et al., supra note 349, at 125 (noting that the "cancelling out"
hypothesis of prosecution strikes and defense strikes, which appeared to be happening,
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social psychologists have demonstrated that to affect the outcome of a
typical jury of twelve, more than one person espousing a minority
position must be on the jury, for when voiced by just one person, the
minority argument does not receive significant consideration. As a
result, the inclusion of a single minority member will generally have
only limited effect. 5
Despite changes in the laws and practices governing jury
selection, those who exercise discretion in imposing the death
sentence-jurors-remain disproportionately white, and African
American service on juries is often limited. Indeed, in a number of
the cases of defendants presently on death row, the jury was all white
even though a number of these cases were tried in counties with
substantial African American populations.356
favored the prosecution because "the prime targets of the Commonwealth typically were
substantially smaller in number than were defense counsel's prime targets").
355. According to social science research, the presence of one or more allies, in
other words at least two and perhaps three jurors who share a minority position, is
usually critical to a minority effectively voicing its position in the deliberation process.
[Flor one or two jurors to hold out to the end, it would appear necessary that they
had companionship at the beginning of the deliberations. The juror psychology
recalls a famous series of experiments by the psychologist Asch and others which
showed that in an ambiguous situation a member of a group will doubt and finally
disbelieve his own correct observation if all other members of the group claim that
he must have been mistaken. To maintain his original position, not only before
others but even before himself, it is necessary for him to have at least one ally.
HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 463 (1966); see also Baldus
et al., supra note 349, at 124 (finding that, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, juries with five or
more African American jurors were significantly less likely to impose death sentences
than those with four or fewer African American members); John J. Francis, Peremptory
Challenges, Gutter, and Critical Mass: A Means of Reclaiming the Promise of Batson, 29
VT. L. REV. 297, 327-36 (2005) (describing the benefits of multiracial juries for resisting
stereotypical reasoning and the importance of a critical mass of minority jurors). Also,
social science research and theory indicate another potential impact of minority presence.
A single juror espousing a minority position is quite unlikely to prevail in either holding
out against the majority's position in the determination of the case, but even a lone juror
of a minority race can have the effect of sensitizing majority jurors to different
perspectives that might otherwise be ignored, often because it is not articulated or
perceived. See Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, White Juror Bias, 7 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL'Y & L. 201, 221 (2001).
356. Among defendants currently on death row, at least thirty were tried by juries that
had no African American members. The defendants are listed alphabetically by race with
the county where the case originated shown in parentheses. The cases include: African
American defendants-Quintel Augustine (Cumberland), Roger Blakeney (Union), Paul
Brown (Wayne), Rayford Burke (Iredell), Wade Cole (Camden), Phillip Davis
(Buncombe), Keith East (Surry), Andre Fletcher (Rutherford), Mitchell Holmes
(Johnston), Cerron Hooks (Forsyth), Guy LeGrande (Stanly), Thomas Larry (Forsyth),
Terry Moore (Davie), Andrew Ramseur (Iredell), Martin Richardson (Union), Kenneth
Rouse (Randolph), and Russell Tucker (Forsyth); Native American defendants-
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In addition to inviting a broad examination of statistical evidence
regarding race-of-the-defendant and race-of-the-victim discrimination,
the RJA authorizes a systemic examination of the use of race in the
examination of peremptory challenges during jury selection. This
cumulative examination within relevant geographical areas for
prosecution should address the apparent ineffectiveness of Batson in
individual case litigation to eliminate the racial exclusionary effects of
the prosecution's use of peremptory challenges. This Article now
turns to analysis and interpretation of the RJA as it implements the
task of ensuring that racial motivation does not affect the operation
of the death penalty in North Carolina with regard to significant
differences in the race of defendants and victims and the
prosecution's exercise of prosecutorial peremptory challenges.
III. THE RACIAL JUSTICE ACT
A number of important issues must be addressed by courts in
interpreting the RJA. Its key features and their role in ensuring that
race is eliminated from decisions affecting defendants, victims, and
jurors in the operation of the North Carolina death penalty system
are examined below. The analysis relies on legislative intent,
placement within the context of other remedial legislation employing
statistical evidence, and clear distinctions between the RJA and the
Kentucky statute.
A. Accepting McCleskey's Invitation to Legislatures to Receive
Statistical Evidence in Addition to Proof of Intentional
Discrimination
In enacting the Racial Justice Act, North Carolina determined
that its inquiry would not be limited by McCleskey v. Kemp357 and its
rejection of statistical evidence when examining constitutional claims
Alexander Polke (Randolph) and Darryl Strickland (Union); white defendants-Eric Call
(Ashe), Chris Goss (Ashe), James Jaynes (Polk), Wayne Laws (Davidson), Carl Moseley
(Forsyth & Stokes), Ted Prevatte (Stanly), William Raines (Henderson), Tony Sidden
(Alexander), Gary Trull (Randolph), George Wilkerson (Randolph), and James Williams
(Randolph). See Jury Information Memorandum (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
According to 2000 census data, the African American percentage in Cumberland,
Forsyth, and Wayne Counties exceeded the state-wide average of 21.6%, and Wake
County, with 19.7% of its population African American, was close to the state-wide
percentage. Camden, Iredell, Johnston, Rutherford, and Stanly Counties all had African
American populations that exceeded 10% but were less than 20%. In the remaining
counties listed above, the African American population was less than 10%. See 2000
Census, supra note 258.
357. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
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under the Equal Protection Clause. In McCleskey, the Court ruled
that "to prevail under the Equal Protection Clause, [the defendant]
must prove that the decisionmakers in his case acted with
discriminatory propose." '358 The legislature understood that it was
creating a different system of proof than that prescribed by
McCleskey, explicitly accepting the Court's invitation to legislatures
to act because they, rather than the United States Supreme Court, are
best able to judge how statistical studies should be used in regulating
the death penalty.359
In the debate on May 14, 2009, the day when the North Carolina
Senate first approved Senate Bill 461, which became the RJA,
Senator Doug Berger set out how it differs from McCleskey:
[W]ithout this legislation, previous attempts to raise this issue
would have been to no avail because of the McCleskey
decision.... The McCleskey decision ... said that while
statistics may show race discrimination, it doesn't rise to the
level of being a constitutional violation of the equal protection
clause and specifically directed that if states wanted to provide
this additional protection and making it a means by which
someone could prove racial discrimination, then they could do
it. And that's what we're doing here today. I want to step back
and explain, very quickly, where this idea of using statistics to
prove race discrimination comes from and why it's needed.
Race discrimination is very hard to prove. Rarely, particularly
in today's time, do people outright say, "I am doing this
because of the color of your skin." Imagine if our civil rights act
that was passed in '64 said that the only way that you can prove
race discrimination is that kind of evidence-an admission by
the person engaging in racial discrimination. We would have
had very little change in our society and culture in terms of the
hiring practices. What we did in the civil rights act in '64 is said,
"In addition to using direct evidence in proving discrimination;
358. Id. at 292. The McCleskey decision's insistence on proof of purposeful racial
discrimination for proof of constitutional claims under the Equal Protection doctrine in
death penalty cases, drastically limited the use of statistical evidence and the significance
of proof of disparate racial impact, and because of the virtual impossibility of meeting the
burden imposed, effectively ended federal court scrutiny of such claims. See Baldus &
Woodworth, supra note 239, at 1466; see also John H. Blume et al., Post-McCleskey Racial
Discrimination in Capital Cases, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1771, 1778-79 (1998) (noting that
the limitation in McCleskey to proof regarding the defendant's particular case effectively
limits proof to the individual prosecutor or office).
359. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 319.
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you could use statistics." And, in fact, what we did, and there's
a parallel to what we're doing in this bill.3"
By contrast to McCleskey, the RJA explicitly authorizes proof by
"statistical evidence" that race was a significant factor in decisions to
seek or impose death sentences in the county, the prosecutorial
district, the judicial division, or the State at the relevant time.361 It also
declares that based on the process set out and the proof admitted,
including statistical evidence, if the court finds that race was a
significant factor in such decisions in any one of the four relevant
geographical areas, relief is to be granted.362 The death sentence is to
be vacated, and the defendant is to be resentenced to life without
parole.363
360. See Sen. Doug Berger, Senate Floor Debate on Racial Justice Act (May 14, 2009)
(transcript on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (responding in opposition to an
amendment offered by Senator Phil Berger to limit the use of statistical evidence as set
out in McCleskey). His statement that the model being used was that of statistical evidence
in employment cases was echoed in the House by Rep. Rick Glazier during the debate in
the North Carolina House on July 14, 2009, when it adopted Senate Bill 461. See Rep.
Rick Glazier, House Floor Debate on Racial Justice Act (July 14, 2009) (transcript on file
with the North Carolina Law Review) ("Well, I'm here to tell you, at least from my
perspective, that unstated motivation is extraordinarily difficult to ferret out. That is why
we use statistical evidence in employment discrimination cases, and if we are using
statistical evidence in employment cases to protect property rights, I fail to see why
credible statistical evidence ought not be a legislative reason or a legislative priority to
allow people to use to fight for their life."). Sen. Doug Berger's explicit acceptance of
McCleskey's invitation to legislatures to determine the appropriate use of statistical
evidence regarding racial discrimination was echoed in that same debate by Rep. Deborah
Ross. See Rep. Deborah Ross, House Floor Debate on Racial Justice Act (July 14, 2009)
(transcript on file with the North Carolina Law Review) ("In a 5-4 decision, the US
Supreme Court said that you don't have the constitutional right to present statistical
evidence ... [t]hough at the end of his opinion for the five judge majority, Justice Lewis
Powell said 'these arguments are best presented to legislative bodies. It is the Legislatures,
the elected representatives of the people that are constituted to respond to the will and
consequently the moral values of the people. Legislatures are also better qualified to
weigh and evaluate the results of statistical studies in terms of their local conditions and
with a flexibility of approach that is not available to the court.' ") (quoting McCleskey, 481
U.S. at 319).
361. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2010(b) (2009).
362. See id. § 15A-2012(a)(3).
363. See id.
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B. Proof of Discrimination through Statistical Evidence and Burden
Shifting
The legislature set out in the RJA a statutory test for "[p]roof of
racial discrimination," which replaces McCleskey's almost
impossible-to-establish constitutional requirement of direct proof of
intention to discriminate. The statute states that the "finding that race
was the basis of the decision to seek or impose a death sentence may
be established if the court finds that race was a significant factor in
decisions to seek or impose the sentence" in one of four designated
areas at the time the decision was made.365
The RJA sets out the framework of relevant concerns. The two
decisions of interest are the decision to seek the death penalty, which
is made by the prosecutor, and the decision to impose the death
penalty, which is made by the jury.366 Proof regarding the effect of
race on these decisions "may include statistical evidence," direct
testimony, or other evidence.367 Statistical evidence may show
disproportionate racial impact and therefore that race was the
"significant factor" in the decisions regarding whether to seek or
impose the death penalty. First, the RJA authorizes proof by
introducing evidence that "[d]eath sentences were sought or imposed
significantly more frequently upon persons of one race," which makes
the race of the defendant critical.3" Second, it authorizes proof that
"[d]eath sentences were sought or imposed significantly more
frequently as punishment for capital offenses against persons of one
race than as capital offenses against persons of another race," which
focuses on the race of the victim.3 69 Third, it recognizes that "[r]ace
was a significant factor in decisions to exercise peremptory challenges
during jury selection," which directs examination of the race of jurors
who were excused.370 As long as made at the time of the decision to
seek or impose the death sentence, this statistical showing may be
364. See id. § 15A-2011 (using "racial discrimination" in the statutory title as the only
use of that term in the RJA); see id. § 15A-2010 (prohibiting a death sentence that "was
sought or obtained on the basis of race").
365. See § 15A-2011(a) (emphasis added).
366. Id.
367. See § 15A-2011(b). In addition to statistical evidence, the statute permits sworn
testimony from witnesses drawn from the criminal justice system. See id.
368. See § 15A-2011(b)(1).
369. See § 15A-2011(b)(2).
370. See § 15A-2011(b)(3). In combination with section 15A-2012(b), which gives the
defendant the right to raise claims under the RJA "[niot withstanding any other provision
or time limitation contained in Article 89 of Chapter 15A," this provision allows
defendants to litigate racial discrimination regarding peremptory strikes even if objections
were not made at trial or might be subject to other procedural bars in Article 89.
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made in "the county, the prosecutorial district, the judicial division, or
the State. 371
In one section, the statute describes a finding that race was "the
basis" of a decision to seek or impose a death sentence, which "may"
be established if the court finds that race was a significant factor in
the decision in one of the four identified geographical areas.372
Elsewhere, the statute states more directly the connection between
the requirement of relief and proof of disparate impact:
If the court finds that race was a significant factor in decisions
to seek or impose the sentence of death in the county, the
prosecutorial district, the judicial division, or the State at the
time death was sought or imposed, the court shall order that the
death sentence not be sought, or that the death sentence
imposed by the judgment shall be vacated and the defendant
resentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole.373
In combination with others, these provisions set out a burden
shifting process. The defendant has the burden to prove "race was a
significant factor in decisions to seek or impose the sentence of death
in the county, the prosecutorial district, the judicial division, or the
State at the time death was sought or imposed. 3 74 If he or she does
so, then the state may rebut the defendant's proof, again using either
statistical or other evidence.375 However, if the state does not refute
the defendant's proof, the language of the statute commands that
"the judgment shall be vacated and the defendant resentenced to life
without the possibility of parole.
3 76
Thus, the RJA follows the familiar pattern of the use of statistical
evidence in civil rights law.377 However, in setting out the remedy, it
371. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2012(b) (2009).
372. See § 15A-2011(a).
373. See § 15A-2012(a)(3) (emphasis added).
374. See § 15A-2012(c).
375. See id.
376. See § 15A-2012(a)(3) (emphasis added).
377. Statistical evidence is used to satisfy the claimant's burden and to shift the burden
to the opponent to rebut the inference established by the statistical evidence in voting
rights and employment discrimination cases and in criminal law as to fair representation of
the community in jury venires and the use of peremptory strikes in jury selection. See Alex
Lesman, State Responses to the Specter of Racial Discrimination in Capital Proceedings:
The Kentucky Racial Justice Act and the New Jersey Supreme Court's Proportionality
Review Project, 13 J. L. & POL'Y 359, 371-72 (2005); Baldus & Woodworth, supra note
239, at 1467 (noting the Kentucky Racial Justice Act is modeled on the Federal Racial
Justice Act, which was based on the model of proof used in challenging a pattern of
apparent race-based peremptory strikes in Batson). This was the model used as well in the
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does more than permit use of statistical evidence to establish a "prima
facie" case. A "prima facie" case under North Carolina law permits
the finder of fact to grant relief.378 The RJA at least does that much. It
also appears to go further and not only permits but compels relief if
the defendant's proof is not refuted that race was a significant factor
in the decision to seek or impose the death penalty in one of the four
geographical areas identified by the statute.
C. Requirement of Particularity Regarding Race as a Significant
Factor in Decisions in a Relevant Geographical Area, Not in the
Individual Case
The key limitation in McCleskey-proof of intentional or
purposeful discrimination in the defendant's case-is not required
under the RJA, although it would be permitted.3 79 Moreover,
differences between the North Carolina RJA and the Kentucky
legislation of the same name reveal how the North Carolina RJA
avoids indirectly limiting the defendant's use of statistical proof. The
Kentucky statute indirectly limits the defendant's use of statistical
proof by its requirement of particularity in proof linking the statistical
evidence to the defendant's specific case.38° By contrast, the North
proposed federal Racial Justice Act as developed in the United States House of
Representatives. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-98 (1986) (authorizing use of a
pattern of peremptory strikes against members of a racial group by the prosecutor to
establish an inference of discrimination that shifts the burden to the state to explain with
neutral reasons to avoid a finding of discriminatory action); H.R. REP. NO. 103-458, at 3-5
(1994) (noting that because few people readily admit to an intent to discriminate, illegal
discrimination can be established in a number of areas of federal law by showing that the
results of the process have a discriminatory impact); Don Edwards & John Conyers, Jr.,
The Racial Justice Act-A Simple Matter of Justice, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 699, 704-06,
708-09 (1995) (describing the mechanism of the proposed federal Racial Justice Act,
which follows the pattern of civil rights statutes where statistical evidence produces an
inference of racial discrimination that establishes a prima facie case, shifting the burden to
the state to rebut the inference if it is to avoid relief); Maxine Goodman, A Death Penalty
Wake-Up Call: Reducing the Risk of Racial Discrimination in Capital Punishment, 12
BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 29, 57-58 (2007) (describing the operation of the statistical
evidence of disparate impact to create an inference of discrimination that the state could
then rebut, which it must do to avoid invalidation of the death sentence).
378. Under North Carolina terminology, establishing a prima facie case may result in
the party prevailing in the absence of rebuttal evidence, but it does not formally shift the
burden of proof. See 1 KENNETH S. BROUN, BRANDIS & BROUN ON NORTH CAROLINA
EVIDENCE § 32, at 120-21 (6th ed. 2004) (noting that establishing a prima facie case does
not truly shift the burden).
379. The recognition in the statute of the propriety of use of testimony from various
witnesses in the criminal justice system is appropriate to such proof. See N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15A-2011(b).
380. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532-300(4) (2008). This provision has apparently had
the effect of limiting the use of statistical evidence in Kentucky. Although the Kentucky
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Carolina RJA focuses the particularity of proof on how statistical
evidence supports "a claim that race was a significant factor in
decisions ... in the county, the prosecutorial district, the judicial
division, or the State."38' It requires the defendant "to state with
particularity how the evidence supports" the claim that race was a
significant factor in decisions of the prosecutor or jury in any of these
racial justice act authorizes use of statistical evidence on a state-wide basis to establish a
finding that race was the basis of the decision to seek death, see id. § 532-300(2), the force
of that authorization to meet the defendant's burden was undercut by the statute's
requirement that the defendant state "with particularity" how racial considerations played
a significant part in the decision to seek death "in his or her case," id. § 532-300(4). The
phrasing of the latter requirement has the ring of McCleskey's requirement of proof that
"the decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory propose." McCleskey v. Kemp,
481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987). Some observers believe the effect of this provision has been to
focus proof by statistical evidence in the specific prosecutorial district. See Baldus &
Woodworth, supra note 239, at 1468 & n.218 (quoting an observation of a defender); see
also Gerald Neal, Not Soft on Crime, but Strong on Justice: The Kentucky Racial Justice
Act, 26 THE ADVOCATE (Frankfurt, KY), Mar. 2004, at 9, 19, available at http://apps.dpa
.ky.gov/library/advocate/pdf/2004/adv032004.pdf (analyzing defender responses to the
Kentucky act). North Carolina's differently directed "particularity requirement" does not
invite that effect.
381. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2012(a). Earlier versions of the North Carolina Racial
Justice Act introduced in the North Carolina House of Representatives bore strong
resemblance to the Kentucky statute, and thus changes in the legislation before enactment
to modify those provisions that limited its effectiveness are significant indicators of
legislative intent. H.B. 1291, which was introduced in 2007 but not adopted, tracked the
major provisions of the Kentucky act and contained the major limitations described in
supra note 380 and discussed below.
The North Carolina statute also differs from the Kentucky Racial Justice Act, see
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 532-300 to -309 (1998), in a number of significant ways. First, the
Kentucky act applies only to the decision "to seek the sentence of death." Id. § 532-300(2).
The North Carolina statute applies to death sentences "sought or obtained on the basis of
race" and where "race was a significant factor in decisions to seek or impose a death
penalty." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2010; § 15A-2011(a). The effect of the Kentucky statute
is to limit the impact of its legislation to the charging decision while the North Carolina act
clearly covers decisions by the jury to impose the sentence. Indeed, the North Carolina
statute specifically permits proof of race as a significant factor in the exercise of
peremptory challenges, see id. § 15A-2011(b)(3), which are applicable only to jurors. It
also explicitly authorizes testimony from jurors. See id. § 15A-2011(b). The North Carolina
act also potentially covers other official action that goes to how the death sentence was
"obtained," which is not otherwise defined. Also, the Kentucky Act places the burden of
proof on the defendant by "clear and convincing evidence." KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532-
300(5). The North Carolina Act places the burden of proof on the defendant but does not
impose any higher burden than the normal preponderance of evidence standard. See N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 15A-2011(c). Both the Kentucky Act and the North Carolina Act permit
proof that both the race of the defendant and the race of the victim provided the basis of
decisions regarding the death sentence. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532-300(3)(a) (race of
the defendant -"[u]pon persons of one race"); § 532-300(3)(b) (race of the victim-
"offenses against persons of one race"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2011(b)(1) (race of the
defendant-"upon persons of one race"); § 15A-2011(b)(2) (race of the victim-"offenses
against persons of one race").
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geographical areas at the time of decision, focusing the particularity
requirement on proof of the impact of race in one of those areas.382
Thus, compared to the Kentucky statute, the North Carolina RJA
imposes a particularity requirement regarding proof as to the four
relevant geographical areas and not the individual defendant's case.383
The administration of the death penalty in North Carolina is best
understood as a state-wide system with a combination of local and
centralized authority. The state legislature has passed laws
establishing the death penalty and setting out broad rules for its
operation.384 Local prosecutors, who are elected from and serve in
districts, are given significant discretion in applying the state laws to
prosecution of particular cases. Resident superior court judges, who
are also elected locally, serve within a judicial division and have a
home district. They preside over hearings and trials in capital cases
where they interpret and apply the law. Jurors, who render the
verdicts in capital cases, are drawn from the county where the capital
crime occurred, unless the court moves the trial to another county.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviews cases where the death
penalty has been imposed and establishes rules supplemental to state
law regarding trial and appellate procedure in capital cases.385
This system has changed significantly since its initial adoption.
Few, if any, government actors remain from the beginning of our
modern death penalty. The laws and the application of the laws have
changed significantly. Racial attitudes of the public and public
officials have likewise changed over the last thirty years. Thus, the
examination of the impact of race called for by the RJA is an
examination of this multi-level system of death penalty administration
at the time relevant to each case. If the system, when examined at the
state-wide level, reveals the systemic improper influence of race at a
relevant time, then the death verdicts that are a product of that
system at that time period cannot stand. If, however, no state-wide
systemic problem is found, then the capital defendant may press his
382. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2011(a).
383. Id. § 15A-2012(a); see also supra note 358 (discussing the significant limitation
imposed on proof where, instead of the jurisdiction-wide focus of the RJA, the claim is a
constitutional action under the Equal Protection Clause and McCleskey, which results
almost inevitably in a very narrow focus on prosecutorial practices).
The only point at which the statute relates a showing to the particular case
involves rebuttal evidence from the state where the statute authorizes receiving evidence
that any program established by the state for the purpose of eliminating race as a factor in
death sentence decisions had an "impact upon the defendant's trial." § 15A-2011(c).
384. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §15A-2000 (2009).
385. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-33 (2009); § 7A-34.
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case based on an examination of the data by judicial division, judicial
district, or county.
D. Rebuttal by the State
Statistical proof that meets the defendant's initial burden entitles
and likely compels relief unless rebutted by the state. The statute
recognizes that such rebuttal evidence may include, but is not limited
to, statistical evidence. 86 The statute also recognizes that rebuttal
evidence may be offered in the form of programs designed to
eliminate race as a factor, but only as to its "impact upon the
defendant's trial.,
387
In rebutting the defendant's statistical evidence, the prosecution
may demonstrate that the disparate impact resulted from any
statutorily authorized factor, some of which may correlate with race
and thereby eliminate significance of the apparent impact of race in
producing that disparate impact.388 The structure developed in the
RJA is a straightforward but important application of the burden
shifting pattern followed in other remedial civil rights legislation,
which gives the defense the opportunity and in many situations the
obligation to rebut the moving party's statistically based proof if relief
is to be avoided.
386. See § 15A-2011(c). Because the RJA grants relief upon a finding that "race was a
significant factor in decisions to seek or impose" the death penalty in either "the county,
the prosecutorial district, the judicial division, or the State," § 15A-2012(a)(3) (emphasis
added), with treatment of the geographical units written in the disjunctive, statistical
evidence offered by the prosecution in rebuttal as a matter of logic must respond at the
same geographical level as the defendant's proof to avoid relief. For example, the
defendant's proof that disparate impact occurred in the county level where the case was
tried would generally not be rebutted by the prosecution's state-wide evidence of no
significant disparate impact at that geographic level when all individual units are
cumulated. Similarly, the defendant's proof of state-wide disparate impact cannot logically
be rebutted by the prosecution's evidence that there was no discrimination in a particular
county since that would not show that cumulatively the decisions showed such disparate
impact.
387. § 15A-2011(c). As noted earlier, this linking of the impact of the program to the
defendant's case is in distinction to the linkage of defendant's statistical showing to one of
the relevant jurisdictions within which his or her case was handled. See supra notes 379-83
and accompanying text (contrasting the North Carolina RJA to both the requirements of
McCleskey regarding proof of discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause and the
Kentucky Racial Justice Act).
388. The RJA's only reference that relates to this obvious point is a limitation on
evidence relevant to the defendant's showing, which allows proof "irrespective of statutory
factors." § 15A-2011(b). Such evidence is logically relevant as well to refute the
defendant's statistical proof.
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E. Standing to Raise the Claim
The RJA, which is explicitly retroactive, applies to claims by all
defendants, whether sentenced in the past or facing trial on capital
charges.3 89 As long as the defendant produces disparate impact
evidence tending to show that race was a significant factor in
decisions to seek or impose the death sentence in the relevant county,
prosecutorial district, or judicial division or in the state at the time of
the decision to seek or impose his or her death sentence, the statute
provides grounds for relief.3 9° Disparate impact of race is relevant if it
relates to the defendant, the victim, or jurors excused by peremptory
strikes.39' Because the defendant would be entitled to relief, any
defendant facing a death sentence who can provide evidence on these
issues obviously has standing to seek such relief. Therefore, if a
defendant produces disparate impact evidence on any of these issues
as to any of these geographic units at the relevant time, he or she has
standing under the statute to challenge his or her death sentence.
The RJA does not, on its face or even theoretically, limit
standing based on race of the defendant or victim. Under established
jury selection law, defendants of any race may challenge
discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges. Indeed, even as to
more restrictive procedural requirements for federal constitutional
claims, standing and "cognizable injury" does not require that the
defendant and the excluded juror be of the same race.3" As a result,
defendants regardless of their race have standing under the RJA to
389 See Racial Justice Act, ch. 464, § 2, 2009 N.C. Legis. Serv. 1193, 1194 (West)
(requiring claims of those presently under a death sentence to be filed within a year of the
effective date of the RJA). It became effective August 11, 2009, id., establishing a deadline
for filing of August 10, 2010. As noted earlier, see supra note 370, claims regarding jury
selection are not precluded by failure to previously raise them as long as the RJA
challenge is timely filed.
390. See § 15A-2012(a)(3).
391. See § 15A-2011(b)(1)-(b)(3).
392. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410-16 (1991). In Powers, the Court stated:
The discriminatory use of peremptory challenges by the prosecution causes a
criminal defendant cognizable injury, and the defendant has a concrete interest in
challenging the practice .... This is not because the individual jurors dismissed by
the prosecution may have been predisposed to favor the defendant; if that were
true, the jurors might have been excused for cause. Rather, it is because racial
discrimination in the selection of jurors "casts doubt on the integrity of the judicial
process," . . . and places the fairness of a criminal proceeding in doubt.
Id. at 411 (quoting Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 556 (1979)). The result in Powers is
consistent with an earlier ruling regarding exclusion of African Americans from the
grand jury, which the Court found unconstitutional in Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 492
(1972), a challenge brought by a white defendant.
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challenge their death sentence if they produce evidence of disparate
racial impact regarding peremptory strikes against any race by the
prosecution.
Two different types of disparate impact are clear bases both for
standing and for relief. First, the defendant may have been harmed by
the operation of race; his or her prospects of a death sentence may
have been increased by the irrationality that race introduced into the
operation of the death penalty. That harm could arise from decisions
based either on the defendant's race or the race of the victim. In the
first situation, the defendant would be the object of discrimination in
the decision to seek a death sentence or by the jury to impose a death
sentence. It could also occur when the race of the victim had an effect
on the decision of the prosecutor to seek a death sentence or the jury
to impose it, which occurs typically through racial empathy.393
Another rationale for invalidation of the death sentence where
there is disparate impact regarding victims is the undervaluation of
African American lives and the unfairness visited on the African
American community when the murder of one of its members is
denigrated, a result of lesser punishment based on the victim's race.
The history of capital punishment in North Carolina shows that
executions have been far less common when the victim was African
American regardless of the race of the defendant, and very rare if the
defendant also was white.394 Disparate execution rates based on the
race of the defendant could justify removing defendants from death
row on two rationales. One is that such discrimination devalues
African American lives and thereby has a negative impact on that
community. The second is that, although not designed to serve this
end, a death penalty system that in practice operates to punish
primarily those who take the lives of white citizens is incompatible
with North Carolina's egalitarian values.395  Whether it is
discrimination against defendants based on their race and/or race-of-
the-victim discrimination that helps produce a death sentence against
the defendant, not only is standing clear, but so is "injury in fact."
This is because, as to both types of discrimination, disparate racial
393. See supra Part II.B.2.b (discussing unconscious motivation and race-of-the-
defendant discrimination through empathy between predominately white prosecutors and
jurors and white victims).
394. See supra notes 65-77, 109, 300-04 and accompanying text (describing strong
predominance of white victims among cases where executions occurred) and supra notes
18, 23, 36, 88, 303 and accompanying text (showing that only four whites have been
executed for crimes against African Americans in North Carolina's history).
395. See Baldus & Woodworth, supra note 239, at 1453.
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impact supports the operation of race as a "but for" cause of the
death penalty.
39 6
Thus, assuming appropriate evidence of disparate impact,
standing should not be an issue. Indeed, standing is likely to exist in
multiple ways for all those sentenced to death under the RJA if the
requisite statistical showing is produced. That is the intention of the
statute according to the judgment of the North Carolina Department
of Justice, as indicated in its Fiscal Research Division
memorandum.397
F. Systemic Relief and "Injury in Fact"
The availability of relief might ordinarily be in doubt in a
situation where the defendant cannot as a matter of theory claim that
race-of-the-defendant or race-of-the-victim discrimination increased
the likelihood of a death sentence for the defendant, but it is arguably
called for under the RJA.398 The RJA is broadly animated by an
396. Even under the restrictive reading of constitutional challenges to use of statistical
evidence in McCleskey, the Supreme Court ruled that the defendant had standing to base
a claim for relief on the race of the victim, which the Court treated the same as allegations
regarding the race of the defendant. McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 291-92 (1987). It
stated that race infected the administration of the death penalty statute as to victims by
making it more likely that defendants who murdered whites would be sentenced to death
than defendants who murdered African Americans. The defendant is not, the Court
observed, asserting the rights of third persons. Instead, he is arguing that
application of the State's statute has created a classification that is "an irrational
exercise of governmental power," ... because it is not "necessary to the
accomplishment of some permissible state objective." ... It would violate the
Equal Protection Clause for a State to base enforcement of its criminal laws on
"an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification."
Id. at 291 n.8 (quoting Brief of Petitioner at 41, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (No.
395) and Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962)). On that basis, it found McCleskey had
standing.
397. See Memorandum from Danielle Seale & Denise Thomas, N.C. Gen. Assembly
Fiscal Research Div. to N.C Gen, Assembly (July 14, 2009) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review) ("As presently written, the bill allows all current death row inmates
regardless of race to file a motion alleging that race was a significant factor in decisions to
seek or impose the sentence of death in the county, the prosecutorial district, or the
judicial division at the time the death sentence was sought or imposed."). As noted earlier,
when a disparity is shown in the jurisdiction at the relevant time on the basis of the race of
the victim, the rationale for relief can also relate to the undervaluation of African
American lives and the unfairness visited to the African American community in addition
to the irrationality of the system's operation.
398. The question of entitlement to relief sometimes arises under a challenge to
standing because ordinarily standing requires a showing of cognizable injury to the
defendant, which could incorporate an inquiry into standing. However, the linkage
between standing and injury to the defendant has been eliminated for the issue of
peremptory challenges, see Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411 (1991), which is one of the
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effort to remove the irrational impact of race from the death penalty,
and it may render the death penalty illegal when it significantly
affects decisions to seek or impose the death sentence in the state or
one of the relevant judicial or prosecutorial units recognized by the
RJA.399 Furman declared all the death penalty statutes of that era
unconstitutional on such a theory of general irrationality in
imposition of the death penalty; one opinion compared it to the
capriciousness of being struck by lightning, which could not justify the
extraordinary punishment of death.4' None of the defendants who
were removed from death row when their sentences were invalidated
by Furman were required to show that the random quality of the
system made their sentence more likely than under a properly
designed system, and, indeed, as to those defendants with the worst
personal histories who committed the most horrific crimes, their best
chance of avoiding execution was under a system that replicated the
chance event of being hit by lightning.
The RJA may be read to recognize a similar basis for
invalidating death sentences if the process is shown to have been
infected by the irrationality of race upon the finding of the court "that
race was a significant factor in decisions to seek or impose the
sentence of death in the county, the prosecutorial district, the judicial
inquiries under the statute. Moreover, without resolving issues regarding the substantive
purpose of the RJA, whether cognizable injury has occurred to any defendant cannot be
determined. This is because the statute, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2011(c) (2009), directs
that procedural issues, such as establishing the defendant's case, the nature of the burden
of proof, and the meaning of prejudice are to be found in section 15A-1420(c)(6). Under
that statute, "prejudice" consists, not only of outcome determinative actions, but also
errors "as a matter of law." Id. § 15A-1443(a). The RJA may create an entitlement to
relief as a matter of law in requiring relief upon the court's finding "that race was a
significant factor in decisions to seek or impose" death in one of the relevant geographical
units. See id. § 15A-2012(a)(3). Thus, the standing issue is not separable from the
substantive issue in the small number of cases where standing might ordinarily be
challenged because of the lack of impact on the outcome in the defendant's case.
399. Cf Paul Schoeman, Note, Easing the Fear of Too Much Justice: A Compromise
Proposal to Revise the Racial Justice Act, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 543, 552 (1995)
(concluding that the federal racial justice act, which has similar language, would have
barred all sentences in the jurisdiction where the discriminatory pattern is found). If this
were strictly a constitutional adjudication rather than adjudication under the RJA that was
designed to remedy the limitations of such litigation, the failure to be able to show
causation would likely be a significant argument against standing. See Lee & Bhagwat,
supra note 333, at 184-85.
400. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309-10 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("These
death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is
cruel and unusual. [From among] many just as reprehensible as these, the petitioners are
among a capriciously selected random handful upon whom the sentence of death has in
fact been imposed.").
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division, or the State at the time the death sentence was sought or
imposed."'" In North Carolina law, an analogy exists in the treatment
of the prohibition in the North Carolina Constitution regarding
discrimination in jury service. °2 To prevail, defendants need not show
that exclusion affected the prospects in their case; instead, the case is
reversed because the challenged practice damaged the integrity of the
system.
43
401. § 15A-2011(c). Moreover, the statute grants this relief in any one of four
geographic units, using the term "or," which on its face would appear to mean that the
death penalty is invalid if race was a significant factor state-wide even if not in the county
or prosecutorial district where the case was decided. Id.
402. In construing the RJA, courts may find an analogy in State v. Cofield, 320 N.C.
297, 357 S.E.2d 622 (1987), which requires reversal upon a showing of discrimination in
selection of the grand jury foreman without any showing of harm to the defendant. It
stated:
Our state constitutional guarantees against racial discrimination in jury service are
intended to protect values other than the reliability of the outcome of the
proceedings. Central to these protections, as we have already noted, is the
perception of evenhandedness in the administration of justice. [The constitutional
provision] is intended to protect the integrity of the judicial system, not just the
reliability of the conviction obtained in a particular case. The question, therefore,
is not whether discrimination in the foreman selection process affected the
outcome of the grand jury proceedings; rather, the question is whether there was
racial discrimination in the selection of this officer at all.
Id. at 304, 357 S.E.2d at 626.
403. Divorced from even the above-described theoretical justification, those who
opposed the passage of the RJA construed the legislation in their final statements as
having basically exactly this type of broad impact, and assuming statistical proof of
disparate impact was produced at the state-wide level, argued the RJA would effectively
end the death penalty in the state. See, e.g., Statement of Rep. N. Leo Daughtry, House
Floor Debate on Racial Justice Act (July 15, 2009) (transcript on file with the North
Carolina Law Review). Representative Daughtry stated:
It is my opinion, after reading the bill that if you keep that part in the bill that was
put in by the House that was not in it when the Senate went through it that the
State or the State at the time the death sentence was sought or imposed, if you use
the statistics of the state, then those advocate for the death penalty are going to
lose because there is complete evidence of racial discrimination from the state. So,
I don't see any way that this bill will ever allow us to use the death penalty again
until this is straightened out it's simply a way to stop executions. I hope you'll vote
against the bill.
Id.; see also Statement of Sen. Phil Berger, Senate Floor Debate on Racial Justice Act
(Aug. 5, 2009) (transcript on file with the North Carolina Law Review) ("It's just a matter
of the statistics and a matter of making a statistical determination in an area that may not
have or probably has no particular relevance to the particular case at hand.... It will
make it so that imposition of the death penalty in North Carolina probably will not occur
any longer."). But see Statement of Rep. Rick Glazier, House Floor Debate on Racial
Justice Act (July 15, 2009) (transcript on file with the North Carolina Law Review)
(disputing in opposing Rep. Daughtry's argument that invalid statistical evidence would be
used but not the broad application of the RJA, focusing on the requirement of
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The above analysis does not answer all the interpretative
questions posed by this new legislation, but it does resolve many of
the most important ones regarding the basic structure of this burden
shifting statute using statistical evidence. The statute creates a
powerful tool for the examination and elimination of discriminatory
racial motivation whether exercised intentionally and openly or
covertly and unconsciously. Its interpretation in individual cases will
require care and reasoned judgment, but it should be done against a
clear background of legislative intent that courts examine carefully
the prospect that racial discrimination skews death penalty outcomes
and substantially reduces minority jury participation and that any
death sentence be vacated and life imprisonment without parole be
imposed if race has played a significant role in prosecution or jury
decision making or a prosecutor's peremptory challenges.
CONCLUSION
The RJA opens a new chapter in North Carolina's history. Many
factors made its enactment possible,4 °4 including a heightened concern
for innocence inspired by exonerations of death row prisoners in
North Carolina and around the nation,405 a concern that has also
"particularity as to how the evidence supports the claim that race was a significant factor
in the decision to seek or impose the sentence of death"). The RJA was nevertheless
passed in the face of that construction of it by its opponents.
404. The new forces include growing concern among criminal justice experts about the
inherent flaw in the capital punishment system, see Adam Liptak, Shapers of Death
Penalty Give Up on Their Work, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2010, at All (describing decision of
the American Law Institute, which in 1962 created the intellectual framework for the
modern capital justice system of guided discretion to abandon its involvement with the
death penalty and disavow the structure it had created "in light of the current intractable
institutional and structural obstacles to ensuring a minimally adequate system for
administering capital punishment"), and recognition of its excessive financial cost, see
Philip J. Cook, Potential Savings from Abolition of the Death Penalty in North Carolina, 11
AM. L. ECON. REV. 498, 499, 525-26 (2009) (estimating based on 2005 and 2006 fiscal year
data that North Carolina's criminal justice system would have saved almost $11 million per
year if it had abolished the death penalty); Mandy Locke, Study: End Death Cases, Save
Money, NEWS AND OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.) Dec. 28, 2009, at B1 (describing the major
points of the study).
405. One can never firmly know what motivates broad public trends, but the
exoneration of hundreds of defendants, many of whom faced execution, based on DNA
technology strongly appears to have been a major factor in changes in attitudes toward the
death penalty. See generally FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., THE DECLINE OF THE
DEATH PENALTY AND THE DISCOVERY OF INNOCENCE IN AMERICA (2008) (describing
how the stories of exonerations of those on death row through DNA transformed
American attitudes toward the death penalty). In North Carolina, the stories of three
African American defendants-Glenn Chapman, Jonathan Hoffman, and Levon Jones-
whose cases were dismissed outright after fundamental errors were found, served as
powerful symbols. See Shalia Dewan, Releases from Death Row Raise Doubts over Quality
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played an important role in the decline of death penalties in the state
in recent years.4°6 Another factor was quite important. Throughout
the state's history, many politicians, judges, prosecutors, and jurors
have worked sincerely on behalf of all the state's citizens to fairly
dispense justice. Nevertheless, throughout much of the state's history,
African Americans were not involved in making important criminal
justice system decisions. For example, until well into the twentieth
century, almost exclusively white jurors determined death penalty
decisions for victims and defendants of all races, and whether African
Americans have been effectively included in the modern period is
subject to debate. In contrast, African Americans played a major role
in fashioning and enacting the RJA, which mandates that the effects
of race be removed from the death penalty process. Standing behind
Governor Perdue when she signed the RJA into law were leaders of
all races, including prominent members of the state's African
American political and civil rights leadership." 7
of Defense, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2008, at Al. They combine the innocence movement's
concern that innocent defendants have been sentenced to death with the danger that the
defendant's race may have influenced their death sentences.
406. In 2009, only a total of eight cases were tried capitally in the entire state of North
Carolina (Mark Andrews, Hasson Bacote, Myron Britt, Lawrence Flood, John Hester,
Anthony McMillan, Louis Scates, and Michael Sherrill), and only two death sentences
were returned (Bacote and Sherrill). See Memorandum from M.R. Hunter, Ctr. for Death
Penalty Litig., to Professor Robert Mosteller (Mar. 8, 2010) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review); DOC Offenders on Death Row, supra note 34. In 2008, only
twelve cases were tried capitally (James Blue, Charles Dickerson, Kenneth Hartley, Asian
Johnson, James Little, Jonte McLaurin, Eric Oakes, Pliney Purser, John Ross, Neil
Sargeant, James Stitt, and Jakiem Wilson, and one (Little) was sentenced to death.
Memorandum from M.R. Hunter, supra; DOC Offenders on Death Row, supra note 34.
In the first half of 2010, two defendants have been added to North Carolina's death row
(Michael Ryan and Andrew Ramseur). See DOC Offenders on Death Row, supra note 34.
Nationally, only 106 were added to death rows in 2009, the lowest number since the death
penalty was reinstated in 1976. See DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, THE
DEATH PENALTY IN 2009: YEAR END REPORT, DEATH PENALTY, available at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/2009YearEndReport.pdf. Also only fifty-two
individuals were executed in the United States in 2009 and thirty-seven in 2008, down
from a high of ninety-eight executions in 1999. See DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION
CENTER, FACTS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY, available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo
,org/documents/FactSheet.pdf.
407. Two leaders were given special praise for their work to win passage of the RJA at
the ceremony where Governor Perdue signed it into law. One was Rev. William Barber,
President of the North Carolina NAACP and the other was Charmaine Fuller Cooper,
executive director of the nonprofit Carolina Justice Policy Center. See Cash Michaels,
Racist Justice Act Now NC Law, WILMINGTON J., Aug. 23, 2009, at 1. Both Barber and
Cooper are prominent African American leaders in the state. The RJA was co-sponsored
by Senator Floyd McKissick and Representatives Larry Womble, Earline Parmon, Paul
Luebke, and Pricey Harrison. Id. McKissick, Womble, and Parmon are African
Americans. The RJA, for many in the African American community, became a civil rights
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This Article has detailed the strong, pernicious, and persistent
influence of race upon the death penalty in North Carolina from the
state's first execution well into the twentieth century. It has found
that race and the death penalty have been constant companions
throughout history, with racial discrimination exerting a profound
and discriminatory impact on the imposition and disposition of death
sentences. In short, the race of defendants and victims played a
crucial role in determining who died and who did not.
The RJA creates a testing ground to evaluate whether the set of
changes that were in process in the middle and latter part of the
twentieth century, symbolized by the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Furman, broke the link between race and the death
penalty in North Carolina. The legal analysis in Part II.A shows that
post-Furman changes in structure that restricted discretion but
maintained numerous judgment determinations for both the
prosecution and the jury. Nothing about those particular legal
changes necessarily curbed the powerful effect of race, although data
regarding the race of defendants sentenced to death shows some
reduction in the degree of disparity. However, the frequency of
judicial reversals for fundamental failures of justice and grants of
clemency for minority defendants suggests that during trials the
effects of race may override justice. Moreover, jury service
information shows minimal change in African American participation
in many cases, and data on the race of victims of defendants on death
row demonstrates remarkable continuity with earlier eras. Thus, the
answer to the question of the persistence of racial discrimination in
operation of North Carolina's death penalty demands the careful and
sophisticated analysis that the RJA provides.
issue. Id. (noting that the national NAACP organization embraced passage of the North
Carolina Racial Justice Act as one of its concerns).
Those who supported the RJA viewed it as an effort to eliminate inequities in
death sentences, reflecting the desire of multiple groups to provide fairness to all
defendants and victims by ensuring that justice is dispensed without the distorting effect of
race. See, e.g., Statement of Rep. Kelly Alexander, Jr., House Floor Debate on Racial
Justice Act (July 14, 2009) (transcript on file with the North Carolina Law Review) ("This
bill is not about statistics; this bill is about trying to eliminate and end bias in our
system."). Similar arguments about the need for racial fairness if the state is to maintain a
death penalty have been made at earlier times. See supra Part I.B.4 (describing calls for
equal justice by African American newspapers in the 1930s and 1940s). Those who
opposed passage viewed it as badly misguided legislation that threatened the continued
operation of the death penalty. See, e.g., Statement of Rep. Paul Stain, House Floor
Debate on Racial Justice Act (July 14, 2009) (transcript on file with the North Carolina
Law Review) (stating "[t]his bill is really not about race, it's about the death penalty" and
listing some of major flaws in the reasoning of the RJA and its strong negative impact on
the operation of the death penalty in the state).
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North Carolina's willingness to undertake this examination
reflects the state's tradition of self-examination and its citizens'
interest in its fair administration of the death penalty. With the RJA
the legislature has instructed the courts to address directly and openly
the factor that was always somewhere in the process-the potential of
racial prejudice to deny both fairness and justice. While supporters
and opponents of the RJA may never fully resolve their
disagreement,4 °8 the judgment of history regarding the RJA will rest
upon the results of the studies, examination, and litigation conducted
under its authorization. This part of history is yet to be written. It will
not only reveal a great deal about the degree to which race has
influenced the operation of the death penalty in North Carolina in the
past, but will also determine whether the unfairness and injustice
introduced long ago into the state's death penalty system by racial
prejudice is finally at an end.40 9
408. Speaker of the North Carolina House Joe Hackney, a lawyer and supporter of the
RJA, stated, "I've spent my life in courtrooms across North Carolina, and I have seen the
subtle impact of race in our courtrooms." Editorial, NC Racial Justice Act Aims at
Fairness, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Aug. 17, 2009, at 10A. By contrast, Senate Minority
Leader Phil Berger stated, "Make no mistake, this law has little to do with justice and
nothing to do with guilt or innocence." Id.
409. In its editorial supporting passage of the RJA, the Winston-Salem Journal quoted
Matthew Robinson, a criminologist at Appalachian State University, as follows:
The Racial Justice Act won't fix the myriad problems with the administration of
capital punishment in North Carolina. But it would encourage the court system to
tackle questions of bias in these cases and attempt to resolve, once and for all,
whether there is a widespread pattern of bias. Before this state returns to
executions, it should do whatever it can to answer all the questions tied to them.
Editorial, Death Penalty Bias, WINSTON-SALEM J., July 23, 2009, at A12. He sets out both
its challenge and its promise.
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APPENDIX. NORTH CAROLINA RACIAL JUSTICE ACT
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2010.
No person shall be subject to or given a sentence of death or
shall be executed pursuant to any judgment that was sought or
obtained on the basis of race.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2011. Proof of racial discrimination.
(a) A finding that race was the basis of the decision to seek or
impose a death sentence may be established if the court finds that
race was a significant factor in decisions to seek or impose the
sentence of death in the county, the prosecutorial district, the judicial
division, or the State at the time the death sentence was sought or
imposed.
(b) Evidence relevant to establish a finding that race was a
significant factor in decisions to seek or impose the sentence of death
in the county, the prosecutorial district, the judicial division, or the
State at the time the death sentence was sought or imposed may
include statistical evidence or other evidence, including, but not
limited to, sworn testimony of attorneys, prosecutors, law
enforcement officers, jurors, or other members of the criminal justice
system or both, that, irrespective of statutory factors, one or more of
the following applies:
(1) Death sentences were sought or imposed significantly more
frequently upon persons of one race than upon persons of another
race.
(2) Death sentences were sought or imposed significantly more
frequently as punishment for capital offenses against persons of one
race than as punishment of capital offenses against persons of another
race.
(3) Race was a significant factor in decisions to exercise
peremptory challenges during jury selection.
A juror's testimony under this subsection shall be consistent with
Rule 606(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence, as contained in
G.S.8C-1.
(c) The defendant has the burden of proving that race was a
significant factor in decisions to seek or impose the sentence of death
in the county, the prosecutorial district, the judicial division, or the
State at the time the death sentence was sought or imposed. The State
may offer evidence in rebuttal of the claims or evidence of the
defendant, including statistical evidence. The court may consider
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evidence of the impact upon the defendant's trial of any program the
purpose of which is to eliminate race as a factor in seeking or
imposing a sentence of death.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2012. Hearing procedure.
(a) The defendant shall state with particularity how the evidence
supports a claim that race was a significant factor in decisions to seek
or impose the sentence of death in the county, the prosecutorial
district, the judicial division, or the State at the time the death
sentence was sought or imposed.
(1) The claim shall be raised by the defendant at the pretrial
conference required by Rule 24 of the General Rules of Practice for
the Superior and District Courts or in postconviction proceedings
pursuant to Article 89 of Chapter 15A of the General Statutes.
(2) The court shall schedule a hearing on the claim and shall
prescribe a time for the submission of evidence by both parties.
(3) If the court finds that race was a significant factor in
decisions to seek or impose the sentence of death in the county, the
prosecutorial district, the judicial division, or the State at the time the
death sentence was sought or imposed, the court shall order that a
death sentence not be sought, or that the death sentence imposed by
the judgment shall be vacated and the defendant resentenced to life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
(b) Notwithstanding any other provision or time limitation
contained in Article 89 of Chapter 15A of the General Statutes, a
defendant may seek relief from the defendant's death sentence upon
the ground that racial considerations played a significant part in the
decision to seek or impose a death sentence by filing a motion seeking
relief.
(c) Except as specifically stated in subsections (a) and (b) of this
section, the procedures and hearing on the motion seeking relief from
a death sentence upon the ground that race was a significant factor in
decisions to seek or impose the sentence of death in the county, the
prosecutorial district, the judicial division, or the State at the time the
death sentence was sought or imposed shall follow and comply with
G.S.15A-14 20, 15A-1421, and 15A-1422.
Section 2 of Session Law 2009-464.
This act is effective when it becomes law [August 11, 2009] and
applies retroactively. For persons under a death sentence imposed
before the effective date of this act, motions under this act shall be
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filled within one year of the effective date of this act; for persons
whose death sentence is imposed on or after the effective date of this
act, motions shall be filled as provided in this act.
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